GOSPEL AND GOVERNMENT

BEVAN

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN STATE

BY

WILSON LLOYD BEVAN
SOMETIME FELLOW OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH

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PREFACE

The Gospel contains no prescriptions as to Government, therefore the title of this work might be considered misleading. It is not a mere paradox. All that it is intended to suggest is that the people who have accepted the Gospel have also developed a type of government which, because those who have created it adhere to the tenets of Christianity, may be called with at least historical justification a Christian government.

The Christian world has adopted democracy and constitutional rule as the highest ideals of government. Why is it that under Islam, Buddism, and other great religions no advance was made in the conception or practice of government? To answer this query requires an explanation, and the most satisfactory explanation is given by history. Christian doctrines, theories and ethics might be taken as a starting point, and they could be shown to result in the kind of individual and social life that the world to-day is striving to obtain. A more convincing, and a more instructive method, is to abide by the witness of history, and show in historical events and movements the origins and the causes that have made the modern Christian State. People in all civilized nationalities are con-

vinced that their social obligations can be best attained through a certain kind of government. This government must be democratic and representative; its people must have freedom and education: they must practice religious liberty and toleration; they must care for the interests of the less fortunate members of society; these convictions are the product of a long and hard struggle which began in the early days of the Christian Church. They are largely the outgrowth of the persistent effort made by Christians to provide a government for their Church, and to resist the effort of a tyrannical State system, to crush their liberty. The traditions of Roman absolute rule remain strong in the crude society of the Middle Ages. Only through the training received in cultivating self-help and in resisting the excesses of a centralized and autocratic Church system was it possible for the foundations of a modern society to be securely laid. The religious revolt of the sixteenth century gave momentum to the progress of freedom and toleration, and to-day the world is witnessing a movement which gives a heightened value to the ethical and religious aims of State life.

October, 1914. W. L. B.

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CHAPTER I

Attitude of the Early Church Towards the State. The Persecutions.

Unlike the Old Testament the earliest Christian records collected in the New Testament canon give no definite directions on the subject of the political ideals of a regenerated humanity. It is plain that the Old Testament writers approved of a monarchy modified by a clerical oligarchy. This arrangement does not represent the so-called Mosaic code, but it is a fair description of the kind of government that met with the approval of the Jewish people during the longest period of their historical existence. Although they lost their liberty they never lost their attachment to clericalism and it is fair to say in the time of Jesus that the Jews looked forward to the establishment of an oligarchy composed of a king and a council of clerical advisers strong enough to lead him.

Some explanation is needed as to why the Christian Church did not take over this simple governmental ideal. In the first place, we must look at the attitude of Jesus himself. He was antagonistic to the Jewish clerical oligarchy. He directed his disciples to accept entirely different rules of conduct from those followed by the Scribes and Pharisees. From the scanty sources that have come down to us there are indications that he did not altogether share the popular impression that the Messianic Kingdom was an event near at hand, to be ushered in by some catastrophic occurrences. Certain words of his seem to indicate that he looked forward to a kind of corporate existence of more than a temporary character obtaining among his followers. He told them clearly, for example, that they were not to be guided by the maxims of secular rulers. Even more important are his precise words in reference to the legitimacy of Roman rule in the celebrated dictum where he distinguished the two powers in their origin and their separate spheres. Even more noteworthy because of the acknowledged early date of the Crucifixion narrative is the attitude of Jesus when he faced the Roman governor. On all questions relating

to the legitimacy of imperial control over Palestine pious Jews were obdurate, not to say fanatical. It is not possible to find traces of this fanaticism in the speech or behavior of Jesus at his trial before the weak-kneed and mealy-mouthed Pontius Pilate. There was unsparing criticism and drastic action in the Temple; in the Pretorium, the jurisdiction of a venal administration was, one might say, courteously respected and acknowledged. In other words, the dictum of the separation of the two spheres made plain in the answer as to the tribute money became a guide of conduct.

This lesson was not lost on the early Christian community; it remained anti-clerical, *i.e.*, it kept up its opposition to the Jewish religious oligarchy and remained on good terms for some time with the civil authorities. St. Luke in the Acts is naïvely considerate to the Roman power wherever its officials or its regulations are mentioned. St. Paul is markedly concerned to support the existing government; his Epistles contain definite directions as to good citizenship, while he tacitly discourages anything like revolt from the constituted authorities of the State. St. John's bitterest words are directed against

the Jews; he is not concerned with the secular power, although his references to the world, as contrasted with God's Kingdom, show that he did not share the optimistic view of the civil government held by St. Paul. Notable disappointment because of the unfriendliness of the Roman government is to be seen in the Catholic epistles which bear the name of St. Peter.

But the climax of antagonism is reached in the Apocalypse, which revives the traditional hatred of the Jews for the imperial government of Rome. It must be acknowledged that older pre-Christian documents are worked up in the text of the Apocalypse, but it is obvious that the author sympathized with the pre-Jewish point of view of his material and contributed vivid images and burning words to emphasize his detestation of the Roman world and all it stood for. He had no hope of seeing persecution stop. It was but the logical outcome of the past misdeeds of a grinding despotism. In the Epistle to the Hebrews there is preserved a document which bears the impress of Alexandrian culture. It is in no way fanatical, but it gives clear indication of an age where persecution was expected as the normal Christian expe-

rience. "Our citizenship is in heaven" is the refrain of its encouraging message, delivered to a community which still looked for a proximate coming of the Lord.

On the whole, then, it can be fairly said that the New Testament writings, while they are different in many details, are at one in recommending a passive rather than an active attitude in all matters affecting government. High ideals of conduct are proclaimed as necessary for the follower of Christ, but there is no question of organizing a Christian commonwealth, no prescriptions from which Christian standards of government could be directly deduced. If this negative result is surprising, it is only necessary to notice how in this respect the teaching of the New Testament exactly coincides with other types of moral teaching of the same period. Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, all write as if a high degree of ethical character could be attained irrespective of governmental forms.

Marcus Aurelius, a man placed at the apex of the imperial system, severely conscientious as he was, took no steps to alter an autocratic method of rule. Individual moralists believed in the perfectibility of man and, of course,

they looked for a better social order, but they took no interest, as Plato had done, in working out the details of a model State. When one wonders, therefore, why Christianity practised an aloofness which, from the modern standpoint, seems artificial, the explanation is that it accepted the existing social and political order and in so doing it conformed to the ethical traditions of the society in which it originated. When the early apologists protested against the persecuting policy of the Empire, they asked to be treated fairly according to the common principles of justice. They did not prepare programmes of a new form of government less exposed to the exercise of tyrannical interference with private rights than a centralized autocracy and bureaucracy.

In the centuries that have passed since the age of the Primitive Church, forces have been set in motion that have produced the Christian State, which in itself is an entity as recognizable as the Christian Church, although in the nineteenth and present centuries it would not be easy to express its characteristics in a few short formulas. Some of this difficulty arises, let us remember, from the fact that the divided Christian

Church does less and has less to do than a united Christian State. It is always easy to describe an organism whose activities are limited.

Now, it is this change from a Christianity which took refuge in segregating itself from its political and social environment to a Christianity which measures its efficiency by its activity in the largest spheres of national and international interests that requires some explanation. Here there is no abstract question of political theory, for the difference is one of character, of achievement, as well as of vision and ideal. It requires really no proof when one thinks of the heroes and statesmen of modern Christendom, men who embody this aggressive idealism—as Washington, Lincoln and Gladstone—and in contrast sum up the records of the great men of the Primitive Church, its saints and martyrs, whose lives illustrate the nobility, but also what must be called the insularity of a faith which had not yet become conscious of the breadth of its endowment.

The Christian State has come into being through increments great and small, by a convergence of many influences. What has been gained by struggle, by experiment, is

not likely to be cast aside as profitless, though there are not wanting writers to-day who urge that the time has again come when the Church must protect its integrity by returning to the policy of segregation by which the spheres of the secular and religious were scrupulously differentiated. It seems to me inconceivable, however, that such an attitude of aloofness can ever be anything but an artificial product. There is the testimony of modern missions to prove how the energy of a newly received progressive religion works without a conscious effort to direct it outside the individual sphere. Let the most subjective type of Christianity be brought to a people at a low stage of culture, and spontaneously, as it were, traits marking this low stage of culture even if not condemned by Christian ethics tend to disappear. A Christian tribe of converted natives of Polynesia or Africa cannot maintain their tribal habits and outlook. Their communal life is transformed, even if efforts are made to preserve the attractive simplicity of old traditions which seem in no way inconsistent with a new type of religious belief.

Slowly, unconsciously, even suspiciously, the early Christian community, with formal

direction, guided by no clear maxims from the literature it produced, broke asunder the restrictions, partly self-imposed and partly belonging to the society in which it was placed, and inaugurated the first stage in the development of the Christian State. At the time when these early followers of Christ were asking for the right to worship God after their own manner, and when they regarded themselves as the passive victims of a crude, unfeeling exercise of civil repression, they would have been the last ones to suspect that they were really the leaders of a movement far more dangerous to the stability of the Roman world than the dreaded barbarian hordes encircling its frontiers. They asked only for toleration; they wanted no government support; they did not aim at securing social influence.

To be left in peace with the opportunity of drawing to their own fold men and women of good will in every station in life and in all quarters of the Roman world was a demand simple in itself, which could not be construed as a threat to existing society, yet from this simple demand has devolved by traceable steps the democratic movement of the nineteenth century, which in all its aspects is a

direct negation of the absolutism of the Roman world. Democratic government represents the aspirations of modern Christianity; between these aspirations and the power generated by the thought and actions of the early Christian Church there is a real connection—though the links which unite the age in which we live to-day and the age in which the disciples of Jesus began to question the power of the State to control their beliefs are numerous and of varying degrees of solidity.

All that is attempted in this short volume is to present some of the decisive factors in this movement. There are certain critical periods; by understanding the results of these times of crisis it is possible to reach a clearer view of the significance of Christianity as a controlling social force which it is impossible to exhaust or to limit by equating it with any one Christian organization, or even with the sum total of all as they appear to-day under the disguise of sectarianism. Yet even sectarianism by establishing a kind of competitive struggle seems to be a replica in the religious sphere of the *laissez-faire* doctrine and practice of the economic world. It has evoked new powers and energies so

wide in their scope that just as modern capitalism has overshadowed in the field of production the mediæval guild, so competition among religious bodies has created a kind of intensive activity probably never so widely diffused among masses of individuals in other ages of Christian history.

Both in economics and religion the real crux to-day is distribution. The slum quarter is the great problem for the churches as it is for the social worker. The hopeful outlook for the future comes from the encouragement due to the past. From a situation once viewed as hopeless except as a field of discipline in preparation for a world where material goods could be counted as zero has originated a collective experience bent on making man's human life better circumstanced, more worthy of the divine element cherished and nurtured in a nature closely allied in so many ways with the animal world.

It is this collective experience which has created the conviction that government can be made the instrument of betterment. Wherever these aims are inspired by the teaching of Christ and illuminated by the deeds and thoughts of Christian men and women it is in no artificial sense that one can

use to-day the phrases Christian State or Christian civilization. There is no taint of partisanship in such a usage, for no one who is coming closer to the ideal of humanity can be excluded. In giving an outline of the critical periods of the progressive movement continuing from the first age of the Church, deeds rather than ideas must be considered. No one would question the value of the political theories of great Christian teachers and writers. But the limitations imposed by a volume of this kind make it necessary, if the argument is to be effective, to confine one's self to action, or at any rate to interpret theory in the light of action rather than vice versa.

As I have already intimated, it appears as if the opposition of the nascent Church to the autocratic principles of the Roman Empire led to the vision of a new order of society which was to be guided in a large sense by the principles held in solution by the original Christian community, scattered as it was in small groups throughout the Roman world, and so loosely bound together that one can hardly dare use the word "federation" to describe their relationship in political terminology. Assuming the amicable relations

as lasting indefinitely between the early Christian communities and the civil authorities, as St. Paul evidently conceded would be the case (provided the Jews did not interfere by their intrigues and hostility), the various local churches as founded by him and by other apostolic teachers might have attained the comfortable quasi-authoritative position secured by the Jewish synagogues of the Dispersion in the numerous Hebrew colonies found in all the large cities of the Empire.

There is a decided mystical element in St. Paul's dialectic, even where he refers to the most practical matters; this must be taken into account wherever he deals with the future expansion of the Church. He had hopes of the reconciliation of his own race to the acceptance of the Messiahship of Jesus and he looked forward with passionate longing to the return of the Risen Lord—certainly the last event he connected with the proclamation of the Gospel in various parts of the Roman world. I cannot discover from his language the majestic programme of conversion detected by Sir William Ramsay. Scattered groups of new believers, of enthusiastic followers, a model to outsiders by their exalted ethical standards, would

constitute the kind of vision suggested by St. Paul's own experience and traditions. It seems altogether unlikely that the cosmopolitan enthusiasm for Roman rule found in Virgil and Horace could have become a portion of St. Paul's nature simply as a result of his conversion. I think, of course, he had a cosmology; no one could read his later epistles without allowing that, but I cannot see that his cosmology can bear a political interpretation.

The first communities of Christians did realize the vision of the type of expansion above indicated; they scattered in groups throughout the Roman provinces exactly as St. Paul had hoped; sometimes, as we see from Pliny's letters, they must have attracted converts to a degree without parallel in the records of Jewish synagogue propaganda among the adherents of polytheism. But peaceful relations with the secular authorities were not maintained. In this respect the Christian Church differed entirely from the Jewish synagogue. Why Christians merited or were thought to merit this treatment requires close examination. The amount of literature on the subject and the divergent views of scholars as to the details, their

importance and their connections show that the answer cannot be made with off-hand assurance.

Society at the time the Christian Church originated was in no sense anti-religious. All kinds of religions flourished in the Roman Empire without exciting the hostility of the civil authorities. As long as religious affiliations did not come into conflict with the tenets of an autocratic system of government no sort of religious teaching had anything to fear. There was a system of political dogma, however, which every religion had to recognize if it hoped to become a permitted religion in the terms of Roman law. The reason why the Christian religion could not accept this position of benevolent tutelage requires explanation. If the Jewish synagogue was able to live in peace, how did it happen that the Christian Church became the object not only of violent dislike, which was everywhere expressed against the Jews, but also of direct legal enactments specially directed to repress Christian propaganda?

The Jews were a race detested and unpopular, it is true, but racial peculiarities were treated tenderly by the Roman authorities unless political factors were involved.

For example, we know that the Druids in Gaul were objects of suspicion largely because they were regarded as the fomenters of Celtic Nationalist movements. After the Jewish nationalism had been ruthlessly suppressed in Judea, imperial Rome cared little for the eccentricities of Jewish faith and so far as we know indulgently allowed the Jews to gather about them in their synagogues groups of affiliated Gentile sympathizers. The only way the Jews could interfere with the government was to attempt an uprising in Syria with a view to re-establish their national kingdom. Nothing they could do elsewhere could interfere with the political system of Rome, for in their own minds they only looked forward to the foundation of a renewed earthly kingdom, located in a petty, unimportant corner of the world.

The growth of Christian communities hurt the economic status of classes who were connected with the service of the temples, as we see in the account of the riot at Ephesus in the Acts. It was not a racial religion, and its language as to the coming of the Kingdom of God was easily in popular rumor susceptible of the charge that some anti-governmental revolutionary scheme was being planned.

The racial excuse for isolated treatment being absent, it was hard to explain why Christians refused to accede homage to the emperor's statue, the outward symbol of reverence on ceremonial occasions, as to a divine being. Many of the Christians were Roman citizens and it was a suspicious circumstance that this open ritual acknowledgment of the obligations of citizenship was withheld.

Such an attitude of recalcitrancy was punished by severe penalties according to the Roman criminal code, sometimes by loss of life or freedom or the rights of citizenship. Individuals were not alone guilty of refusing to share in the common act of civil worship—a conduct called, as a term of reproach, atheism; they aggravated the offense by persuading others to imitate them. In handling such cases much elasticity was customary; there was no regular form of procedure prescribed, neither were the penalties definitely defined. Much was left to the discretion of the magistrate; he might easily be swayed by his own prejudices or might bend to a passing wave of fanaticism in the community where the offense was committed.

As the Church grew in power its influence came to be more dreaded because its critical

attitude towards the treatment it received might, as was suspected, start in motion some local anti-revolutionary movement. The Roman Empire had no armies at all approaching in numbers the size of a great power of to-day, yet its territories were of vast extent, even judged by modern standards. Its safety depended on internal peace; external foes could be dealt with by its armed forces on the frontiers in three continents. It is plain why the Christian apologists are so careful to emphasize the absence from the Christian ideal of every aim to upset the existing government.

Although these pleas may have been regarded popularly as disingenuous, it is known as a matter of fact that in the second century uncertainty prevailed as to the exact status of Christians as subjects of criminal prosecution. A conscientious governor, Pliny, in asking his friend and superior, the Emperor Trajan (98-117), for instructions, inquired whether Christians should, in his jurisdiction, Bithynia, be treated as ordinary criminals and, therefore, were to be hunted down, and whether they were to be prosecuted as guilty of crime when they abandoned their faith; *i.e.*, when they consented to take part

in the act of religious worship to the emperor. Trajan's reply was that the adoption of the name of Christian was to be regarded as equivalent to the refusal to accord to the emperor the required worship, but that Christians should not be sought out as "*de facto*" guilty individuals. Those who abjured Christianity were to be pardoned.

Trajan's rule, inconsequent as it was, came to be accepted as a model to be followed by his successors, though his immediate successor, Hadrian, ruled that charges against Christians without specifying the crime were not to be entertained, to which just enactment was added as a corollary the direction that informers responsible for false charges were to be punished. Violent persecutions occurred during the course of the second century; the infliction of the death penalty became normal for the higher classes, the lower were deported. Charges brought by informers were encouraged. As these measures failed to produce the expected result, the extreme penalty was extended, especially to those who, on secret information, were charged with having become converts. Oftentimes the Acts of the martyrs prove that the prisoners were tortured in an attempt to secure obedience.

Either general charges of treason were made, or the method of bringing the Christian before the court was to show evidence that sacrifice or incense had not been offered before the statue of the emperor. All sorts of barbarous penalties were inflicted, burning, crucifixion, exposure to wild animals, isolation on small islands or deportation to the mines.

As the church organization became better known and understood its officers were singled out for persecution, evidently with the hope that by so doing its strength as an association itself might be weakened. Persecution, which had hitherto been localized, now was carried out universally by the whole machinery of the State. The most notable example of this systematized persecution took place under the Emperor Diocletian at the beginning of the fourth century, when church buildings and burying places were destroyed, sacred books searched out, as well as individuals subjected to the penalties before enumerated. With the rigor of the law so unmistakably defined the wonder is that there were long periods in which toleration was tacitly practised. It must be remembered that under an autocracy, just as

much, or even more than in a democracy, the executive power can see that a law is practically not enforced.

Local feeling, too, must often have prevented persecution, just as we see in so many cases local feeling caused the legal machinery to be set in motion against the Christians. Numerous as the victims were there is no evidence that the Roman State had the same interest in repressing a religious movement as in putting down mutinous legions or in breaking the power of some imperial usurper. The work was unfamiliar; in any case it was clumsily managed when contrasted with the almost scientific accuracy of the Spanish Inquisition. Even under the most formidable attempt to destroy the Church, the persecution of Diocletian, it is a well-known fact that the engine of destruction hardly moved at all in the western part of the empire, where Diocletian's colleague, Constantius, did not hesitate to allow his Christian sympathies to frustrate the plans of his superior.

It is not at all necessary to infer that the policy of suppression failed because the Christians were so numerous, or that they were in any way organized to resist the civil authorities. Moral grounds, in other words,

respect for the principles of justice and scruples against inflicting suffering on a large scale, undoubtedly contributed to paralyze the attempt to shatter the Christian Church. After all, the Roman government represented in a rough and imperfect way the standards of a civilized government; its rulers were not built after the model of Genghis Khan, Timur, or Abdul Hamid.

Moral force constituted the strength of the appeal made to the outside world by the Church of these earliest ages; the very fact that this appeal was responded to is enough to suggest that public opinion was in no way prepared to force the Roman government to make its anti-Christian legislation effective. The way in which the persecution varied from place to place, with periods of intensity, after long intervals of practical toleration, shows that the local authorities who administered the laws of repression were oftentimes controlled by the attitude of the community itself towards the adherents of the new religion.

Provocative acts also could not have been infrequent, *i.e.*, the assurance that a public witness to the faith, with a steadfast endurance of the extreme penalty, secured *ipso*

facto the winning of future blessedness, was not without its allurements. Indeed the mania for martyrdom had to be reproved by the official teachers of the Church. Nothing speaks so much for the sporadic and fitful nature of persecution under government control as the fact that movements within the Church attracting, as Montanism did, fanatical partisans, appeared to have continued their course without interference, though it is pretty certain that the teachers of this doctrine must have deeply stirred the communities of more than one region in the eastern provinces of the empire. Among Roman officials there were probably many more Gallios than Torquemadas.

In the face of these experiences the Christians, hardly as they were treated, had no thought of suggesting a type of government under which their life might have been made more endurable. They were provincials of a firmly established empire; in civil government the possibility of any other type of rule never occurred to them. Even bitter critics of paganism in all its forms, such as were Tertullian and Tatian, did not construct Utopias; they were satisfied with the empire as a form of government, though they loathed

the kind of administration which tolerated persecuting officials and connived at mob violence. Modern journalism might claim the great African writer as a kindred spirit in the use of strong language of superlative bitterness. Yet Tertullian was a conservative, though sometimes he does speak of the Roman State as if it were virtually arrayed as a separated power against a community altogether isolated from it, the Church. There was a group of republican litterateurs in Rome who, holding the imperial system in contempt as a sign of degeneration, contrasted the new with the old in terms which leave no doubt as to the kind of government they preferred. No such explicitness is to be found in the Christian writers of the two centuries and a half during which the Church was persecuted.

Consciously the Christians were imperialists; opportunism alone would have suggested no other course. The apologists are persistent, sometimes fatiguing, in the way they protest their loyalty to the State. But after all it was a new, inexplicable kind of loyalty they supported; they knew they were not criminals, for they were strict upholders of the ethical code. Yet they were opposed to

the State in a way which brought upon them the charge of treason.

Under the conditions of the ancient world such recalcitrance usually ended in the formation of a group intended to overthrow by force those who opposed them. A united opposition to the way a government is administered rather than to the form of the government itself was a distinct contribution to political thought. Through this product of the age of persecution a real and enduring service was contributed by an organization which had no thought of contributing anything to society except the direct preaching of an austere moral code associated with doctrines of a transcendent and mysterious character.

There were other religious systems current in the Roman world as antagonistic theologically to the traditional polytheism of the official type, and even more saturated with esoteric and mysterious elements than Christianity, yet their adherents lived at peace with the government. They could perform the ceremonial acts of public worship; the Christians could not and would not. It was the ethical convictions of Christians and nothing else which kept them from making a

compromise so facilely accepted by others, who no more than they were satisfied with the paltry fragments of a dying polytheism.

Even the Roman State, which followed what might be called a policy of enlightened self-interest wherever religion was concerned, hesitated to be consistent and held its hand when it came to the question of annihilating those of its citizens who accepted the teaching of Jesus. That the efforts at persecution were fitful, inconsequent and anything but systematic, except for a short period during the reign of the unbending patriot, Diocletian, is a proof of the irresistible power of that moral law which in the last resort rules the conscience of mankind.

Summing up, it is plain then that the early Church originated no system of civil government; all that they wanted was for the government they knew and reverenced to be just and honest. They had a keen if not technically developed sense of what was and what was not a crime, and they knew that in their refusal to give divine honors to the emperor they were not placing themselves on the level of ordinary criminals. The populace who were stirred by their opposition must have known so too, for they eagerly grasped

at charges of atheism and gross immorality when an occasion arose to exhibit their hatred. Here the Church's enemies were at one with its members; both sides realized that the dispute over an act of ceremonial worship could not justify treatment only suited for outlaws from society.

In these three centuries the Christian community had worked out a theory and practice of passive resistance, but no governmental programme can be built on such a basis. Passive resistance can be directed against any kind of government. Socrates had been condemned by a radical democracy. The Roman Republic, in its old-fashioned aristocratic days, had moved vigorously against the introduction of new religions from the Orient. The treatment meted out to the Christians might have been inflicted upon them by any type of government ranging from the organization of a tribe to the complicated civil structure under the control of a Roman emperor.

CHAPTER II

The Development of Government Within the Church. The Episcopate. The Roman Primacy.

On the side of constructive effort, in questions of State organizations, as we have seen, there is nothing to learn from the early Christian Church. But though they held aloof from public life they could not escape from the influence of the environment in which they lived. As soon as they had a literature and an art it was seen that they stood on common grounds with the ordinary standards of taste of their own day. No attempt was made to copy Semitic or Palestinian style of expression; when the patristic writers engaged in composition they followed the models taken from pagan authors. When the Gospel was preached it was the lecture room of the sophist or the rhetorician that supplied the framework of the argument; not

the imagery of Hebrew prophets or the parables of Christ. Christian literary style was as unoriginal as the words in which it was made up. The literature of the early Church is oftentimes painfully commonplace simply because it is imitative. It may be said to have no form apart from the conventional form common to the thoroughly second-rate productions of the later imperial period; second-rate, that is, in contrast to the great writers of the older days in both Greek and Latin literature. These well-known facts of literary criticism are only cited to introduce some converging lines of proof when the organization of the early Church itself comes under review.

Aloofness from the concerns of civil government in no way means that the Christians were anarchists when they had to consider the actual needs of their own communities and provide for efficiency in their propaganda. The government of the Church came into being at a time when the civil government had begun to assume an openly declared hostility. The sense of order is apparent in St. Paul's Epistles, but they reveal no experience in organization. How could a Jew, who belonged to a people whose political

autonomy had been lost for centuries, show the acumen of a Greek or Roman, who knew the meaning of the body politic in its various historical forms? Political sense the Jews lacked because they had had, properly speaking, no political experience; they were the victims of an arrested political development; they were far separated in point of time from a past in which their petty kingdom existed, ruled over in a most primitive fashion by tribal leaders—inconspicuous kings.

The uncertainties and inconsistencies of the Church order prevailing in the Apostolic Church are explicable when one takes into account that the work of conversion was in the hands of Jews. Any organization of the kind that was adopted wherever the Greeks or Romans gathered in groups could hardly have been considered. The Jews knew no city states; they had not founded colonies nor set up provincial administrations; there was no experience from which the early apostles could draw except the experience of the synagogue or the group life of some Jewish quarter in a Gentile community. This was a slender equipment to depend upon when it became necessary to construct some simple type of administration for the new religious

communities. Racial distinctions could not be followed as in the case of the Jews, who were glad to accept a local segregation under which they could derive the mutual comfort of association with their own kinsfolk.

The personal authority of the apostle, with no attempt to formulate rights or powers or to discriminate spheres of activity, was the controlling power in the primitive communities. If we knew more of the kind of organization usual in the synagogues, where there were many Gentile converts to Judaism, it might be possible to understand better the organization of the Christian Church. Contrasted with the size of the community and its necessarily restricted field of operation there appears to have been a strangely large number of officials with overlapping functions. Yet, too, there seemed, as in the case of Corinth, to be a state of liberty and individualism which leaves one in doubt as to the functions of the officials in the community.

From St. Paul's directions to his converts, so minute are they in many details, one would infer that most of what is to-day thought of as belonging to church government was solved by appeals to personal loyalty rather than by local machinery. No one person

addressed, nor any particular group of persons presumably invested with particular powers, is held accountable for doing any one specific thing. One gathers that the predominant restraining influence was the personal appeal of the apostle who was related, by patriarchal ties, to the community founded by him. Nothing was defined or codified; in enforcing directions arguments were used, not rules imposed. Of course, there were certain exceptions, as in the case of the man mentioned by St. Paul as guilty of gross immorality. We do not know whether the power to sever the connection of such a member with the community was in the hands of its local officers or not.

When one reads the Pastoral Epistles one feels the presence there of a certain stiffening up of the bonds of authority, though there is not a great deal of direct evidence as to the distribution of official power or the way it was exercised. The letter of St. Clement of Rome contains arguments for orderly restraint of a schismatic movement supported by references to the system of the Jewish commonwealth. But the analogies are obviously of a rhetorical nature; in other words, they are used to enforce respect for authority,

but no information is given exactly as to the way the authority was to be exercised. It would be absurd to suppose that the Church in Corinth could have modelled its government after the precedents of the Mosaic law.

To those who are eager to construct by hypotheses based on the slender amount of fact afforded by the early literature of the Church theories as to the hierarchical system followed in those days, it might well be urged that they are probably gratifying pure speculations far removed from the actual experiences of the early community. There was probably no strong government, no dignified sovereignty, no divisions of powers, no certainly fixed spheres of action, all of which things were the outgrowth of problems and points of view not familiar to the first age of Christianity.

As I have indicated, due allowance must be made for the Semitic temperament of the leaders of the Church at this period, who were not even conscious of the inconsistencies that to us to-day seem so plain when we think of an ordered ecclesiastical government. Each community was in itself a visible embodiment of God's Kingdom under the mystical headship of the ascended Saviour. This

was the link which bound together all the scattered Christian communities. No further analysis was deemed necessary because, to the intense faith of the apostolic age, this theory was an ultimate reality. An analysis of the relations of superiority and subordination in the Christian society might well have seemed an act of disloyalty to him whose near coming was looked to as an almost present fact. So paramount to the Christian mind was the appearance of the Lord and Master that it might well be considered a concession to purely secular and temporary conditions if the confusing and ill-ordered status originating from the immediate followers of Christ should be tampered with simply with a view to attain the kind of perfection in matters of rule that could only show connection with the logical processes of thought belonging to the Gentile world.

It may well have been the bitter hostility of the Jews to the new communities that first forced a development in itself distasteful and alien. As time elapsed, outside certain isolated regions, such as Palestine, the Jewish element in the Church came to be overshadowed by converts of different training and

traditions. Though the eastern provinces of the empire, where the first notable expansion of the Church took place, had been long conquered by the power of Rome, there prevailed in these towns an autonomy, a kind of Home Rule which had been allowed by the conquering Romans to exist. In a way the ancient traditions of the Greek city state were still kept up under an autocratic system of centralization. What was more natural than that the Gentiles, who had accepted the Christian name, should bring with them into the new community the lessons of their experience in civic affairs? With all the reverence for the Old Testament inculcated in them by their instructors of Semitic origin the Gentile communities were intelligent enough to see that in matters of organization the Golden Age of Judaism had little to teach them.

As contrasted with the chaos of titles and functions contained in St. Paul's Epistles, the letters of St. Ignatius show that in the fifty years after the death of the Apostle to the Gentiles a process of simplification, not to say elimination, had taken place. The Gentile element had by natural circumstances come to predominate; the language of St. John's Gospel alone shows that in the latest written

account of the ministry of Jesus hostility on the part of the Jews was the overshadowing question. The whole tenor of this Gospel suggests a Christian community throwing off Jewish influence and striving to counteract the effect of Jewish propaganda. The traditional locality associated with the writing of St. John is Asia Minor, and it is no mere accident that in just the same centre comes the emergence as an historical fact of the monarchical episcopate.

It may be that the strange lateness of a definitely co-ordinated monarchical episcopate at Rome may have some connection with the predominance in the capital of the empire of the Jewish element in the Church, long after in other places the Gentiles had definitely taken over the leadership. There is an altogether different point of view in the letter of St. Clement of Rome from that presented by the epistles of St. Ignatius. Yet the actual separation in time was inconsiderable—a question of fifteen or twenty years. St. Clement, representing a church where Jews probably predominated, writes under Hebraic presuppositions unknown to St. Ignatius. It takes subtle argumentation to prove that episcopacy in the later sense was established

in the community in whose name St. Clement writes; in the case of the Ignatian documents argumentation equally subtle is needed to prove that it does not exist.

In fact, from every letter composed by St. Ignatius, the monarchical episcopate *"saute aux yeux."* The rough-hewn temporary scheme of church government, the natural product of the apostolic founders, to whom not only the axioms of political theory were foreign, but whose very training and tradition made them obtuse to the facts of political life, was being subjected to a process of filing down and grinding away of excrescences demanded by converts of a more practical type of intelligence. No more recondite grounds may be looked for when one seeks to discover the why and the wherefore of the monarchical episcopate. Of course, bishops were not created by the men of the age in which St. Ignatius and St. Polycarp lived—they are of apostolic origin. But the status of a bishop is one thing; his functions are another.

There is no doubt that the statement in the Ordinal of the Book of Common Prayer: "It is evident unto all men diligently reading the Holy Scripture and ancient authors that from the Apostles' time there have been these or-

ders of ministers in Christ's Church: Bishops, Priests and Deacons," is historically accurate. What later research has accomplished is to show how the sphere of the bishops' activity has expanded, as the result of changing conditions and circumstances.

Things moved rapidly in the early age of the Church; conservatism had not yet come to be a part of religious life. The order of the apostolic age passed away without break or sign of discontinuity into a more co-ordinated system, with new problems and new ways of meeting them. When the years had passed, leaving no one behind who had been on actual terms of personal intercourse with those who had been eye-witnesses of the individual deeds and sayings of the ministry of Jesus, the enthusiastic expectation of a near return of the Lord was not such a present factor as it had been. As we see from the writings of St. Ignatius, teaching, warning against incorrect presentations of the faith, organization, were uppermost in the minds of those who were placed in positions of leadership.

Scanty as are the records, no one can fail to note the changed orientation. There was very little that St. Paul wrote that could be

understood by men and women neither directly trained in a Jewish environment nor exposed to Jewish influence for a long term of years. St. Luke obviously did not write for this class, who rejoiced in the word-play of rabbinical dialectic, but then he composed his Gospel and his Book of Acts for a friendly Gentile inquirer. The letters of St. Ignatius are for a community that only knows Judaism as an enemy. It was a Gentile community, to whom probably Hebrew dialectic would have been incomprehensible, but also it may be fairly said that the clear-cut references to an ordered government in the letters of St. Ignatius would have been regarded as naïve unessentials by those who appreciated the Epistle to the Romans.

Remembering how fragile all hypotheses are, where the earliest age of the Church is concerned they have almost the evanescence of soap bubbles; therefore, the suggestions made hitherto must be regarded as merely tentative. But they are not much worse in this respect than many of the traditional affirmations regarding the government of the early Church, which so often represent a reading back into an earlier century the resultant of convictions and

institutions which most certainly originated at a later period. The facts are so few and the field of interpretation is practically unlimited. I do not know anywhere a more clear and satisfactory account of the origin of the episcopate than that lately given by Mr. C. H. Turner of Oxford in the first volume of the "Cambridge Mediæval History." This work is written for the general public and no one need be terrorized by the fear of a technical discussion when a reference to this particular contribution of an accredited and most acccurate Anglican historical scholar is advised as something less difficult than a "counsel of perfection" to those who wish to form their own opinion on a most vexed question.

What has been written in the last few pages is only an attempt to explain the environment of the changes in the Church which elevated an obscure official of the apostolic church into the leader of the Christian community of the second century. The old figure of the Platonic cave, in which the dwellers in its darkened atmosphere take for reality the moving shadows penetrating within from the outside light, is most appropriate to appeal to in valuing the speculations of the

critic who, in trying to reconstruct exactly what happened in early days of Church history, has undertaken a task far more hazardous than the reconstruction worked out by the scientist of some extinct animal from a fossil fragment. Human nature, individual and collective, under unusual influences, cannot be measured; nor can the conventional lines of social structures be used for guidance with finality. Old words were used in new senses; new forms came into being on old groundwork which was superseded. Who would have guessed that from the rabbinical student would have developed the Apostle to the Gentiles? Let it be noted that critical reconstruction has the uncertainty of past prediction. We can see the waves but the molecules of movement escape the range of observation.

It is comforting to pass from the shadow into the daylight. St. Paul speaks definitely of apostles, prophets and teachers. As opposed to the activities of the corporate community these represented the authoritative aims of the Church as a whole, but it appears that a hard and fast distinction between their functions can hardly be established. In the apostolate of St. Paul we see

all three combined. The instructions to Timothy give indications of a differentiation, although the exercise of his office is not locally confined. In the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles we see the continuance of an apostolate because this unique document gives us a picture of church life far from the great centres of population. Prophets are mentioned as being found in Asia as late as the middle of the second century. As late as the third century there was a definite class of "teachers" in Egypt and Africa. The local community in large cities naturally became the predominant element to be considered. The time of planting and watering had come to an end.

The bishop was the leader in the local community. As the representatives of the Church as a whole passed away their functions of teaching and admonition devolved into the hands of the bishop. He had always been in charge of what might be called the services, *i.e.*, he offered the prayers and presided at the administration of the Eucharist. From now on, *i.e.*, from the time to which the writings of St. Ignatius belong, he directed the community; the relationship was largely personal; there were no prescrip-

tions as to what he could or could not do. It was the community which was the visible form of God's kingdom on earth; the bishop was of it, not outside it, as a superior ruling over subjects, but as one whose deeds of service enabled it to keep the norm of faith and practice as these had been received. St. Ignatius compares the bishop to Christ or God, and the presbyters to the Apostles.

What to us seems exaggerated and artificial, because the elements of absolutism were not present to the thought of these early days, was a figure of a perfected pastoral relation, "I am among you as one that serveth." Adherence to the bishop was taught as the method by which solidarity was to be preserved; nothing was so much dreaded as a schism. The Christians of the second century realized how necessary it was to keep an unbroken front in the face of the hostility of secular rulers and to meet the changes of active Jewish intrigues and the attractive combination of Oriental philosophy and theosophy known as Gnosticism. In these first centuries of the Church, wherever we meet the names Bishops, Priests and Deacons, they are always officers of a single community. The diocese of the later period

of the Church as a sphere of administration controlled by a bishop is unknown.

City communities made up the Church. If communities arose in the country districts they were either connected with the city or they were organized with a bishop as their head in some small isolated place. Home rule was accepted as the normal status; there is no evidence that mere numbers counted, that larger sized groups controlled the smaller. Yet this did not mean isolation. All the communities, as we see from the personal style of the letters written by St. Ignatius to other churches, recognized the existence of a strong bond of union. It was not a question of administration or the pressure of direct authority exercised through officials, rather it was due to the common recognition of all that there was the same faith, widely though they were separated from one another. This sense of kinship is best realized when compared to-day with the sense of allegiance to a political party within the bounds of a single country, or the solid assurance of a common basis of fellowship that brings together physical scientists, medical men, historians, archæologists in great international congresses.

This feeling of solidarity was strengthened by the common necessity felt everywhere of opposing Gnosticism. It won expression in the use of the words, "Catholic Church," a term which includes both the idea of wide dispersion and a common community. It is altogether in contrast with the later adopted designations of Christianity, where the sense of solidarity is impaired by the addition of words referring to national or racial distinctions or even more by expressions indicating a complacent satisfaction in the divisions of Christians themselves. Gnosticism, as I have said, was the common foe; its speculations were attractive because of the mystery surrounding them; there was a decided intellectual appeal also, which was bound to affect Greek-speaking peoples who, after losing their political independence, were satisfied with an acknowledged supremacy of culture.

Gnosticism could not possibly be "Catholic," simply because its teachers, even if they did not oppose one another, followed different lines of thought and showed the independence characteristic of a presentation of religion in which the intellectual element receives exaggerated emphasis. This ideal unity in

the Church was its most valuable asset and it helps to explain many things about the stability and growth of the Christian community which seem to later ages incomprehensible, except on the supposition that a strong authoritative leadership had been already established.

But solid foundations were secured in other ways. Christianity became firmly established first in the great commercial centres on the shores of the Mediterranean, *i.e.*, in Antioch, Alexandria, the coast cities of Asia Minor, such as Ephesus and Smyrna. From these places it spread along the lines of communication to the interior, and it was this economic relationship of superiority or dependence that created first of all the connections between adjacent groups of Christians. In the larger centres hospitality, material and religious, was offered to those who came from other communities, as they were forced to pass from one place to another in connection with their commercial interests.

Questions connected with matters of faith or local discipline would naturally be referred to the older communities by the Christians grouped in other places, who had owed the origin of their own church to some founder

or founders from elsewhere. It is not always necessary to assume that geographical nearness established this close relationship; trade routes were often the chain which bound Christian communities together, as we see in the case of the Church of Southern Gaul, which looked to Asia Minor as its nearest associate rather than to Christian communities much closer geographically. The more important communities in the great centres of population were in constant mutual intercourse; development in all followed generally the same lines. The literature that was being produced in one place was soon made readily accessible elsewhere.

It was this atmosphere of common interests, common points of view, common traditions that gave unity to the Catholic Church of the first age and not a bureaucratic or hierarchical system of Church administration. In order to understand the situation one must keep firmly in view that the question of government was local; there was no debating about Episcopacy, or Presbyterianism, or Congregationalism, or Papalism. When St. Ignatius was exalting the episcopal functions he had not in mind other groups of Christians who were Presbyterians; divi-

sions on questions of ministerial order were unknown. His admonitions were directed against factional tendencies in the one community at Antioch. Those who were following independent lines irrespective of the obligations of personal loyalty to the bishop, the leader of the community, had no plan of their own to organize a community with some other kind of ministry.

Even the Gnostics had bishops of their own, and the conflict with Gnosticism did not involve difference about the ministry, or, indeed, any questions of Church government; they were charged with misrepresenting the apostolic traditions of the Church, and the fact that their groups of adherents had bishops also at their head had not the slightest influence on the controversy. Personal precedence of one bishop over another was equally unknown, simply because the bishop was so closely identified with the community. As this is true, the term "monarchical episcopate" must be taken not literally but only as a convenient label. The bishop was not a monarch; in fact, the word that Justin Martyr, in the middle of the second century, used to make his position intelligible to non-Christian readers was "president."

We have seen what sort of episcopacy prevailed in the early Church; it is time to ask ourselves what kind of "papalism" was recognized during this same period. Those who attempt to read back into this age the conditions as well as the antagonisms which accompanied or followed the religious revolution of the sixteenth century are only to be treated as unsafe guides, or rather as no guides at all. They are like the string of modern tourists wandering through European art galleries with their æsthetic standards derived from an impoverished, non-receptive environment. The primacy of the local church in Rome and the primacy of the Roman Church under papal absolutism are two entirely different things, just as the supremacy of public opinion in the United States is different from the supremacy of the Supreme Court in the Constitution. Now the primacy of the local church in Rome was a feature of the life of the Church in the second century, just as the primacy of the church in Jerusalem appears to have been a feature in the life of the Church during the Apostolic age.

The primacy of the church in Jerusalem arose from the fact that in this community

were contained more individuals who had been in close personal association with Jesus than anywhere else. Another feature in the primacy of Jerusalem appears in St. Paul's letters, where he thinks it perfectly natural that the members of other communities, his own converts in many cases, should be asked to send contributions to Jerusalem in order to relieve the necessities of those who were in want there. The primacy of Jerusalem was not maintained, owing to the terrible wars waged against the Jews by the Roman government in the first and second centuries, when the Jews revolted against imperial rule. Jerusalem was deserted by its inhabitants and their places taken by foreign colonists. The result was that in the second century the church in Jerusalem was only the shadow of a great name. All that had given it practical authority and influence had passed away. There had been a grievous break in continuity in its life as an organized town.

America has seen changes of an analogous kind in the seaports of the New England coast and, in the primacy of letters, Boston to-day has nothing resembling the status it had when it was the residence of most of the men who were recognized leaders in Ameri-

can literature. Predominantly under Jewish direction and guidance the Christians of the first century looked to Jerusalem; in the second century Christians looked towards Rome, not as dependents or patiently expecting bureaucratic intervention in their own affairs, but in the attitude of respectful consideration always readily accorded to numbers and experience. Such a dependence should be easily appreciated to-day, when, in the drama, in journalism, in fashions, in the manner of life and in forms of social intercourse the metropolis of any country exercises a preponderating influence on provincial districts. Rome was the metropolis of the empire; people from all regions were constantly visiting it for reasons of business or pleasure, or in connection with the work of the law courts and civil administration. Citizens from the various portions of the Roman world looked up to Rome in the same way the residents of a modern French department look up to Paris.

As men of their own time the Christians of the second century did not try to isolate themselves from these perfectly natural influences. The fact that the government, which had its centre in Rome, was respon-

sible for the deeds of persecution not only made no difference, but, as far as we can see from the attitude of the early apologists, they turned away from the provincial authorities, and seemed to be hopeful that if they could only get their case put fairly and intelligently before the head of the imperial administration in Rome all would be well. The institutions, the counsel and the traditions of the Christian community at Rome were given great weight simply because it was the church of the world capital.

This feeling of reverence and respect was heightened by two other important considerations: the two great Apostles of the First Age of the Church, St. Paul and St. Peter, had at Rome suffered martyrs' deaths, and beyond all other churches the Church in Rome, simply because it was a great trade and government centre, was called upon to show to Christians from everywhere the virtues of hospitality and kind treatment in all the various phases of the widely recognized obligation of welcoming the stranger in his sojourn there.

St. Ignatius speaks of the Roman communities as being the model or type of love, and on their side the Roman community, as we

see in the letter of St. Clement to the Corinthians, felt it incumbent upon them to give advice and admonition when other communities neglected their duty or seemed faithless to the tradition of apostolic teaching and order. The only competitor of Rome was the Province of Asia, where Philip and John and their immediate disciples had labored; among them was Polycarp, who survived to a great age and took part, along with the Roman church, in the systematic opposition to the spread of Gnosticism. In the Roman community which, as Monsignor Duchesne puts it, "was the business head of the Church," some short and accessible method had to be devised by which the correctness of the opinions of those who sought its welcome and hospitality might be determined. Hence came into use the Apostles' Creed, the baptismal symbol of the local church in Rome, which was readily borrowed by other churches for similar purposes and came into universal use in the western part of the Roman Empire. The literature of the apostolic age began to be collected into a formal volume of writings, by which the teachings of the Gnostics could be conveniently tested; hence arose the conception of a New Testa-

ment. The first known list of canonically accepted books is found in a Latin manuscript originating in Italy.

Just as important in connection with the struggle with Gnosticism was the appeal to the bishops of the community as the guarantors of the apostolic tradition. It was a fashion with the Gnostics to claim that their peculiar theosophy and mysticism had been directly handed down from an early period, even though it might not be found incorporated in the early literature of the Church. This assertion was met by pointing in the old, established communities to the long list of official leaders extending back about a hundred years or more to the lifetime of the apostles themselves. So the continuity of the community could be attested; a valuable point because, as there had been no break, the identity of the doctrine taught in each successive generation would naturally follow. Each bishop became a member of an unbroken chain extending back to the foundation of the Church, each too had handed on to a successor the whole Christian tradition as he had received it from the head of the community who had preceded him. This was a conclusive and popular way of meeting the

intricate dogmas of the Gnostics, which were as confusing to attack by direct argument as they were to explain in the first place. It was no accident that a common faith coincided with a common apostolic succession—that the great communities on the shores of the Mediterranean agreed in the substance of their faith and they were all able to show from their records that there had been an unbroken line of bishops for several generations. Rome was especially well off in being prepared for this test; we know that before 177 A.D. the local church had in its records such episcopal lists extending to the age of the apostles themselves.

The various phases of the institution of the episcopate began under the stress of new conditions, with novel problems to be emphasized. From the appeal against Gnosticism the bishops gained in authority and came to be considered as the personal recipients of the Faith, as the protectors and owners of apostolic teaching. They came to be set apart in this official status from the community, gaining a position of their own independent of the community at whose head they stood. The orthodoxy of the bishop is made interchangeable with that of the Church

itself. But the community is not absorbed in the person of its head, for the community still has charge of discipline, it still makes rules for its own control; in these respects the bishop is only an executive officer, not an originating autocrat.

The distinction between clergy and laity is a conception taken over from civil local government, the words themselves are borrowed from this source and they are intended to distinguish between the community and the organs by which it is administered. In one way the essence of the Church is not continuous with the episcopal office, yet, as the bishops are the guardians and guarantors of pure teaching, they are an essential, therefore an inseparable, part of the Church as an organism. Without them one basic feature of the Church as the reservoir of teaching would be absent. Absolutism was impossible because of the honor given to unofficial members of the community, to those who practised ascetic virtues, or had before the civil tribunals made open profession of their faith. Virgins and widows, as a special class, who had what might be called regularly recognized pastoral relations with the women members of the local church, or to whom

was entrusted the care of the poor, were also singled out for consideration. They enjoyed a kind of authority dependent not so much on their official position as on their reputation for personal sanctity and as possessors of spiritual gifts.

The next stage in the advance of episcopal authority is reached through the discussion of questions of discipline. There were three sins held so serious—murder, denial of the faith, and immorality—that the guilty person was irrevocably thrust out of the community of the Church. At first only martyrs could relax this rule in favor of individuals whom they singled out as worthy of being given a further test. In the Roman community, at the end of the second century or the beginning of the third, the bishop begins to claim to exercise full disciplinary powers on the grounds of having a special endowment of the Holy Spirit as the successor of the apostles, in particular of the Apostle St. Peter. Callistus put forth an edict declaring that this judicial function was first accorded to St. Peter, then to the rest of the apostles and, therefore, it was limited to those who were in communion with St. Peter, *i.e.*, with the Roman church, its bishop and its tradi-

tion. But even Callistus hesitated to question the existing right of martyrs to exercise the right of admitting those who had committed mortal sin. As the persecutions became more frequent and more violent in the last half of the third century, many who had lapsed from the faith demanded to be readmitted without delay. It was decided to do this in the case of those who were at the point of death. A controversy raged as to whether the bishop could not review the decisions of the martyrs and confessors in these particular cases; for not only the martyrs demanded the final and exclusive right of decision but there was another party with more austere views who held that under no circumstances ought the lapsed to be admitted to the communion of the Church. St. Cyprian, the leading bishop in the African Church, claimed that such cases should be settled by the community, and then he modified this position afterward by limiting the right of readmission to the episcopate as a whole.

The whole tendency was now in the direction of an active "monarchical episcopate," an expression which, as we have seen, cannot be with any strictness applied to conditions before this date. Both in the spheres of

discipline and in public worship the bishop is not the representative of the community, but is its leader by divine right. In him are concentrated the functions of the earlier apostles, prophets and teachers. St. Cyprian writes: "On bishops the constitution of the Church rests, and every act of the Church is governed by these same presiding officers," and again, "whence you are bound to know that the bishop is in the Church and the Church in the bishop, and if anyone is not with the bishop he is not in the Church."

These claims were all the more emphasized by Cyprian when the North African Church came in conflict with the Roman community on the question of heretical baptism. In Rome those who had received baptism outside the Church were subject to discipline and then admitted to communion. In Africa they were re-baptized. When Bishop Stephen of Rome demanded that the North African churches, as originally founded by the Roman community, should follow its custom as laid down by the successors of St. Peter and the holders of the primacy, Cyprian claimed the exercise of liberty in this point in dispute. Rome, he was willing to allow, was the symbolical presentment of unity, but he

refused to allow any practical deductions to be made from this concession. Each bishop, he said, had a portion of God's flock to shepherd and was responsible for it only to God. Stephen was proclaimed to be a heretic and a schismatic.

Cyprian did not deny, be it observed, the primacy of the Roman community and its bishop. Its position he referred to its importance as being situated in the capital of the empire and the fact of its foundation by St. Peter, who represented the unity of the faith. It is interesting to note, too, how Origen explained the words in St. Matthew's Gospel (chap. xvi), not as conferring sovereignty on St. Peter, but as rather addressed through him to all perfectly instructed Christians. These details are given not for any dogmatic or polemical reason, and in estimating their weight and significance one should beware of mixing up moral judgments with them, as is so often done by advocates who claim the superiority of one type of Church government over another.

The way of least resistance has evidently been followed. It is easier under normal human conditions to come nearer to the state of organization reached by the Church in the

third century than to try to restore the conditions in which the apostolic Church took its origin. This is true simply because the Church of other centuries is in its relation to society as a whole more like the Church of Cyprian and Origen than it is to that of St. Paul and St. Peter. In our own day much severe criticism is being directed against parliamentary institutions, but no one thinks of restoring the Long Parliament, or Simon de Montfort's Parliament, or the Teutonic tribal customs from which as a nucleus representative government developed.

No one body of Christians can convincingly try to imitate in a slavish spirit the institutions of the early Church; they might very well imitate its elasticity and its statesmanship. The tentative steps to an effective primacy on the part of the Roman community, the oligarchical episcopate of St. Cyprian, the loosely guided community of the second century, with its episcopal president, the apostolic Church with its distaste for centralization and desire to keep its spheres of work in a compartmental system under which officials, founders and leaders could only keep clear of one another because they were closely associated as in a family,

must all be judged by the standard of the task to be done and the way the task was performed. Ethically the test is what form or forms seemed best suited to allow society, which is itself a changing quantity, to become the instrument of Christian ideals and to be an example of general Christian living.

There is one sufficient reason why what might be considered a mere collection of antiquarian details should be introduced into a study of the relation of Christianity and government; this is none other than the historical certainty that the influence of Christianity on the State has been due in a large degree to the way Christians set about to organize their own community. If they had created initially no stronger bond than that which gave the adherents of paganism a general and vague sympathetic attitude towards other polytheists, or if there had only been the common intellectual interests of the cultured classes, who in the Roman Empire attended rhetorical lectures on philosophy or listened to the reading of poems, the whole course of historical development would have followed other lines. The modern State is the product of the contact and conflict of two highly organized forms of social life:

the political and the religious. Each has borrowed from the other, and because of the borrowing the history of Western Europe is so very unlike the course of national existence in the Oriental world. The State cannot be understood without the Church nor the Church without the State. A political history of Europe is an impossibility if religious organization is omitted, just as an ecclesiastical history is a figment if so-called secular events and institutions are disregarded.

All of the changes indicated in outline above, in the development of the Church institutions, represent a parallelism between the constitution of the Christian communities and the changes in the administration of the Greek-Roman cities in the empire. Autonomous magistrates that were the relics of the old free city state became officials of the centralized imperial bureaucracy appointed to control the local administration. As society itself became hierarchical in many distinctly separated classes, so the ministerial orders of the Christian community became differentiated. In the third century in Rome we hear of seven distinct orders in the ministry; in addition to the three higher there

are subdeacons, lectors, exorcists, doorkeepers and acolytes.

In the confederation of the various local churches civil divisions are followed as a rule. The heads of the communities, *i.e.*, the bishops, meet together for deliberation in the metropolis of the province under the presidency of the bishop of the metropolis. In this case the origin of the provincial system seems to be derived from the model of the organization of the common worship accorded to the emperor, under the direction of a high priest who supervised the ritual acts, presided over the celebration of festivals and acted as speaker of an assembly of delegates, who, in addition to arranging for the religious concerns of the province, seem to have had some direction of local administrative affairs. Even the nomenclature of this system was taken over by the Church.

With this readiness to follow secular precedents it is a matter of surprise that the primacy of the See of Rome was so imperfectly recognized; the natural thing to expect would be that as the emperor was the autocrat in the State, so the bishop of the most conspicuous see would become autocrat in the

Church. The way certainly was being opened up towards a central absolutism; but it was more of a vision than a fact. Why the long foreseen end was reached only after many centuries and not in the age which witnessed the contest between Cyprian of Carthage and Stephen of Rome is probably due to two causes. There was a very strong feeling, the relic of the theory of early days when the exercise of the lordship of Christ was an ever-present reality, that all the churches were under one mystical head, and accordingly a nearer approach to absolutism would have been considered treason to this traditional conviction.

Moreover, Christianity was really stronger in the eastern half of the empire, where Greek was spoken and where too there had been preserved, even under the centralized system of Rome, some of the elasticity, or, it might be called, some of the lack of consistency, which belonged to Greek political life. No one feared any separatist movement in this portion of the empire; economically the Oriental cities were strong, but they were not regarded as worth considering from the military point of view. They were thoroughly loyal to the imperial government, they had

been so for many generations—indeed, since the downfall of the Greek kingdoms in the East in the second century B.C. They enjoyed a liberal measure of home rule; therefore, in the part of the world where Christians were most numerous, there was no inclination to accept a centralized system of church government or to heed the appeals of the Roman bishop when he argued about the primacy of St. Peter or held up the community of Rome as the model to be followed in other places. There was no way of applying direct pressure and, besides, in the East, on account of the intellectual position acquired by Alexandria through its scholars and teachers, that city was regarded as in an indefinite way a tribunal of appeal and a place of record in all cases regarding the Christian tradition and practice. But nothing was systematized, and in this respect it differed from the West.

Eastern Christianity, by its own natural position, without making any conscious effort at resistance or protest, proved an obstacle in the way of perfecting the ecclesiastical machinery to which the Roman mind, with its inclinations towards government and jurisprudence, naturally tended. A

looseness of texture is visible in the provincial arrangements of the East; there was no desire to introduce uniformity; so there was no single episcopal see in the East which in any way approached the definite predominance held in the West by Rome. While Western Christians were occupied largely with practical question of discipline and order, in the East the absorbing interests could be concentrated on matters into which intellectual expression and philosophical formulas largely entered.

CHAPTER III

The Church Recognized by the Empire. Church Policy of Constantine. The Councils, the Roman See.

Whatever criticisms may be directed against the Church on the ground that it made too many concessions to the world of paganism, no one can deny that it had built up an organization strong enough to resist the power of the strongest government that civilized mankind had as yet created. It had maintained a high standard of moral life in a society which was showing many notorious signs of decadence. What is more, it had developed a literature which in vigor at least and copiousness was far superior to anything produced in the Greco-Roman world during the same period. The Church had everywhere become a subject of discussion; it was no longer treated as a negligible

quantity and, although numerically it was, even after three centuries, in a far inferior position to the sum of Gentile religions throughout the empire, it was as an active force not only far more vigorous than any other type of religion, but by its organization and solidarity irresistible in the face of all of them.

After the last wave of persecution had vanished, because of the victory of the Emperor Constantine over all his rivals, the aid of the government in favor of the Christian religion produced a rapid change. The State was no longer neutral; Christian emblems appeared on the coins and on the military standards. Private sacrifice was forbidden, citizens were openly advised by the civil authorities to become Christians, and heathendom was openly proclaimed as an erroneous system of teaching. Some pagan temples were destroyed and their property secularized. The imperial civil service was largely made up of Christian officials. When the imperial residence was transferred to Constantinople there were none of the customary pagan rites usual on such occasions. Every opportunity was taken by the imperial court in public celebrations to show its con-

tempt for the ancient polytheistic traditions of the Roman government. On the other side, the Church fell heir to all the ancient privileges of official paganism. It gained full civil rights, it was allowed to hold property, to ecclesiastical authorities were assigned salaries derived from property originally belonging to heathen temples, and large churches were built at the public expense.

These deeds of generosity were not accomplished without ulterior motives. Constantine was not a monarch after the model of St. Louis of France. By favoring the Church he shrewdly wished to turn it into an ally and a subordinate of the State. He had no intention of deserting the old Roman maxim that the State cannot tolerate an organization with corporate rights strong enough to exert political influence and likely to become a centre of opposition to the civil authorities. What Constantine accomplished was a reversal of policy, not a change of principle. Autocracy remained in the saddle and in combination with Christianity it produced the Eastern Church with its overlord at Byzantium or Constantinople in the early mediæval period, and in modern times one can see a replica of Constantine's conception

of the relation between the State and the Christian religion in the Russian Church. In this last case there is, of course, no accidental imitation, because the institutional principles of Russian Christianity can be traced back through the Byzantine Church, of which the Russian is the offspring, to the relationship of State and Church formulated by the first Christian emperors.

Of course, Constantine did not invent the system, as we have just indicated; he took over the legal and political principles of Roman rule and imposed them upon a religious organization composed of members in general sympathy with their social environment and therefore more than ready to look upon the imposition as a gift. There is no need to doubt the sincerity of Constantine; his intellectual equipment was crude; he was the type of the soldier-statesman who struck hard and aimed to reach the nearest goal in the speediest way. Neither his experience nor his temperament had fitted him to appreciate the delicacy or the moral strenuousness of Christian teaching. The worthy ecclesiastics who surrounded him were only too ready, in exchange for the advantages they received from imperial recognition, to accept

at a good deal more than their face value the professions of Christian allegiance the masterful soldier was so ready to make.

The imperial desire for unity counted for a great deal in the Arian controversy, which threatened to disrupt the whole Church. Constantine believed in uniformity and he set out to secure it in a much more diplomatic way than might be expected of a man trained in the rough and ready methods of repression practised by Diocletian, the last great persecutor. It is obvious that the so-called Toleration Edict of Milan, by which freedom of religious practice was guaranteed to all subjects of the empire, was only intended as a declaration useful in the sense that a modern party political platform is useful. After the campaign is over it is stored away in the lumber room and is only used as a model for future campaign documents. In this case the campaign was the struggle between Constantine and his rival for the imperial title, Licinius. Constantine could not afford to make Licinius the champion of paganism, weak and ineffective as paganism was. The moment, as we have seen, that Constantine became the sole emperor toleration was forgotten; it was not even spoken of as a pious

aspiration to guide ultimately the emperor's religious policy.

Constantine did more than encourage the establishment of uniformity by promoting the conversion of his subjects to Christianity. He not only wanted a single universal religion, but desired that religion to be one and uniform. It is a great testimony to the emperor's own acumen as well as a proof of the solid force in the Christian organization that he used the officers of the Church, *i.e.*, the bishops, and not state officials, to secure the prevention of schism and heresy. In the midst of an autocratic government a kind of representative body met at the Council of Nicæa to settle the Creed of the Church. It may safely be said that on no other possible subject but the subject of the internal affairs of the Christian religion would representatives, gathered from various parts of the empire, have been allowed to debate. The emperor contented himself with the function of acting as presiding officer over the episcopal assembly. He must certainly have felt himself in a novel position, not more on account of the abstruse character of the discussion than because in this gathering his word was not final and absolute.

Constantine was careful to explain that his concern and authority were only involved in furthering the material interests of the Church. Probably on neither side was it realized that at these meetings in a provincial town in Asia Minor a new and unexpected manifestation of man's trend towards liberty and democracy had appeared in an environment least likely to produce it, on the soil of the Roman Empire, saturated with the principles of an unyielding autocracy. In their sphere the representatives of the Church were conceded full sovereignty for the time being. In this allowance of a group system within the State possessing collective rights there is a decisive step towards the distinction of spheres between State and Church from which most of the specific achievements in modern Occidental civilization have been derived.

There was an element in Christianity making for liberty which carried that principle into a valuation not reached before, even in the Greek cities, which were ardent lovers and fierce defenders of liberty. Even Demosthenes, confronting the might of Macedon, hardly presents that individual heroism of daring to be faithful to one's

deepest convictions which makes the struggle of St. Athanasius against an overwhelming imperial power an unique example in the ancient world. Yet Athanasius had no notion of a free Church in a free State; neither members of the combination were, even by the greatest Christian idealists of this age, considered as best realizing their purpose under a regime of freedom. Under a non-Arian emperor Athanasius would undoubtedly have shown as little independence as Eusebius, the courtly friend and admirer of Constantine. The close ties with the State gave the government rights of oversight, *i.e.*, opportunities of interference in the Greco-Roman Christian Empire which, in the eyes of master minds of Christian antiquity, represented the perfection of government. It belonged to the emperor to summon the General Councils of the Church, to set before them the subjects of their debates and to give their resolutions the force of law; not infrequently dogmatic decrees were published by the emperor without any conciliar co-operation. The government passed regulations governing the entrance into the ministerial order, sometimes charges against bishops were heard by the emperor who, in such

cases, did not hesitate to oust the offender from his see.

In the East the absorption of the Church by the State progressed until, under Justinian, in the sixth century, we may fairly speak of a system of Cæsaro-papalism, under which the Church became hardly more than a feature of the imperial administration. In western Europe a different development was mainly due to two things: the centralizing movement by which the supremacy of the See of Rome comes to be the decisive factor in church institutions and the break-up of imperial administration in the western provinces of the empire because of the invasion and settlement in them of the Teutonic peoples.

We have seen the form of Church government that obtained after the recognition of the Church by the State. Something remains to be said as to the influence of Christianity on the empire itself as a social organism. Before the period of State recognition it had been the custom among Christians to avoid appeals to the secular tribunals; their differences were arbitrated through the mediation of the bishop. Now this system was extended generally. Disputes could be settled

under the informal jurisdiction of the bishop at much less cost, with less delay and with less chance of venality than by the ordinary legal system. Nothing so much contributed to spread the influence of the Church among the masses of the people as this work of adjudication and arbitration. The application of the criminal law felt in other ways the effect of Christian teaching; those charged with crime had conceded to them the right of asylum in church buildings, and as they could not be seized while they were in this shelter by the officer of the law, the bishop was given an opportunity of investigating the case and interceding for the assumed culprit if necessary. Another obligation imposed on the Church organization was the care of poor relief, a needed activity, because the age was one of decided economic decline. Individual philanthropy, always taught as a primary element in the code of Christian ethics, was now replaced by systematic humanitarianism extended to large masses of the people. The lot of prisoners was made less cruel, those captured in warfare were ransomed and the indigent were helped financially or enabled to get a fresh start in life. Regular institutions were

founded to receive the helpless members of society such as foundlings; hospitals were built and shelters for aliens and wanderers.

In regard to slavery there is no actual advance in legislating it out of existence. In the earlier period slaves must have composed the great mass of the adherents of the Church and often we know its officers were slaves. Under the new status of imperial recognition the Church becomes closely allied with the higher classes of the population; its bishops belong to distinguished families and the Church ownership of slaves is a well-known practice. Emancipation is rendered more difficult than it was in pagan days, but in any case this strange obliquity, as it appears to us, to a primary human duty was balanced by directions that slaves under a Christian régime must be treated mercifully and that the principle of universal human brotherhood must not in their case be forgotten.

In education the Church had really in this period no distinct function. There were Christian teachers; of many of them we know the names, but the system of study, the inheritance of Greco-Roman civilization in its pagan form, was continued unchanged.

There were, it is true, special schools where the Scriptures and the works of early Christian writers were systematically studied, but the broad current of educational life in the empire continued, uninfluenced by the change of faith. Latin and Greek classical texts continued to be the basis of study; training in the ordinary rhetorical formulas of style shows itself in many ways in all the products of the Christian literature of this age.

Vigorous thought is found in the theological speculations of the best known Christian authors of the fourth and fifth centuries, notably in the case of St. Augustine, whose keenness in psychological analysis is universally recognized; but on the whole it must be allowed that the wide extension of Christianity had little influence in restraining the downward tendency in art and literature, which is such a noticeable feature of the later imperial system. There were no great Christian poets, or dramatists, or historians. There was nothing resembling Elizabethan England in the period when Christianity came to be the predominant faith in Western Europe.

In public life, as seen in the characters of

statesmen, military leaders and officials, it seems strange that the powerful vitality inherent in the Christian outlook on life seemed to leave so little impression. The times lacked something more than delicacy and idealism; there is a roughness and crudeness, an absence of moral fervor in the sphere of government that is nothing short of surprising. It shows how one should be careful to limit the significance of the term conversion when one speaks of the Roman Empire having become Christian. People had lost hope that the State could be improved. It was assumed to have reached its inherent end in the Roman Empire; nothing further could be expected of it. St. Augustine taught in his "City of God" that the secular organization was grounded in lawlessness and lust, that it was, in other words, the creation of the devil; the only salvation was for the State to put itself under the tutelage of the Church, so a system of perfect justice could be realized, and he looked forward to a coming thousand-year period in which the Church was to be the beneficent overlord and guardian of civil rule. Citizenship in the State was to be merged in membership of the Church and all the forms of secular organi-

zation were to be moralized by adoption into the body of the Church.

This hopeless attitude towards secular affairs and interests is directly connected with the rapid extension and wide popularity of monasticism. As no progress could be expected in government institutions or from the social order as a whole, segregated groups were made up of individuals who could isolate themselves from the outside secular world. As secular society could not be lifted to a higher level, the ideals of the Christian community, instead of being diffused, were concentrated in the smaller groups, where God's will could be realized without hindrance from a world by nature hostile to it. A new world was thus created as a corporate negation of civil order, of family life, of private property and of civil obligation. The evil situation of the age, its decadent culture, the increasing material need, the iron despotism of the imperial system with its fixed class divisions, the uncertain tenure of property under an arbitrary absolutism contributed to strengthen in the minds of many individuals the desire to cut loose once and for all from ties of secular life.

Many of these early Christian ascetics car-

ried their individualistic pursuit of perfection so far that they betook themselves to desert places, where there could be a genuine return to a state of nature as the preliminary step to attaining the state of grace. The popularity of the movement brought with it the introduction into the Church of a double standard. The mass of its adherents were regarded as incapable by their situation of fulfilling the moral ideals of the Gospel and had to be satisfied with the reflection that what they lacked in spiritual vitality and reality was supplied by monastic communities.

It was not always nor everywhere that these methods of self-perfection and preparation for salvation were completely applied. In Western Europe especially the radicalism of the monastic conception found no great favor. The extremes of the ascetic ideal, so frequent in the East, as in the case of the Pillar Saints (St. Simeon Stylites), were abandoned in favor of more humane models. Western monks did not retire to deserts; their favorite abodes were on the small islands of the Italian and Dalmatian coasts, or on the French Riviera. Besides, in addition to religious discipline, they undertook to cultivate the land, practised deeds of

mercy and had no scruples in devoting themselves to profane as well as biblical learning.

All these monastic communities may be said to have lived a life of protest against the prevalent form of government; in most cases they represented what might be called extra-territorial spiritual democracies and therefore kept up an organization tacitly opposed to all that the ancient State stood for in its repressive attitude towards independent organizations. The very fact that they were able to defend their existence with no other force than the power of a spiritual idealism demonstrates the silent growth in the world of the view that might is not right. The philosophic view of the monk did not differ from that of the ancient Stoic in respect of his non-valuation of political life. But never before had Stoicism shown such a large number of recruits willing and zealous to put their theory in practice.

In the new world that was arising, owing to the break-up of Roman administration, monasticism had a large rôle to play. But its importance in the cultural and religious development of the Teutonic peoples who occupied the Roman provinces would not have been possible without the centralizing

power of the Roman Church and the Roman papacy. Monasticism, itself a segregation from secular society under the status of civilized government, did not cease to stand for segregation from its secular environment, even when the State was represented by only the crude beginnings of national life among the German tribes in the western empire. Though the State as a whole, under any shape, was an object of hostility or indifference to the members of a monastic community, the old classical tradition of a belief in a strong government was so deeply implanted that the main supports throughout the Middle Ages of the papal system of church government were the monastic orders. Representing in their own internal affairs the primitive unconscious democracy of the original Christian community, in matters where the Church came into relation with secular society they advocated an ecclesiastical absolutism.

There are many paradoxes in mediæval life and this is not the least striking among them. The collapse of imperial rule in Western Europe enabled the bishops of Rome to advance, practically unhindered, to the attainment of an absolute position in Church government foreshadowed by the claims

already noticed. Though Rome had ceased to be the civil capital of the empire the traditions derived from its history were not lost. No one could think of Constantinople as the new Rome in any real sense of the word—the emperor had changed his residence for strategic reasons, but Rome was still for Latin-speaking Christians the imperial city. It was reverenced especially by the new barbarous people of the West as the name which for them represented all that civilization could bestow. Now that civil administration in its centralized form had disappeared the one strong authority with what might be called an international appeal was the Roman Church. Provincial Christians all over Western Europe looked to it for guidance; this sense of dependence was increased by the fact that although the Germanic peoples who invaded the provinces were Christians they were of an unorthodox, *i.e.*, an Arian type. Catholic Christianity was forced to present a united front against its opponents; it was in no condition to make an armed opposition; whatever power it had had rested on moral suasion and on a superior organization. It is fairly clear that one of the chief factors by which Arian Christianity was overcome

was its lack of the definite and centralized activities of the Latin Church.

No mistake is more frequently made when historical Christian religion is discussed in general terms than to speak of the papacy as if in every age it covered similar governmental methods and exercised in an identical way the same kind of jurisdiction. Nothing is more remote from the truth. The line of development by which an effective primacy, based on the principles of a centralized absolutism, was finally attained was continuous, but it resembles a curve of prices or temperatures, not the geometrical distance between two points. The main principles of Gothic architecture may be noticed by the expert in some small, inconspicuous building of the eleventh or twelfth century, but the building as a whole cannot be identified with the perfected Gothic cathedral of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

As a form of government the papacy was the immediate outgrowth of the self-conscious position of the Christian community at Rome as occupants of the centre of imperial rule. The emperors identified themselves with Julius Cæsar, the founder of the empire; the bishops of Rome identified

themselves with the Apostle Peter. In both cases the identification was accepted and in both cases, too, it was some time before supremacy and guidance took the form of bureaucratic absolutism. As the bishops of Rome had no police power, no military support directly in their hands (of course, they did succeed in securing it sometimes by diplomacy), the advance towards absolutism was much slower than in the case of the Roman emperors.

To illustrate the principle just appealed to, and in order not to leave this important matter in the field of vague generalization, it is worth while to indicate in as concise a way as possible exactly what was the relation between the Roman bishops and the Church in Western Europe during the period of the Germanic invasions, for it was on the ground of this relationship that the mediæval papacy arose in the full plenitude of its power. Forged documents, it is true, were frequently used in establishing papal claims, but such fabrications could always be dovetailed into genuine records, so there was no visible line of cleavage between the true and the false, and what is more, without the ideas supplied

by the genuine records the fabrications would never have been invented.

Siricius, Bishop of Rome from 384-399, communicates the acts of his metropolitan synod to the provinces "because every bishop should become acquainted with decrees of the Apostolic See." When he is consulted by the Church in Spain he formulates his reply as directions and instructions, not as advice. He emphasizes the need of all the churches in the West recognizing the decrees of the general councils and ordering themselves carefully along the lines of imperial legislation governing church matters. In all cases of doubt the tradition of the local Roman church is to be decisive. Innocent (401-417) points out that in all the West there is only one Apostolic See, Rome; all other bishops are appointed by it; so they must be in harmony with its tradition. Boniface (418-422) states that to St. Peter has been transferred the care of the whole Church built on him, therefore, his command must be everywhere received unconditionally. Innocent asserts the right of the Roman See to act as the supreme court of appeal, using as his authority canons stated to be Nicene, which were never passed by that council. This

appeal right was used in connection with acts done by provincial synods.

It is noticeable that these claims were made effective only by degrees. The energy with which they are stated varies directly with the collapse of imperial administration in the provinces. While the empire lasted the importance of an episcopal see depended on its political importance in the province. From now on it was made dependent on its relation to the Roman Church. So one finds the city of Arles, in southern France, assigned the rights of primacy over the whole Gallic Church on the ground of a legend that the Christian community there was originally established by a disciple of St. Peter, Trophimus.

There came to be one recognized system of church law throughout the West. In all the collections of canons made in this period, under western authority, papal decretals, that is, official replies to questions submitted, and questions given on papal initiative are quoted as decisive and therefore given in full. In northern Africa, where the local Church was strongly organized, the advance towards centralization was squarely met. Official acts done by the Roman bishop, Zosimus (417-

418) were not recognized as valid. To the appeal made for exercise of jurisdiction over the African Church on the basis of the Nicene canons, the reply was made that they were not recognized as authentic in Africa. When the Vandals overran the African provinces Arian Christianity was established there, with the result that the Roman See was relieved from further opposition.

Not all the Germanic invaders were Christians; notably the Saxons, who took possession of Britain, had never abandoned their old ethnic religion. Moreover, beyond the eastern frontiers of the former Roman province of Gaul, which roughly corresponds to modern France and Germany, there were the Christianized Germanic people who had left kinsfolk among whom Christianity had not yet penetrated. Systematic missionary work and organization was introduced into both England and Germany by those acting under the authority of the Roman See. The Irish Church, isolated from Rome and altogether outside the administrative oversight of the papacy, as outlined above, had a remarkable record of missionary zeal. Its monks were the pioneers of Christian expansion among many heathen peoples, but the constructive

work was accomplished by those whom the Roman See commissioned.

It is not surprising that this leadership in missionary enterprise increased the authority of the Roman See and its bishops, whom it is fair now to call by their distinctive title—popes. It must be remembered, however, that in the earlier period of Church history, *i.e.*, in the Greco-Roman Imperial Church, the term was applied to bishops of important sees in addition to Rome. These sees were in the East. As Western Europe became separated politically from Eastern Christendom it was only natural that for Occidentals the word pope became restricted to the Bishop of Rome and to no one else. With the terribly swift progress of Islam as a conquering power many of the strongest and most ancient centres of Christianity were reduced to impotence. Northern Africa, whose church, as has been seen, sturdily maintained its autonomy against interference from Rome, became Mohammedan; in the East Christianity still existed, but weakened and stagnant. Many Eastern Christians, belonging to churches which professed doctrines condemned by the general councils, preferred Moslem rule to the harsh treatment

received from the Christian Empire of the East. Indeed much more damage was done to the Church by the carefully devised plan of toleration imposed by the Arab conquerors than by those repressive measures which had encouraged so much virile steadfastness among the early Christians in the face of Roman imperial despotism.

From all these causes can be traced the power of the Church organization which had its centre at Rome; no competitor could arise in any way rivalling its religious, its social, its educational, its administrative force. The idea of supremacy was a transmission from Christian and classical antiquity. The Germanic invasions removed the only strong centralized government able to hold the Roman See in check. An experiment in ecclesiastical autocracy was to be made on an unparalleled scale; the field for it was clear for the time being at least. So far as one can see, what prevented Western Europe from developing into a great ecclesiastical State as stagnant as China under its autocratic emperors and as listless as Thibet under its llamas was the liberty-loving instincts of the Germanic peoples. They had strong political instincts, though their tribal life had not given them political experience.

CHAPTER IV

The Christian Empire of the Germanic Peoples: Charles the Great. The Christian Kingdom: Alfred the Great.

The history of mediæval Europe is a contest between the State and the Church; this is a familiar fact. What is less familiar is the knowledge that the character of the contest changes from age to age simply because the institutions involved in it are not constantly identical in their organization as a whole or in their administrative details. Hence, when the questions of ethical valuation arise, as so often happens where religious principles are controversially debated, one must be reminded that though we are using the same words we are really considering two different things. We have come to understand this in political history. No one would be foolish enough to-day to com-

pare English kingship under Henry VIII and George V as if the same institution were being discussed. Few, too, would to-day be surprised that George Washington did not urge the appointment of an Interstate Commerce Commission or would fault the democracy of Jefferson because he did not champion the parcel post. In discussing the papacy, the mediæval empire and the nascent national states of Europe, a rational historical perspective must be maintained.

Nicholas I, Innocent III, Alexander VI were all Popes prior to the Reformation period. Not only were they different types of men, but the organization administered by them, although called the Roman Church, was as different in these different ages as the present commonwealth of New York is different from the Crown Colony of New York established by Charles II. There is continuity of life, and, of course, identity of name, but any one can see how mistaken it would be to try to estimate the value of Federal government in America in a view where no account was taken of changes social, political and administrative in the same geographical area. The most effective way to gauge the influence of incorporated

Christianity on government during the long course of time which elapsed between the fifth and sixth centuries, *i.e.*, the age of the Germanic invasions to the period of religious revolution, is to examine carefully certain selected instances where can be seen actually in operation a State under the influence of Christianity in its Latinized Germanic type. One must ask one's self, in other words, what kind of a State did the peoples of Germanic descent create after they had been brought into contact with Christianity in its Roman mould? Missionaries are at work in modern times; definite social changes have been brought about by their work, but no States have been brought into being as a result of modern missionary expansion.

This creativeness, tending to produce developed nationality, belongs to the Christianity of Western Europe at the time under review. In other words, Christian traditions in doctrine, ethics, worship, organization, combined under the papal system of Church government, did, through working on the medium presented by Germanic tribal life, produce the Western European State. In so far as it did so, to these influences must be ascribed to-day what in a rough way is

called Christian civilization. The new, fresh and vigorous peoples of Western Europe received through the religion they adopted the cohesive strength and the conscious idealism which overcame the conservatism and the stagnation of the original Teutonic tribal communities.

Material wants prompted the movements of the German peoples in the days when they clung to their simple ethnic faith. The German races, as we know from Cæsar and Tacitus, were freedom-loving and respectful of the basic principles of moral life. But they did not invade the Roman provinces to introduce freedom among a bureaucratically governed population, nor did they occupy the territories they seized in Spain, Italy, Gaul and Britain for the purpose of imposing higher moral standards on the conquered inhabitants. In the teaching of Christian missionaries they welcomed a system which, in giving higher moral standards than their own, enabled them also to develop their distinctive capacities for government, and spurred them on to reach a higher cultural level.

In less than four centuries from the time when the so-called barbarian invaders had

permanently settled themselves on the territory of the Roman world a great Christian empire of the West had arisen, guided by Charles the Great, a man of pure Teutonic stock. His people, the Franks, were warlike, shrewd politically, but as long as they were confined within the bounds of their old tribal traditions and usages they had never succeeded in producing a body politic strong enough to resist the pressure from dissensions and feuds in the governing family. Merovingian France presents a dreary picture of barbarity; it seemed hopeless to expect any progress in such a medium, yet it was in the Frankish kingdom that the scheme to organize a Christian international State was matured.

The programme was, it may be said, the outcome of the personality of a great leader; but Charles, it must be remembered, was the creature of his own race and his own time. His ideals of government came from the Christian tradition as he understood it, and in the form he gave it he never forgot he was ruling over Germanic peoples. His warlike methods of extending Christianity in the new lands he conquered to the east, a territory roughly corresponding to modern Germany

minus a large portion of the Kingdom of Prussia, are thoroughly in harmony with the military traditions of his own race. Besides, they are not at all out of harmony with the methods of maintaining the supremacy of Christianity which had been fully accepted by all Christians after its recognition as a State religion by Constantine. Roman Christianity, in a very real sense, represents the tradition of the Roman government: that might backs up right even if the two are not convertible terms. Wherever Charles' armies advanced the ground was cleared immediately for church organization. Bishoprics were created, monasteries arose. In 786 the practice of heathenism and the refusal of baptism were made punishable by death.

Germanic intensity and the roughness of existing social life are not the only elements entering into this drastic treatment of the Saxons; religious differences in other parts of his empire Charles treated in a far more moderate spirit; heathenism among the Saxons was the bond that gave their resistance to the Frankish conquest a fanatical solidarity. The ruthlessness of this policy cannot be isolated from the main characteristics of the government the emperor aimed

to establish. Its anti-Christian basis need not be excused, but it should be understood sufficiently by Christian people in our own day, who, as one result of an unethical industrialism, tolerate slum quarters in great cities where the systematic extinction of human life is probably greater than anything due to the barbarism of the armies of Charles the Great.

To erect an ethical social structure compact in all its parts is a severer task than either empire building or corporation planning. It was not only on the frontiers of his empire that Charles went to work to make the Christian Church more effective; he was more than an extraordinarily versatile ruler, he had besides a great mastery of detail. Bishoprics were created, the parish system extended, endowments increased, the tithing system made obligatory on all parishioners, monastic institutions regulated and supervised. Education was a constant solicitude to the emperor. He established schools and emphasized the need of monks devoting themselves to scholarship. In order to encourage learning he drew about him men of reputation from other lands; Alcuin, the Anglo-Saxon, was induced to leave the studi-

ous retirement of a monastery in England and became what might be called the Minister of Public Education.

The custom of regular episcopal visitations is known to have existed in Western Europe not long after the period of the German invasions. The bishops were required now by imperial direction to exercise a disciplinary oversight in the case of moral derelictions; according to Germanic tribal law these could be atoned for by the payment of a fine. The bishop had a free hand because he could proceed to impose ecclesiastical discipline without requiring a preliminary complaint, as had to be done before a secular judge. On the people was imposed, under heavy penalties, the obligation of learning the Creed and the Lord's Prayer; sponsors were expected to report on the way they had exercised their spiritual guardianship. When the oath of loyalty was administered, as happened at regular intervals, a number of religious and moral duties of a simple character were incorporated in the formula submitted to each individual.

Charles promulgated many rules to enforce higher standards among the clergy, but he had no intention of clericalizing his empire.

The monastic schools were to be accessible to laymen; the instruction was influenced by the traditions of classical antiquity, *i.e.*, there is no evidence that it was theological; pagan authors were read and commented upon. In these institutions it was contemplated to supply the demand for higher education; in the parish schools instruction of an elementary character was open to all the people. It is fair to say that Charles the Great is the originator of the conception of a popular democratic public school system. Unfortunately, this noble ideal was not maintained after his death; reading and writing became the peculiar privilege of the clergy and the Church schools were devoted almost exclusively to the preparation of future priests and monks.

The Church in Charles' Empire was not only national, but established; the secular authority was sovereign and its sovereignty was exercised in the administration of the Church. The laws passed regulated the Church as well as the State. Bishops in metropolitan sees made their reports to the emperor, and he decided the cases submitted to him. He nominated the bishops; canonical rules were only given validity as a part

of the legislative code of the Frankish monarchy; the property of monasteries was controlled just as if it were royal patrimony. The land held by the Church had to pay taxes and ecclesiastics as landlords were obliged to supply the toll of men for the imperial army on the same basis as lay owners. The clergy were subject to the imperial judicial system and even in dogmatic questions the emperor's word was decisive. There was no place in this Christian Empire for the ecclesiastical overlordship of the Roman See.

Charles reverenced the papacy, but he had no intention of dividing his sovereignty with the Bishop of Rome. The pope was the first bishop in the Empire; he spoke of Charles as his master; the papal records were dated according to the years of the imperial reign; the pope had to submit to the exercise of the imperial jurisdiction, administrative and judicial. When Charles was crowned as emperor Pope Leo paid to the new emperor the ceremonial reverence of adoration, *i.e.*, of kneeling before him, a custom usual in Constantinople as indicating the subordination of the patriarch of the capital to the head of the Eastern Empire. Charles, not the pope, decided the question of image worship in

the West. The emperor also, despite papal protests, had the word "filioque" introduced into the western form of the Nicene Creed, where it still remains a relic of the Cæsaro-papalism of the Franks in empire.

Under a strong government of the State, most certainly where the Church is identified with the State, Roman ecclesiastical autocracy cannot exist. Where the Church is separated from the State religious organizations within it can accept any kind of government they prefer; hence is to be explained to-day the existence of strong ultramontanism among American and English Roman Catholics. It seems strange that the papacy did not adopt a "protestant" attitude towards the Church system provided for Western Europe by Charlemagne. The primacy of Peter had certainly become a valuable asset; how was it that the papacy so laboriously built up, so shrewdly extended, had become so easily managed? Dictatorship even in an ecclesiastical autocracy cannot rest on moral force alone. It is a fortunate thing that no one has yet ever been able to make autocracy and morality convertible terms. People cannot be made moral or religious by force or machinery, and when they are moralized they

will not submit to autocratic government. History's lessons may be charged with being vague, but on this point there is not much chance of misinterpreting their meaning. The low estate of the papacy as a sovereign power must have been all the more galling because its reduction to this level came from the hands of friends, not enemies.

Charles was universally revered as the model of a Christian ruler; no taint could be detected in his orthodoxy. With great labor and in many perils a small temporal domain had come into possession of the Roman See. Occupying this isle of refuge, due to the devolution of a small territory, with Rome as its centre, into the hands of the bishops of the city—a result partly of Lombard aggression in Italy, partly caused by the opposition excited there by the legislation against image worship at Constantinople—the popes had played a shrewd diplomatic game. Diplomacy had finally failed, the barbarous Lombards were about to take Rome when the pope appealed for Frankish help. The call was heeded; the Lombards were defeated, their territory was annexed under Charles to the Frankish Empire, but the papal domain did not retain its independence.

No protest was made. Charles was too powerful; he was too faithful a son of the Church, but the feelings of the papal party, when it realized the possibility of the absorption of its fragment of sovereignty, are curiously recorded in a forged document called the Donation of Constantine. As this forgery was constantly appealed to by the papacy, in its contest with the State throughout the mediæval period, it has more than an antiquarian interest. Purporting to be an ancient record drawn from the papal archives, this State paper relates, as if written by Constantine himself, how the first Christian emperor, in gratitude for a miraculous cure effected by Silvester, Bishop of Rome, conceded and surrendered various rights to the Roman See. The Roman church was to be supreme and sovereign over all other churches, especially over the four Eastern Patriarchates, in matters of doctrine and worship; it was to become the landlord of certain imperial estates in the provinces of the Eastern Empire; certain ceremonial insignia of rank and dignity were conceded to the pope, *e.g.*, the emperor was to lead his palfrey, the clergy of Rome were given the status of senators, sovereign rights were as-

signed to the pope over the City of Rome and the princes of the Italian peninsula; though a vague overlordship was reserved to the emperor, the pope, according to this so-called Donation, became *de jure* a temporal ruler.

In an uncritical age these preposterous historical statements were accepted without question. Dante, for example, thought the document was genuine and he makes it the basis of a severe condemnation on Constantine for his readiness to part with a portion of the imperial sovereignty. It was not until the fifteenth century that the forgery was detected by Laurentius Valla, an employé in one of the government departments of the papacy. The renaissance papacy was liberal enough to allow this daring act of modernism to be unvisited by any penalty. Unfortunately there is no record of the opinion of Charles the Great on this strange and devious constitution of the Papal State. One cannot say that he was not impressed by it at all, because he did encourage the centralizing claims made in it when he ordered the churches of his empire to use the liturgy and the breviary according to the local Roman use.

But there are many evidences that the head

of the first great Christian Empire of the West had little sympathy with clericalism. When his own sons were crowned at the close of his reign he avoided asking the pope to be present, plainly desiring to impress upon public opinion the civil sanction of secular rule. The presence of the pope might easily lead to an interpretation that would stress the dependence of the empire on the papacy. The ideal of a strong government conducted on Christian principles controlled by an emperor did not long survive the death of Charles the Great. Family feuds, national divergences, weak personalities, new invaders from northern and eastern lands caused the plan to become unworkable. The fact that it had been tried never ceased to influence political life in Western Europe. For a long time, wherever civil society came to be regarded as a sphere of social progress, the idea of a great Christian Empire was the form it invariably took on the continent of Europe. Its origin, or rather the transformation it received at the hands of the mighty overlord of the Franks, could not be forgotten.

The Christian National State, as judged from the scale outlined above, is a far more humble production; yet, as history shows,

it was destined to serve as a far more continuous and efficient factor of social advancement than the empire. By the force of a strong personality Charles had managed to reconcile the divergent tendencies and interests of various nationalities; but he failed to create a government machine under which nationalism and internationalism could be combined. It took a long time before federalism could be applied to this troublesome problem of reconciling local and general needs. And federalism itself is the product of the National State, not the mediæval empire.

To illustrate in a simple and vivid way the embryonic stage of the Christian National State nothing is more illuminating than the condition of England under the rule of its best and ablest Saxon king, Alfred the Great. As the champion of national unity Alfred had to encounter many obstacles. Politically the Saxons were not a progressive people; they were isolated in their island home and because of this isolation the traditions of Germanic tribal life remained strongly rooted in the national character. There was an inherent repugnance to anything resembling a strong centralized government. In educa-

tion, in matters relating to Church order, the Saxons responded to the civilizing stimulus received from the Roman missionaries, who brought them into contact with the Church system of Western Europe. England became famous for its scholars and its missionaries, but the country showed little national self-consciousness. When the pagan Northmen invaded its shores and threatened the very existence of Christianity in the island, owing to the lack of cohesion in the local divisions that had once been tribal kingdoms, no effective resistance was offered to the invaders.

Alfred's first great work was to prepare an effective national defense; this he did with patient and successful planning. He estimated his own power, and by thus limiting his own programme, built for the future an enduring foundation. By organizing a fleet he protected his coast from the descents of the Scandinavian marauders. The Danes, who had occupied a large portion of the Saxon land, he saw could not be got rid of by trying to compel them to sail back to their northern home. The invaders, therefore, it was agreed, should remain on condition of becoming Christianized. Like Charles the Great, Alfred knew that the country ruled

by him could not be half Christian and half pagan; but the English king was merciful and conscientious, there was no harrying of the conquered to force them to submit to an alien yoke. Alfred, after his victories, left his former enemies to carry out the pledges they had taken. This policy was successful. Among the first coins minted in England by the reconciled Danes are those bearing the name of St. Edmund, the Saxon King who had perished in a defeat suffered during the early stage of the Danish invasions. Alfred scrupulously maintained the compact which arranged the respective spheres of influence of the two races on English soil.

Because of this same type of pacification the Saxon King enjoyed many years of peace, which he was able to devote to constructive statesmanship. Alfred was prepared to fight, but he had no intention of fighting unless the safety of his nation was seriously threatened. He perfected his military forces, but he did not use them for purposes of aggression. Alfred's policy of doing what lay immediately at his hand and doing it well, *i.e.*, in harmony with actual conditions, is seen in his legislation. He did not try to be original. His code was a revision of the

ancient Saxon laws. In the preface to this legal collection he inserts a great part of the Mosaic law from Exodus xx-xviii, to which a note is added that Our Lord, though he came into the world not to destroy but to fulfil the law, inculcated mercy and mild-heartedness and laid down the Golden Rule that we should not do unto other men that which we would not have them do unto us. So he explains the substitution of money penalties for death and mutilation.

Alfred, according to his biographer, exercised a kind of rough system of judicial recall. "The king was a most efficient investigator in dealing with lawsuits, as he was in every other branch of business. And he would make sagacious enquiries concerning almost all litigation that took place in his realm outside his presence to see whether decisions were just or unjust. And if he detected any unjust dealing of the judges he would interrogate them in a mild fashion, as was his disposition, either personally interviewing them or sending some trusted minister, concerning the reasons why they had given such bad decisions, whether by ignorance or from some other fault, from love or

fear of the one side, or hatred of the other, or even for greed of bribes."

The revenues of the kingdom were divided into two equal portions, half being devoted to secular purposes, the rest being assigned to religion. This last share was divided in four equal parts: the poor received the first share, the second quarter was given to two religious houses. The third quarter was spent on the king's school. An emergency fund absorbed the final quarter, devoted to gifts to churches or monasteries. The king had a remarkably keen sense of missionary obligation. He corresponded with the patriarch of Jerusalem on matters relating to ransoming captives in the East in the hands of Moslems, and it is reported he sent money to the ancient Christian churches in India and on the Malabar coast.

Alfred's special care was for the advancement of learning. Times had changed since the days of Charles the Great, when England was looked to to supply learned men for the continent. The harrying of the Danes had brought about a paralysis of culture. Alfred was aware of this desperate condition; in addressing the English bishops he said: "But so clean fallen away was learning now

in the Angle race that there were very few on this side Humber who would know how to render their service book into English or to read off an epistle out of Latin into English, and I ween there would not be many on the other side of Humber. So few of them were there that I cannot think of so much as a single one south of Thames when I took the realm." Before the Danish invasions the churches had libraries, but the knowledge of Latin among the clergy was only superficial. "We have lost both the wealth and the wisdom because we were not willing to bend our minds to the pursuit of learning." He gathered about him a small group of educated men, two bishops and two royal chaplains, but the king was himself bent on improving his own education; in this respect he might well be taken as a model by the benefactors of educational institutions to-day, who, like Moses, look at the promised land afar off.

Alfred's educational board, through the king's exertions, increased in influence. The plan proposed was to restore the monasteries as seats of learning. As most of the English clergy preferred the secular life, monks were imported from France. But clerical education was only one feature of his programme;

the laity must be educated as well. A great school was founded in which school books of both tongues, Latin and English, were assiduously read, and the scholars had time to learn writing also, and become studious and ingenious in the liberal arts before they had the strength to turn themselves to other avocations, such as hunting and the other accomplishments in which noble youths should be conversant. Bishop Asser, the king's biographer, informs us that Alfred's son Edward and his second daughter Aelffryth were great readers of books and so never fell into the idle and unprofitable ways that are a snare for princes. These efforts at improving secular education had lasting effects; nearly a century after Alfred's death there were lay magnates in England capable of writing freely in Latin, an accomplishment not found at this period outside northern Italy, where lay schools had a continuous existence from the period of the Greco-Roman Empire.

Alfred was indefatigable in opening up to his people the stores of ancient learning by means of translations. To this work he applied himself personally with great zeal and skill; where he could make the text more intelligible he did not hesitate to paraphrase

it or even to introduce additional matter of his own. One of the books he translated was a universal history by Orosius, a contemporary of St. Augustine; in this the king incorporated geographical information he had gathered from Norse seamen. There was nothing of the bookworm or dry-as-dust type in the king's interests; he loved out-of-door sports; architecture especially appealed to him, not merely, however, of the ecclesiastical type or as applied to buildings of use in warfare. "He constructed on a wonderful style," Asser says, "royal halls and chambers of stone and wood. Ancient kingly residences of stone were moved by his orders from their former positions, and sumptuously rebuilt in more suitable places." There is every reason to believe that this noble patriotic ruler, the saviour of the fatherland, was accorded the wish dear to every real scholar, of "growing old learning." Critics who have carefully examined the style of his translations hold that some of them show that they must have been the products of the very last years of his life.

The principles of Christian conduct applied to a government were operated on anything but complex lines; personal influence, not

autocracy, was the method selected by Alfred and suggested to him undoubtedly by the history of his own people in order to bring his kingdom to a larger life, a better degree of efficiency. His contribution, simple as it is, is strong in its concentration on making England, as he knew it, a more virile power; his stress on education may have been unreasoning, so that he may have never contemplated the inconsistency between an educated people and the kind of government under which England existed.

Of more international moral distinctions Alfred was fully cognizant; his treatment of the Danes shows this. One of the problems of modern times where a superior race comes in contact with one that has had fewer or often no advantages is how to elevate the inferior race by the machinery of European administration. In Alfred's case personal influence was the preponderating factor, not administrative machinery. Alfred depended on himself alone; there was no power on the continent in his day, civil or ecclesiastical, that was in any condition to aid him in his task. The Carolingian empire had reached a stage of dissolution; the papacy had interests to pursue nearer at home and when Alfred

died in A.D. 900, owing to the local anarchy in Italy, the bishops of Rome had begun to enter the disgraceful period of decline as the tools of aristocratic factions, made up of local Roman landlords.

CHAPTER V

The Mediaeval Papacy and the National State. Innocent III. Magna Charta.

Everywhere in the Middle Ages the ownership of land meant power and sovereignty. To-day corporate ownership of industry has to face the might of the National States; in the early Middle Ages property rights in land spelt might; the only government that existed was administered by landowners for landowners. This situation is what is called feudalism; it is a mistake to call it a system; nothing was less systematic; the one fixed point was the exercise of sovereignty in virtue of land ownership. The Church, too, was feudalized; but the ancient centralizing traditions of Church authority, with the Roman See as its apex, tended to develop a mighty structure of government which the disorganization of feudalism was too weak to resist.

The National State and not feudalism prevented Western Europe from becoming a vast theocracy, a kind of replica of the empire of Charles the Great, in which the head would have been the Bishop of the Roman See. Moral appeals, intellectual leadership, diplomatic skill, organizing efficiency are all elements that must not be neglected when one weighs the marvelous creation called the mediæval papacy. Its position in European life, its successes as a medium of Christian influence and its failure to satisfy some of the most direct and potent of men's social needs can best be estimated if we take it at its height under Innocent III and bring in relation with it the mediæval monarchy of England at a time when the germ life of modern democracy and constitutional government can be studied. Full-fledged imperialism must be regarded as the preamble to the Church constitution, of which Innocent III regarded himself as the divinely appointed executive. The papacy aimed to secure immediate sovereignty over the kingdoms of this world. If this control could not be immediately exercised, it could at least be brought within measurable distance by insisting that all secular rulers

should be called upon to obey the pope and to regard their duty to the papacy as the primary obligation of all government. St. Peter and, therefore, the pope, as inheritor of his plenary power, is the lord of all realms and principalities; they could be assigned to whomsoever the Bishop of Rome pleased. This was asserted to be the true tradition of the Holy See on the basis of a collection of fabricated documents called the Forged Decretals, which appeared in Western Europe about a century after the forged Donation of Constantine previously mentioned.

The State had no reason for existence except as a loyal servant to the Church, for by such loyal service it could alone atone for the original sin of its origin. The State was a creation of the devil, as was to be easily demonstrated by the deeds of violence, outrage and deception always inseparable from secular rule. In place of the State there was to be established on earth a heavenly kingdom with the Pope as God's representative at its head. Innocent III was a trained lawyer and he carefully surveyed the European situation as it was in his day in order to find ways and means of putting in practice these theories. He had the qualities of a statesman,

he was prodigiously industrious and to carry out his policy all means were regarded as legitimate.

It is astonishing to note the many lines of one consistent policy. Innocent appreciated the different situation of different countries; he acted in one way in Italy, in another way in Germany, but his methods all tended to create an irresistible ecclesiastical machine. Italy was easily brought definitely in the papal orbit by an alliance with the democracies of the cities, which dreaded nothing so much as the establishment among them of imperial rule. In Germany the pope aimed to break down all national resistance by selecting in a civil war a claimant for the empire whom he thought he could rely upon to become a subordinate tool in his hands. Separatism was the characteristic of German life; the great nobles and princes had no intention of allowing the introduction of a centralized secular power under the name of an empire. The name appealed to their national pride, but they had no intention of seeing their interests entrusted to the arbitrary direction of a single ruler. The situation worked naturally in the pope's favor, although there were great disappointments

awaiting him, because the papal claimant to the imperial throne showed a vigorous nationalism in maintaining the prerogatives of his position.

In France, where there was a strong monarchical system, led by a strong ruler, Philip Augustus, Innocent contented himself with undermining the autonomy of the French Church. Papal nominees were advanced to high positions; the legal system of the Church was brought into close dependence on the papacy, and a personal victory was won over Philip by the pope's intervention in a matrimonial dispute in the royal family. Philip was obliged to take back a wife from whom he had been parted by the complacent ecclesiastics of his own kingdom. In Spain internal feuds between the Christian kingdoms had led to the acceptance by the King of Aragon of the overlordship of the pope in secular matters. Farseeing schemes for extending the influence of the papacy in the East gave much occupation to the versatile mind of this energetic pope. His plan was to bring all of the Eastern churches into a status of subordination; then East and West united could move to attack Islam. Commercial intercourse was to be broken between

Christian and Moslem lands, while taxes were to be imposed upon the whole of Christendom to support the expenses of a crusade.

In order to strengthen the power of the Church in its immediate dependencies, Innocent proceeded to develop a centralized machinery for suppressing heresy. His zeal in this direction resulted in the creation of the Inquisition. Hitherto the discovery of doctrinal error had been a diocesan affair. By introducing centralizing supervision through papal officials local lukewarmness in these investigations could be corrected. Systematic co-operation from the civil authorities was demanded; heretics became civil outlaws; against groups of them, if they persisted in their contumacy, an actual crusade was declared to be in force permanently until they were overcome. One can see the results of Innocent's policy in the shocking campaign of repression undertaken against the Albigenses of southern France.

Another method of controlling heretical propaganda was the restriction of the right of preaching to those licensed by the Pope and the bishops. Every member of the parish was required to make a yearly confession to the parish priest, and the reception of the

Easter communion was made the condition of regular church membership. This legislation of Innocent is still reflected in the Anglican prayer-book; the form for absolution is derived from this period and also the rule as to Easter communion in the prayer-book rubric. Innocent was a lawyer and through the force of his character, especially his remarkable capacity for considering details, he gave the Church in Western Europe the form of an institution which depended on physical force, and imposed upon the clergy the obligation of performing what might well be called police duty.

Innocent had no more confidence in moral suasion than John Calvin; the ideal church government of both was martial law. Innocent's imperious will and keen intelligence "worked wonders." He was dictator and overlord; he was the Supreme Court of the Church, and in international questions he claimed to exercise the powers in full which to-day are only partially accorded to The Hague Conference. A universal bishop, Innocent was in deed, not only in name, for the diocesan bishops were only his representatives with no initiative left. Taxes were imposed by his command upon the whole

Church; all the religious orders had to accept the organization marked out for them by the pope; he was the first, it seems, to assume the designation of God's Vicegerent on Earth; previously his predecessors had contented themselves with the title of the Successor of St. Peter or the Vicegerent of Christ.

There was no sphere in which the papacy could not interfere; it was no longer restricted even by the misrepresentation of traditional customs and rights contained in forged documents; by its very existence all the power inherent in the Church was placed in the hands of the pope. Under an elastic phrase, "plenitude of power," any act could be justified, any new type of curial bureaucracy could be explained and become a part of the canonical system of the Church.

The mediæval empire was too weak to confront the Church organized under marching orders of this drastic type. It collapsed for two reasons: its lack of centralization and its lack of moral appeal. When anyone, after long lapse of centuries, wonders why the papacy won the victory over the empire the answer is that the empire was the representative of a tradition; it was not giving the

people any tangible benefits; it was not a strong government; it performed few real social services. The most effective test is to enumerate the various functions of the modern State and apply this standard to the mediæval empire, even allowing for simpler conditions.

The empire was as dangerous an enemy to human liberty as the papacy; it was, besides, more inefficient, less intelligent and, if possible, more oblivious of moral scruples. Innocent's victory seemed even to have deceived him. By destroying secular power on a large scale in the empire he neglected to realize the enormously superior importance and vitality of the new national consciousness manifesting itself in democratic city life in Italy and in the National States of Western Europe. Italian communes withstood the pope's will; Venice could not be bent to submit to his bidding. But after all it is in England that one must look for the successful resistance to the papal system of universal dictatorship.

It is not at all probable that Innocent had any conception of turning the countries, whose internal concerns he dominated, into dependencies endowed with the kind of pro-

vincial administration that had prevailed under the Roman Empire. There is no evidence that he desired progressive administration or improved methods of government; what the political status was mattered little provided it were subject to papal control. This type of autocracy politically is far more disastrous to all that makes for man's advancement than any secular scheme of administration created by autocratic rulers in the classical period of Greco-Roman antiquity.

Papalism preserved the attitude of aloofness from secular interests which belonged to the early age of the Church and at the same time pursued the attainment of autocracy with an absence of moral scruple that secular leaders might well envy. Innocent had a shrewd way of pressing the claims of the papacy at the most opportune time, *i.e.*, just on those occasions where he would meet with the least resistance. England and France had long been bitter rivals because of the large continental domains of the House of Anjou, whose head occupied in the person of Henry II the English throne. When Henry's weak and despicable son, John, showed his negative qualities as a ruler by

losing a goodly portion of the French possessions of the Anjou house, this was an indication that time for papal intervention had arrived. There was a disputed election to the See of Canterbury, one by the monks, the other with the co-operation of the bishops, who were complaisant instruments of the royal will. When the two elections were taken to Rome for validation Innocent cashiered both of them. Representatives of the monks and of the episcopate were summoned to Rome, with the king's consent, in order that a new election might be held under the pope's supervision. Both parties were certain that Innocent was on their side. But the pope proposed that Stephen Langton, an English cardinal, should be canonically chosen as archbishop.

This was the first time that the pope had picked out a candidate for the chief see of England. When John complained the pope replied that as the election was held in Rome royal consent was not necessary. This was a curt and legal answer to the king's boast that the English bishops were quite competent to settle all the litigation of the English Church in their own courts; there was no reason why they should buy justice from a

foreign power. The king also pointed out that the large revenues derived by Rome from England could be cut off. Innocent fully understood the character of his opponent. John proceeded to sequestrate the property of the Canterbury monks, and Innocent replied by imposing the dread penalty of the interdict which cut off all religious ministrations of the land. The dead were interred in unconsecrated ground without the office of a minister, the mass could only be celebrated on Sunday and then outside the walls of the church. Weddings took place in the church porch, baptisms were permitted within the church, but the doors were closed and only sponsors allowed to be present. The pope allowed none of the usual relaxations.

The king answered by confiscating all the property of the Church. There seemed to have been little anti-papal feeling among the laity—they remained passive. One of the monastic chroniclers remarks, somewhat pathetically, "there was full plenty of victuals." A short time elapsed and the sentence of excommunication was passed and this was followed after a longer interval by the deposition of John. The king's tyrannous finan-

cial exactions alienated from him the body of his nobles, the only source of support he had against the crusade which Innocent, depending on French help, had organized against him. John gave up the struggle, throwing himself on the mercy of the pope, made over his kingdom to the Holy See, to be held as a fief for an annual money rent. This idea came, it must be said, from the king himself, and he followed precedents already existing in the case of the two Sicilies, Denmark, Aragon, Poland, all of which were papal vassal states.

John gained nothing by his complacency and when Innocent tried to arrest the uprising against the discredited and detested monarch by denouncing the authors of factions and conspiracies, even his own nominee, Stephen Langton, actively championed the case of the barons. The army that marched against John's capital was under Robert Fitzwalter, "Marshal of the Host of the Lord and the Holy Church." When John proposed that his differences with his subjects should be submitted to the pope for arbitration the offer was scornfully refused, with the final result that the Magna Charta was hurriedly

drawn up and signed by the king as the one method of securing peace.

This famous document deals with acts and contains few general principles. Among them is certainly the demand that "the Church of England be free," though, of course, the freedom in the minds of the framers of the document had reference to the interference of the monarch in episcopal elections and in a general way the right of the Church to have its jurisdiction unimpaired by secular authority. This clause is not at all likely to have been aimed at the papacy. John's financial extortions and his irregular methods of administering justice are specifically dealt with in several clauses.

John guarantees that for the future all penalties shall be proportionate to the offense for which they are imposed; that no man shall be brought to trial on bare suspicion, without witnesses; or condemned, except in consequence of a lawful trial, either by his peers or in some other form admitted by the law of the land; that justice shall not be sold nor delayed nor denied any man. The Magna Charta has been charged with containing evidence of class legislation; it is true that the barons did defend their private jurisdic-

tion against royal centralization. Also the Magna Charta accorded only slight consideration to the rights of the lower classes, and no one can detect it in a general plan to provide a better form of government. This is quite in accordance with the mediæval point of view. Nothing was done to protect towns other than London against the king or villeins against their lords in the matter of taxation. Imperfect as the Magna Charta is, it was a good starting point for progress in social righteousness and the plan of hammering away indefatigably at a few definite points to be improved might be suggested as worthy of imitation in more spectacular schemes of reform in our own day.

Innocent III took no pains to understand the Charter. It was regarded apparently as offering an obstacle to carrying out plans and schemes in which the papacy would be the gainer. John, despite his inefficiency, had been selected with a curious lack of perception on the part of the pope to take a leading part in a crusade. The Charter was looked upon as derogatory to the royal authority and, therefore, an attack on the common duty of all Christians to engage in a crusade. Innocent, therefore, annulled the Charter as

derogatory to the crown, as extorted by force, as unjust and unlawful in its contents. The prelates of France and the adjoining lands were directed to preach a crusade in John's aid; remission of sins was offered to any knight who would go to the rescue of a would-be Crusader, precluded from fulfilling his vow by the plots of factious subjects. Innocent's support of John had no effect in diminishing the opposition against him, and the party of the barons only lost numerically when the hierarchy followed the pope's bidding. Their accession to the king's side produced no result.

Stephen Langton, the pope's own nominee, refused to carry out the papal command to excommunicate the king's opponents. He lost heart when he was threatened with suspension and left the kingdom in order to try to win over Innocent. The lay party were firm in their resistance; they could not understand the sudden change in papal policy, and they had no mind to give it their support. A strange situation arose when the English barons agreed to replace their own king with Louis, son of the French monarch, Philip Augustus. Philip had no inclination to come into conflict with the pope; he was familiar

with his temper and his power. It was pretended that Louis' act in co-operating with the barons was an act of disobedience to his father's wishes. In the meantime Philip gave him privately money and backing for the English enterprise.

Almost every incident in the situation arising from the contest over the Charter proves how far the ablest of the mediæval popes was from appreciating the significance of nationalism. Extraordinary blunders were made by Innocent at every step. Leaving aside all questions of ethics, the pope was extraordinarily badly served by his own agents. A complicated political situation was treated as if it were capable of being managed according to a chain of canonical formulas. Gaulo, the papal legate, earned the hatred of the national clergy, who charged him with accepting bribes from those who refused to follow the barons when the pope excommunicated the king and also from the party who sided with the barons after John had received the papal absolution. It is easy to understand the mystification produced by the shiftings of papal policy and one can sympathize with those who found it hard to grasp the moral distinctions involved in the

pope's volte-face. This deviousness did not end with John's reign, for when Gaulo found that the power of the barons was in the ascendent with the accession of a regency, owing to the youth of Henry III, he made himself the willing instrument of the head of the baronial party in order to exercise absolute authority over the English Church.

It is impossible to separate the progress of political liberty in England from the exercise or attempted exercise in the kingdom of papal autocracy. Other countries resisted, notably France, more successfully than England, for the struggle of the French monarch with the papacy led to the virtual annexation of the papacy to the French monarchy. England was unique, because in the tangled web of political contests in which the papacy arrayed itself with the royal executive, a system of civil liberty came into being, supported by a representative system of government which to-day has so widely extended that we might speak of the English Catholic State just as we speak of the Roman Catholic Church. There is a real catholicity in the English method of government which in modern times has caused it to be accepted as a model among peoples and nations of

alien speech who have no special sympathy or affinity with English religious history. For example, the modern government of Belgium and Italy, both preponderatingly Roman Catholic in religion, have a form of government the direct resultant of English civil liberty and English political history. In and through the winning of the Magna Charta all nations that have attained adult political life are blessed. There was a larger, sounder and saner Protestantism in the public life of nations when they refused to be governed by papal absolutism than in the narrower Protestantism of the sixteenth century, which concentrated itself exclusively on doctrinal differences. Indeed, unless we understand the earlier kind of Protestantism the meaning of the later brand becomes inexplicable; it was the National State, the product of the earlier Protestantism, that made the anti-papal revolt inevitable and turned the religious revolution to the social benefit of mankind.

CHAPTER VI

The Beginning of Representative Government. Robert Grossteste and Simon de Montfort. Anti-Papal Revolt.

The record of the way in which the Magna Charta came to be the fundamental law of the land shows that the Englishmen of the thirteenth century distinguished between the experimental form of Church government, of which the papacy was the centre, and the Christian axioms of government, of which the Magna Charta was the expression. There were no conscious aims on the part of the barons and Archbishop Langton to overthrow the faith or to deny ordinary Christian obligations when they resisted papal directions; it was a case of appealing from "a Pope badly informed to a Pope better informed." Only the new information now came from the same source as the original appeal. It came, too, through facts, not tradition or theories.

Autocracies tend to be logical, and are devoted to an iron legalism. It was a recognized principle that the papacy could only attain its ends by working through a monarchy. Of course, the monarchy was to be weakened and made dependent, but the instrument of control was, after all, the national monarch. Closely connected with this fallacy is the situation in England that led to the development of representative government.

No one could have better reached the ideal of a national monarch by nature and by divine right fitted to act as the passive instrument of papal control over England than Henry III, the immediate successor of John. Papal taxes were imposed upon the kingdom on the basis of a new and stricter valuation to help Gregory IX in his struggle with the Emperor Frederick II. As this struggle was costly a new method of raising funds was devised by the Roman Curia. The bishops of English sees were directed not to institute to vacant benefices, *i.e.*, not to appoint clergy to unfilled positions, until they had provided for a long list of papal nominees, chiefly Italians, who had no intention of residing in England. Cardinal Otho, the papal legate,

was an indefatigable collector of money; his extortions were backed by the authority of the king. When he demanded from the clergy a fifth part of their rents and movables it was reluctantly paid by the monasteries, while the bishops excused themselves on the ground of poverty. The rectors of Berkshire drew up a manifesto denying that the Roman church could demand tribute from the sister churches and said the pope was the patron and protector, not the suzerain, of the other ecclesiastical authorities; he should, like other bishops, maintain himself from his own revenues.

The leader of the opposition against absolutism in the Church was Robert Grossteste, Bishop of Lincoln, a scholar and a patriot, who was essentially English in the way he set about to reform abuses. He believed in the papacy as the central executive of the Church and accepted sincerely the subordination of the secular to the ecclesiastical power, but he admitted that the lay and spiritual powers each had its own sphere, not to be encroached upon by the other. There was plain common sense in Grossteste's general mental outlook, as may be seen in his scholastic argument that laughter is one of the

three things necessary to the body, or when in his sermons he urged the claims of poverty as a good thing, but allowed that to live by the labor of one's hands was better. His contention was not that the papal system was bad, but that it was badly administered. In the spirit of Burke, he adhered to the old ways, but thought they should not run counter to the moral convictions of his day.

Not long before his death, in 1253, when the pope directed him to admit a nephew, manifestly unfit, to a canonry at Lincoln, the bishop wrote a letter refusing to carry out the command, saying that a request which ran counter to the injunctions of Christ and the apostles could not be obeyed, even though it emanated from the Holy See. Grossteste had been before suspended for making a similar refusal. Innocent IV was warned by his cardinals of the danger of attacking a prelate who, for piety and learning, had neither equal nor superior in Western Europe. The bishop's last words contained a prophecy that only by the sword could the Church be delivered from its Egyptian bondage.

This forecast was soon realized in the person of the Earl of Montfort, who first

organized armed opposition against the king and then appealed, after defeating the royal forces, to a new form of national mediation. The kind of arbitration Montfort devised for the purpose of settling the differences between Henry III and his aggrieved subjects was a Parliament. This was not an assembly created *"in vacuo"*; what Montfort did was to take the Great Council, a body composed of magnates and bishops who had long acted as a council of advice, and add to it four knights of each county in the kingdom. Montfort planned in this way to overcome the magnates who could be counted upon to support the king. From this purely accidental origin the modern parliamentary system of government is derived.

There seemed at first to be no thought of making this representative body permanent, but it worked so well as a check on the royal executive that in a short time it came to include representatives of cities and boroughs. This ancient distinction between the method of representing town and country came to be a feature of English political life, and there is preserved to-day in Connecticut's electoral system a relic of Montfort's plan of placing county members on a different basis from

city members. Parliament did not bring peace; civil war ensued in which Earl Simon lost his life. To the people his fight against the royal power was sufficient to give him a unique place as a champion of popular rights. In spite of prohibitions issued by king and pope, the earl was worshipped as a saint for many years and it was believed that his corpse worked miracles.

The Parliamentary system was continued by Edward I, who saw in it a convenient method of imposing taxation and who used it as a blind to conceal his own attachment to principles of a complete executive prerogative. Its possibilities were not appreciated at the time, but later on its sphere was much extended in the work of national construction. In the fourteenth century the old grievances of papal "provisions" called forth direct anti-papal legislation. According to the Statute of Provisors every one was forbidden to accept "provisions" of any kind. Questions of ecclesiastical patronage were to be decided by the royal courts. Anyone who placed the case before an ecclesiastical court or who appealed to Rome was threatened with severe penalties (Statute of Praemunire), which even to-day could be ap-

plied in England if Church officials, say in the case of the appointment of a bishop by the Prime Minister, failed to elect the nominee of the State. Appeals to Rome actually ceased, while the temper of Parliament was shown in 1365 when Innocent VI tried to collect feudal dues from the country. The contribution was refused on the grounds that John in becoming the liegeman of the Holy See had violated his oath as king.

Soon England became anti-clerical as well as anti-papal under the influence of Wycliffe, who made a general attack on the legitimacy of the papal power. One must not take these manifestoes of nationalism altogether *"au pied de lettre."* The act of window dressing was not unknown to parliamentary legislators even in these early days of representative government, when the refinements of political machinery and party organization were unknown. The papacy was a political power to be reckoned with always; even in the miserable period of the schism and the hardly less contemptible exhibition of decadent autocracy known as the Babylonian captivity, *i.e.*, when the Popes resided at Avignon, it never occurred to the most radical reformer that the central organiza-

tion of the Church could be dispensed with. In the moves and counter moves of international ambitions, the support of the papacy was a valuable asset; in England, as in other countries, when it was profitable to national self-interest to keep on friendly terms with the centralized church system, all the anti-papal armory in the shape of Praemunire and the Statute of Provisors was carefully stowed away. When the political wind veered in another direction, it could be used again.

Nowhere is this frankly utilitarian state of mind towards the principles of ecclesiastical loyalty more definitely revealed than in the Italian city democracies, which so often fell under boss rule in the Middle Ages. Periods of extraordinary devotion to the papal cause vary with periods of aloofness that are almost chilling. Florence had the reputation of being steadfastly attached to the Holy See; its freedom came from its consistent Guelph policy, that is, it lost no opportunity, as was natural, of preventing the existence in Italy of a strong imperial power, but in all its relations with the papacy the ardor of Florentine statesmen was considerably tempered by business sense.

In its administrative organization the

papacy was far superior to any National State; in the service of its bureaucratic machinery it kept up a continuous tradition, and the influence of education and an experience covering wide fields of international life were bound to tell against the somewhat crude provincialism of the mediæval State. Not only was education enlisted on the side of the papacy; it enjoyed financial supremacy as well. In its schemes of taxation, in its arrangements for collecting money, in its management of accounts, papal administration was far in advance of secular methods. Many of the elements of modern banking are derived from the financial organization perfected by the papal fiscal agents in Western Europe. From one point of view, therefore, the concentration of the papal government on politics and finance was a benefit to society at large.

The National States devoted themselves largely to warfare and to raising the money to prosecute it; in England we know that the extension of the national judicial system had a very close connection with the additional legal fees secured by the royal courts; there was a great deal of frank materialism about the activities of the State. With all the re-

ligious duties turned over to the Church this attitude on the part of the State is easily explicable; but the papal government, after the contest with the empire was over, had actually no higher ethical ideals than the State. It was a great financial administrative machine. The result was that a large field for human liberty was left intact; neither pope nor king interfered when it was not to their self-interest to do so.

Some of these free movements cannot be neglected, for in them and through them came the experience which has given its quality to modern civilization. Notably is this the case with the university system, under which, in all civilized countries to-day, the advanced branches of learning are pursued. The university is a characteristic product of mediæval life, for it represents the ability to organize for common purposes under autonomous rule. The university had its own jurisdiction as uncontrolled from the outside as the jurisdiction of the lord of a manor. Its regulations were not imposed from above; they were developed from within. Properly speaking the term university means any kind of legal corporation; in ordinary usage it has become restricted to corporations

founded for the purpose of study. Opportunities for acquiring educational training did not originate with universities, but by introducing corporate life into educational method the universities made educational ideals popular and gave an importance to the teaching profession.

Monastic schools, capitular schools attached to cathedrals, the individual wandering teachers who passed from one centre to another, for a long time satisfied the demand for the higher learning. Even after the universities came into existence the centralization of study was far from being complete. Whenever there was a nucleus of students a teaching corporation could be established. In England, for example, it was some time before the educational monopoly of Oxford and Cambridge was complete; one begins to hear of Oxford as a university in the reign of Henry II, and under his son, John, the corporate existence of Cambridge becomes recognized. The traditional accounts of these famous universities, by which their origin is assigned to the Saxon period, may be easily explained by the inability of mediæval chroniclers to distinguish between some inconspicuous monastic school and a

regularly incorporated body of teachers and scholars. In the early days of English university life, Salisbury, Northampton, Stamford, Lincoln, Reading and Exeter were also seats of incorporated teaching bodies. In the later part of the twelfth century Gerald de Barri gave public readings at Oxford from his book on the topography of Ireland, and he explains his choice of Oxford as due to the fact that "more clerks were to be found there, and they more clerkly" (*i. e.*, better educated), and he found on his visit that these clerks were organized in faculties and were taught by licensed teachers.

The most important and cosmopolitan of all these institutions was the University of Paris. The popularity of Paris as a centre of learning first was due to the fame of Abelard, a keen and independent thinker and dialectician, who attracted large numbers of students. France had been for some time in the twelfth century the leader of an intellectual revival; it produced many notable teachers, who were surrounded by groups of scholars from all the countries of Western Europe. These teachers were not exclusively monks or members of the clergy; there seem to have been many laymen. They had no

direct affiliation with the Church schools and their own schools were founded where they wished, and they taught without securing a license from the ecclesiastical authorities. They were, however, required to get permission from the landlord on whose property the buildings in which they taught and lived were situated and, of course, this landlord collected from them the ordinary feudal dues.

Even when a teacher became attached to one of the monastic or capitular Church schools his right to teach was not questioned, unless there were moral objections, or when it could be shown that his intellectual qualifications were not sufficient. The onus of proof was laid upon the Church authorities and not on the teacher. Freedom in teaching was the rule, and special episcopal oversight in matters of teaching was not exercised.

This was the kind of elastic and free association that first existed in Paris. There were two groups of teachers and scholars: one on ground belonging to the monastery of St. Geneviève, the other on the Isle de Seine, near the Cathedral of Notre Dame. This last school was under the bishop because he was the landlord of the island; at St. Geneviève the abbot of the monastery owned

the property—both abbot and bishop originally exercised the kind of vague supervision noted above. When the French king bestowed on the bishop the right of legal jurisdiction over the teachers and scholars living on the cathedral property, its exercise was entrusted by the bishop to a member of the cathedral chapter, the chancellor. This official began to exercise, in regard to the scholars and professors subordinate to him, on the ground of property rights over the buildings where they lectured, the kind of absolute authority which in American colleges and universities is assumed by the President.

In some institutions on American soil the word chancellor has been preserved, so even after so many centuries an early incident in the educational development of Paris is crystallized among people of an alien race in the New World. It can hardly be said here, though, that "one touch of nature makes the whole world kin," for the chancellor is a product of the lawyer's brain, not nature in its ordinarily accepted meaning. The analogy between the old and the new would be complete if one could find any documentary evidence for the existence of trustees; but it is

fairly certain that this contribution to university life is of purely American origin.

In Paris there was no enthusiasm among the group of teachers at the appointment of an official supervisor; in order to protect their liberties they organized a corporation. Such was the incidental origin of a university. The predominant influence of Paris in the world of learning caused its example to be followed elsewhere. The chancellor remained, but his power was constitutionalized. Popes and kings united to extend the privileges of the new corporation; the papacy seeing in its growth a valuable balance against episcopal authority, and the French monarchs probably not uninfluenced by the economic advantages of having thousands of students gathered in the capital of their kingdom.

The universities quickly became the foci of a mediæval modernist movement. As the result of the intellectual activity those encouraging traditional methods of thought had a difficult time in holding their own. University activities were not purely speculative. Both Oxford and Cambridge, for example, took an intense interest in politics. In Oxford, Bishop Grossteste found his most

ardent supporters in his nationalistic campaign against the papacy. It may be well to remember that Matthew Arnold's dictum as to Oxford being the home of lost causes is really an historical blunder and can only be excused on the ground that, like many literary men, Arnold, with an extraordinary confidence in the versatile processes of his own self-consciousness, identified a pleasing, tuneful phrase with fact. Oxford's attachment to the Jacobite cause was the exception which does not prove the rule.

In any case, thirteenth century Oxford was the home of the cause which was victorious. It stood for nationalism, and it stood for the learning which was then new, and afterwards, with the rise of Humanism, became discredited because it was old. Oxford scholars attacked the papacy and turned aside from traditional dogma to devote themselves to Aristotle. There was great freedom of teaching, and although the curriculum for graduation was severe, each student could select his favorite teacher, and his own time, for graduation. Justinian or Aristotle offered an avenue to a future career as well as theological studies. It was hard to reconcile Greek political theories with the constitu-

tion of society in the Middle Ages; it is not surprising, therefore, to note that Oxford was often the scene of political ferment and sceptical criticism.

Roger Bacon, a characteristic Oxford scholar, a pupil also of Grossteste, undertook to counteract the effect of Aristotelian study as interpreted by Arabic commentators. In his address to Clement IV he writes: "Much have I labored, both in the sciences and in languages, for forty years since first I learned my alphabet. Except for two years of the forty I have been always studying." He spent $10,000 on books, experiments, tables and instruments; in training assistants and in securing the friendship of wise men. He had a wide vision of an education which combined study of the past with devotion to natural science. Science he regarded as the best protection of religion and no teacher to-day could be more emphatic than Bacon in urging that authoritative dicta be examined as well as repeated. He excepted no one from this test; and he speaks adversely of the extraordinary rewards attached to legal studies and deplores the perversity of clericalism. The clergy he declares have no desire for truth; "wherever clerks

are met together, as happens at Paris and Oxford, they scandalize the whole world with their feuds, their contentions and their vices."

Bacon may be regarded as an academic Isaiah; in many respects he stood alone, yet it must be conceded that the great universities of the mediæval period represented a movement which, leaving aside the enduring value of the dialectical subtleties in scholastic theology and philosophy, acted as a leaven in eliminating crudeness and brutality, elements so often surprising to us in a society where the religious sanction predominated on its formal side. Those who are witnessing the experiment of social assimilation in the United States are better fitted to understand the incongruities of life in the Middle Ages, when the process was carried on without a strong civil government. As to moral questions, the Church was looked to for guidance, but often the fulfilment of religious obligations was regarded as satisfactory, even when what to-day are considered normal social standards were neglected.

The other-worldliness of the Church in certain matters joined with an Italian keenness to make the most of material advantages

is visible in the Crusades. No duty was more incessantly insisted upon than this obligation of taking part in warlike expeditions in order to rescue from Moslem hands the sacred sites of Palestine. No nation indeed could recognize itself as a member of the family of Christendom unless it showed ardor in the undertaking. It appealed to the masses like the conversion campaigns in countries to-day of Anglo-Saxon descent. Yet the Crusades were as fruitful a cause of international bickering as the Balance of Power axiom in the eighteenth century. In the crusading principalities of the East the native Christian inhabitants were treated with as little consideration as are the present day victims of industrialism in the rubber forests of South America, or the cocoa islands of Africa.

CHAPTER VII

Progress in Local Institutions and the Growth of Public Opinion.

Elements of progress, not taught either by State or Church, were being acquired through the freedom of experiment in town life, *i.e.*, in the guild system as well as in the educational corporations just described. In some cases the trade guilds, which were in a general way analogous to modern trade unions, actually became the sovereign power of democracies. In Florence they directed the city government, and as the city itself, by its conquests, came in control of dependent towns, the guilds of Florence exercised rule over municipalities where other local guilds directed the city administration. In countries more strongly organized under natural monarchies, the guilds attained no such importance, yet in both France and England the control of town affairs was in the hands of

the industrial organizations. An interesting relic of this old situation is still retained in London to-day where, in the city, the restricted area at the centre of the great metropolis, the civil officers of the government are exclusively related to the so-called livery companies, the local designation for the ancient guilds.

Confraternities or brotherhoods, with religious aims, seem to have arisen simultaneously with the industrial corporations. A special saint was taken as patron, his altar was decorated by the members, chapels were set aside for them in the cathedrals or parish churches, and the particular saint's day was observed. Certain prayers and religious exercises marked the association. There was common attendance at church services, and special memorials for deceased members. The associates observed certain restrictions as to luxurious living or apparel and active philanthropy was prescribed not only to poorer members, but to the distressed generally, whether from poverty or from illness. Other duties were the maintenance and building of bridges and the suppression of lawlessness. It often happened that an industrial guild had a duplicate organization

as a religious confraternity. Sometimes it was entirely independent of such connections.

Association with the Church was the central principle of these bodies of laymen. They were valuable allies in all measures relating to the maintenance of the church system; besides, they prevented that wide gap between the clerical and lay order which, on the surface, seemed to mark mediæval society. In these confraternities the laymen came to learn how to take their share in the active work of the Church. It is necessary to be reminded when one thinks of the complicated machinery of a religious autocracy that in these areas of voluntary activity there was great opportunity for cultivating self-help and self-reliance.

With the growth of town life and industry a new spirit of progress is everywhere in the air; what one calls the Dark Ages is simply a name for the centuries when all of Western Europe was under an agricultural system of economics. The efflorescence of the movement just mentioned coincides with trade expansion. The great cathedrals and the great abbeys, which mark the climax of Gothic art, could not have been built in an age when money was scarce. The work on them was

not done, as is so often supposed, in the way of thank offerings by the artisans who engaged in their construction. We know from the recently published accounts of Vale Rose Abbey, a small foundation in the north of England, that the master of the works employed there received a yearly salary of nearly eight thousand dollars, according to current values.

Italian art, too, was the product of communities which were industrially active. People who wonder why mediæval Rome, the religious capital of the world, had hardly any place at all as a centre of artistic creativeness, only need remember that Rome was a bureaucratic, not an industrial, centre. Society was anything, therefore, but static in the Middle Ages. While the Church government and the State government remained consistently in the old paths, in the many free areas of life there was great activity. Something resembling what is called public opinion was in process of formation.

The spectacular contest between Boniface VIII and the French King Philip le Bel, who was charged with infringing upon the rights of the French clergy, was accompanied by the spontaneous appearance of a popular

pamphlet literature. Lawyers and theologians were active in defending the national position. The pope had forbidden the king—to give an outline of this bitter duel between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities—to impose taxes on the clergy without the papal consent. He was charged with unlawful interference with the Church administration in France and was cited to appear at Rome to justify his conduct. If he did not appear, a congress of Church notables would investigate the case without him, and he was warned that the pope was his overlord, appointed by God over princes and kings, with the power to root up and destroy.

In their various pamphlets the king's champions pointed out that the secular power was entirely distinct from the power of the Church. In matters regarding the administration of the law the king's authority, they claimed, was absolute; the office of the clergy was pastoral and philanthropic, they were bound to live a life of poverty, and as members of secular society they had no official functions by nature. Whatever powers of this kind they enjoyed were conferred upon them by the State and could be revoked at the pleasure of the civil authorities. The pope

was indeed, they conceded, the Vicegerent of Christ, but it was the Christ of the earthly ministry, not the ascended Saviour, the Eternal Judge.

As to the civil power, it was a service performed for the benefit of Christian people as a whole. Church property belonged to the Church to administer in behalf of all the members of the Church, not alone of the clergy, and, therefore, was subject to taxation. As a practical consequence it was contended that the King could act as protector of the Church and appoint his nominees to ecclesiastical positions.

A much more radical champion of the secular power appeared in the middle of the fourteenth century in the persons of Marsilius of Padua and Johann of Landau, who, using the passage of Psalm cxv:16 as their text, "The heaven is the Lord's, but the earth he hath given over to the children of men," declared that all power belongs by right to the people or the national ruler, who can decide how it is to be exerted. All law is, therefore, state law. Divine law will govern in God's future kingdom and not before; it will then be in the hands of Christ. The Church hierarchy in this world have no ex-

ternal authority, nor is there any real gradation of office; there is no bishop over the presbyters and no pope over the bishops; all are called to pursue a life of poverty, are confined to spiritual weapons. In their hands is the administration of the sacraments and the preaching of the Gospel. As the Church is in no way identical with the hierarchy, but is coextensive with the Christian people, all the authority of the Church belongs to the whole body of Christians, or to its head, the national monarch, all the temporal affairs of the Church are in his control. Besides, councils can be summoned by the secular authority, composed of both clergy and laity, to make and to give explanations of the Holy Scriptures, which last are infallible documents.

By divine law the pope is not the successor of St. Peter; conditions and political changes have enabled him to make this claim. Properly speaking, all the power of a pope must come from a general council or from the assent of Christian people. Even then he only has oversight over purely ecclesiastical matters; he is the executive officer of the council; he acts as a mediator in disputes,

but he cannot act apart from the secular authority.

Occam, a great English scholastic teacher, took part in the discussion and developed some original lines of his own. He preached the uselessness of strict logical consistency and argued for a sane opportunism, guided by utilitarian, or what might be called to-day pragmatic principles. Under certain conditions he thought the pope might well depose princes, but if new conditions arose this power of the pope might disappear and some new form of Church government could be introduced; for superior to all systems of law is the faith and order of the Church. In the place of a centralized system of church government a number of national churches could be established. A territorial prince, even a simple layman, can exercise far-reaching rights over the Church, provided he has the right faith. For Christ has not promised that the whole of Christianity, or even a majority of Christians, much less the papacy and the hierarchy, shall always retain the correct faith. He has only affirmed that faith shall abide in the Church, a promise which will be fulfilled if it abides in little children. For this reason a general council

is not infallible; its chief duty is to act as a court of appeal where the papal executive is concerned. Lay people, those in authority beyond all others, are bound, as the representatives of their Christian subjects, to protect the faith when the Church organization fails to do so. Faith, *i.e.*, membership in the Church, and nothing else, alone confers the right to speak in its name.

This outline of the relationship between the lay power and Church organization, as worked out by Occam, shows how long before the religious revolution of the sixteenth century the ideas that took permanent and definite shape at that time had been openly and freely discussed. Incidentally, too, the revolutionary character of Occam's speculations, which were circulated without any formal condemnation, will surprise those who unwisely argue that under a centralized ecclesiastical system there was little opportunity given for freedom of thought. As a matter of fact, along such lines as these there was great liberty in the mediæval Church; active measures were taken, as in the case of Savonarola, against teaching which interfered directly and positively with the political and material interests of the papacy. If Savon-

arola was condemned and Occam allowed a remarkably wide latitude it was because the Florentine monk was directing the government of Florence, while the English Franciscan contented himself with remaining within the sphere of a writer and scholar.

CHAPTER VIII

Humanism.

With the growth of public opinion, popular intellectual needs came to be supplied in a way that no form of scholastic reasoning, with its technicalities of argument and arrangement, could satisfy, no matter how radical a position might be advocated. In such a medium the general public could not be reached. Even to-day, with the wide interest in natural science and after several generations of popular education, the results of the labors of physicists, biologists and chemists must be presented in a non-technical form. Dante, of course, was a layman, but he was a trained scholastic of striking intellectual power, able to combine sheer poetic genius with the formal type of thought that belonged so distinctively to the theology and philosophy of his own day. But information could not be ordinarily conveyed by technical

formalism and the cultural side of man's nature had to be recognized.

This was the work of Humanism, a movement which contributed to the modern Christian State its desire for education as seen in its schools, its museums, in the development of the drama, and in the cultivation of musical taste. The fact that the focus of the humanistic movement was in Italy was not fortuitous. Because of the Crusades Italy had become the chief mercantile nation of Western Europe, the meeting point of the lines of trade between the East and the Occident. In Italy city life was fully developed to a degree unknown in other western countries. No places could rival Florence, Genoa, Venice or Pisa as trade centres. These democracies rested on a basis of intensive business development. All sections of the population were occupied in trade. Wealth was the characteristic of Italian society, which appreciated the comforts and the amenities of life possible among those who enjoyed prosperity. Important political questions no longer excited much attention; the cities fell under the sway of boss or oligarchical rule. After the question between the Church and the Empire was finally decided by the collapse

of the Empire, people accepted the papal system as necessary and natural, but it received no enthusiastic support. This attitude is perfectly familiar to-day, now that most countries have become democracies; the old feverish interest that accompanied the struggle against class privileges, or executive prerogative, has died away. People do not wish a return to absolute monarchy, they resent class legislation, and they would be prepared to withstand a return to it. But republican institutions excite none of the old enthusiasm. In no other country was there manifested such detachment from theological controversy and speculation.

The first great name in Italian Humanism was Petrarch; he was an individualist without a system of thought; he believed in the perfectibility of man through culture, and he found his standards of culture in the great masters of classical literature. The mediæval appeal to tradition was quietly but emphatically set aside without argument. Petrarch relied on the æsthetic appeal, not on formal argument, conducted according to the rules of scholastic dialectic, to win his case against the advocates of tradition. Because classical models came to be appealed to

as final in stylistic form and expression there was a greater desire to investigate the treasures of the past.

Greek as well as Latin manuscripts were rescued from oblivion and students throughout the West began to devote themselves to acquiring a more thorough knowledge of ancient languages for their own sake, not simply as aids to strengthen accredited theological systems. The movement was an international one; scholars of all countries felt a kinship that took the place of the affinity based on membership of the Church. New impetus was naturally given by the discovery of the art of printing; to all classes were now opened the means of self-improvement; there could no longer be a monopoly enjoyed by the clergy alone.

Insensibly the domination of the ecclesiastical authority was destroyed and in a more effective way than had been attempted in the long-drawn struggle between the mediæval State and the centralized papacy. In this latter case two autocratic institutions were in conflict. With Humanism the layman was creating a world for himself where official position in Church and State counted for nothing, a world in which the individual could

develop and move according to his own needs. The laity became articulate; the consciousness of their power was a powerful factor, and it was expressed in what is known as public opinion, an element all the more potent because it has no bureaucratic origin and exercises no official functions.

In taking this independent position there was bound to arise, sooner or later, an antagonism to the accredited system of the Church. Petrarch himself was a person of timorous temper; he had no desire for martyrdom and no radical views as to the need of a religious or social revolution. He was glad to be patronized by the Church authorities, even if he directed against them the shafts of his wit and satire. He was, in other words, more of a Matthew Arnold than a Karl Marx.

The Humanistic movement could not abide within the limits suggested by Petrarch's own interests as a stylistic essayist and a genial critic of the foibles of his day. A broader, more serious attitude was taken when scholars began to apply critical standards to the history of the Church and the claims of the papacy in their search for the genuine records of antiquity. All the forged

documents which supplied the armory for the champions of the papacy were exposed as untenable. The supremacy of Aristotle as the dictator of philosophy was no longer accepted, now that the investigation of the past revealed the importance of Plato as a guide of philosophic thought. Though Plato's authority was reverenced, he was interpreted in the light of Neo-Platonic mysticism, and, therefore, Platonic teaching was accepted as furnishing the religious groundwork for Humanism.

In mysticism was given the elements of personal religion adapted for the needs of lay folk who felt no revolt against the practices of institutional religion, but looked upon it as a subordinate matter in contrast to the value of the personal soul. One type of mysticism easily led to another; no teaching was refused provided it appealed to the imagination and offered some supposed new avenue for spiritual development. With this freedom of choice it was inevitable that the Scriptures themselves and the works of the great Christian teachers of antiquity should be approached from a new point of view.

Petrarch admired Augustine, but it was not the Augustine of the predestination dis-

cussion, but the author of the "Confessions," the keen analyzer of religious psychology. St. Paul began to be studied, not as a collection of texts to support theological formulas in dialectical theses, but as a medium to discover the mind of the early Church. At the close of the fifteenth century the Humanist Ficino lectured on the Pauline epistles; in England Dean Colet was urging a conservative reform, to be conducted by an appeal to the Scriptures and to the writings of the teachers of Christian antiquity. Even Petrarch, who hated radicalism, became convinced that a distinction must be made between the religion of Christ as found in the New Testament and in patristic literature and that set forth in scholastic philosophy. This view tended naturally to disintegrate the official tradition of the mediæval Christian world.

Now that the classical type of culture was being understood in its undiluted form, scholasticism was regarded as only another example of the trend downward which was assumed by Humanists to have followed from the destruction of ancient civilization. In this idealism of the past there were bound to be extravagances; the Humanists were ex-

posed to all the foibles of a clique, without responsibility, and removed as they were from any opportunity of taking part in public affairs. Even those who were bitterest in attacking priests and monks were glad to earn a living as the pensioners of highly paid ecclesiastical dignitaries. Virility was not characteristic of the Italian Humanists; they moved in a narrow circle and were generally self-conscious, as most professional educators are in every age, and therefore inclined to rate their merits and their influence at an inflated valuation.

The age of Humanism, one needs to remember, was also the age of the War of the Roses, the period of upstart dynasts in Italian cities, the age of Alexander VI, who in every way violated as pope the ordinary decencies of private life and whose policy was exactly what Mr. Gladstone called the government of the infamous Neapolitan Bourbons, a negation of God. Most Humanists assumed a Gallio-like attitude: they cared for none of these things. Petted and flattered by a select public who applauded their stylistic achievements, the Humanists were content to lead a sheltered existence, in which their chief practical activity was de-

voted to securing from their patrons the largest possible emoluments.

A more compact influence was created by Humanism when it passed into Northern Europe. It found strong support in the Teutonic universities and in a short time most of the adherents of Humanism were closely associated with the teachers who, in Church and State questions, adopted a racial or nationalist point of view. Over against the Hapsburg monarchy on one side, which by family alliances had come to control the greater portion of Western Europe, and the papacy, which was being used as a willing instrument of Hapsburg policy, Humanism became transformed and democratized. It lost its pettiness and aloofness and for some years it was the storm centre of the new social and religious conflict under which mediæval conditions passed away.

CHAPTER IX

The National State and Religion.

The National State was the predominating factor of all the changes at the close of the mediæval period. After the trying experiences of several general councils, during which it was believed to be possible to save the international Church by turning the autocratic papacy into some kind of a central constitutional executive, it was plain that nothing could be accomplished by the common action of Christendom. Attention was then concentrated on making the National State do the work which an international congress or council had failed to do.

The most signal example of the change from the old to the new type of State organization is the united kingdom of Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella. A reformation under royal authority took place; no autonomous associations were left; the Church was

made dependent upon the State. One of the chief organs of royal despotism was the Inquisition, which was directly managed by royal officials. It was able to remove objectionable political opponents out of the road with unparalleled certainty and through its drastic criminal process property could be confiscated without delay and without appeal to any independent authority. Ecclesiastical positions were filled by royal nominees and no papal documents could be of legal force within the kingdom unless with the royal consent. In all that pertained to the discipline and education of the clergy the royal authority was supreme; city life was undeveloped, and with the discovery of America the material support of the Spanish Crown came from the extensive silver mines discovered there.

This unique condition of economic independence contributed to establish in Spain a unique type of absolutism. The King, in every sense of the word, was an absolute sovereign and he was the master and ally of the papacy, not its servant. This close relationship of a dreaded centralized secular power, capable of drawing upon hoards of precious metals in the New World, with the traditional

seat of ecclesiastical autocracy able to exert a strong pressure on the various national churches, gave an impetus to the reforming movement in every country. Religious issues never stood alone, they were always complicated with the decisive factors of international politics. Loyalty to the old system of the faith meant most often subordination to the Spanish monarchy, which controlled in Europe, besides the Iberian peninsula, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany.

Spain became a dangerous power in English political life, as one sees in the marriage of Queen Mary with Philip II, and later through its support of Mary Queen of Scots. In France Spain used the religious revolution consistently and continuously to bring the country into a state of dependence. Everyone knows the heroic struggle of the Dutch by which they secured a status of freedom and so inflicted on the Spanish monarchy a blow from which it did not recover. It was fortunate for the growth of nationalism that the Spanish rulers of this period, with the exception of Charles V, were mediocre statesmen. It was also fortunate from the same point of view that owing to a mistaken economic policy the Spanish monarchy could

not maintain its financial supremacy on the basis of its mineral wealth in America in the face of the productive industrialism of other countries that had no such artificial support.

No country in the sixteenth century that lacked organization in its government and was devoid of industrial strength was able to maintain its natural integrity during the long period of storm and stress. Absolutism was the bulwark of nationalism; Scotland and Ireland came under the complete control of England, because the English people were industrially superior and had a stronger government. The Germans preserved their Protestantism intact and fortified, largely because Cardinal Richelieu, as the head of strongly absolutist France, had no mind, even though an ecclesiastic, to help Roman Catholic Hapsburgs organize a strong government to the east of the Rhine. This is the classical example of the supremacy of State interests over considerations of ecclesiastical allegiance. Neither Roman Catholics nor Protestants were ready to disregard the aims of nationalism. No matter what the particular type of religious confession might be it came to be regarded as overshadowed by

the interest of self-preservation on the part of the State.

Finally, one arrives at the stage in the nineteenth century when Christian governments, for the sake of preserving the international balance of power, are willing to protect Moslem governments, or ready to secure the alliance of a nationality where Buddhism and Shintoism prevail in order to secure alien aid in the complicated moves of the groups of the great European powers. In the Napoleonic period one finds a coalition of England, Austria, Prussia and Russia, all representative of different types of confessional allegiance, acting together to repress a despot who had restored the Roman Catholic hierarchy in France and had won applause, because, after the religious anarchy of the French Revolution, he favored the religious system most acceptable to the great body of French citizens. The State, therefore, takes precedence of any formal religious organization and yet the State preserves itself by preserving its Christian title and character.

Even in the United States, where there is no official relation between the government and religious organizations, there are chaplains appointed in the army and navy, Chris-

tian principles are appealed to in the courts and in executive documents. There is an unparalleled activity displayed in the corporate life of religion; money to a degree never before anticipated is given for the support of the various communions of Christians who have been taught under a régime of toleration to live together in comity. Such a development, familiar as it is, seems strange and inexplicable. It remains now to trace the origin of the free Church in a free State. In the age of the Reformation neither of these institutions were free; there were no examples of democracy and there were no instances of a Church organization unrelated to the administrative functions of the State. Calvin's ideal was a theocracy, Luther's ideal was a government conducted by Christian princes who acted as benevolent patrons of the Church. Ignatius Loyola planned by the methods of the religious drill sergeant to makes secular officials the willing instruments of revived mediæval papacy. The Tudor and Stuart monarchs in England believed in maintaining at all costs a uniform type of religion within the borders of the nation as the safest way of combining a Christianized society with a strong monarchy able to play

its part in international affairs. In France and in Spain there was much the same aim under different conditions.

No Roman Catholic State in Europe showed any intention of working to restore a papacy of the kind represented by Innocent III. No Protestant State in Europe had any intention of lending itself to a scheme by which a purely Protestant propaganda would be encouraged, irrespective of the ambitions of the several National States which had embraced Protestantism. Even supposing that all the movements to Christianize the masses of the people in the United States were successful, *i.e.*, assuming that every citizen had some kind of Church affiliation, there would be no idea of altering the Constitution of the United States in any respect. The State governments would continue, municipalities would be in the hands of the officials named in present city charters.

This conception of religion as an organism active within the State, a part of it and yet not of it, is the artificial creation of the men who draw up constitutional documents. It is the result of the view that the autocratic State as well as the autocratic Church is not the best instrument of human progress.

Bureaucracy can perform useful services, but only on condition that it acts as the agent, not as the master, of society. The Middle Ages tried out the principle of autocracy on a broad scale in the religious administrative machine presided over by the papacy. It performed services to the peoples of Western Europe of a cultural kind that could not be performed by the mediæval State, representing, as it did, the old Germanic tribal tradition that people band themselves together solely for the purpose of self-protection or aggression.

The Reformation State held to the autocratic principle also with tenacity. On a small scale it was applied with an effectiveness never reached previously in the larger field. In the sphere of religion the axiom followed was that every subject must adhere to the religion adhered to by the ruler of the territory in which the subject resided. Every State worked for uniformity; Calvinism, Romanism, Anglicanism and Lutheranism were at one on this issue that religious differences could not be tolerated. Where they were tolerated, as in France, the two religious groups showed a tendency to organize two in-

dependent secular associations, which would have destroyed the existence of the State.

The attainment of liberty for the individual has also been accompanied by attainment of liberty of association within the powerful State organization which consciously limits itself for the public good. What the existence of a body of citizens of divided religious allegiance has proved is, among other things, the not unimportant one that enormous sums of money rivalling the amount raised by the State through taxation can be obtained without the appeal to force or legal process. The Christian State of today, in its most complete expression in the new lands of Saxon speech, neither conducts a contest with a religious organization as was done in the mediæval period, in order to preserve the integrity of its nationalism, nor does it dominate religious organization as did the State of the Reformation period, in order to secure a homogeneous citizenship. The policy is one of live and let live; a church in its own sphere is regarded as no more of a menace to the social order than a theatre. Its place in society is not treated officially as being of the same importance as a school or college or university, because the State

supports school systems and in many cases subsidizes and controls institutions of higher learning. In educational work the State can afford, without serious question, to conduct its own system; it can tax its citizens for its support, but it hesitates to establish an actual exclusive monopoly as it does in the post-office in the control of the media of communication by letter.

No one wishes to re-establish a religious monopoly; even in Roman Catholic countries only a few fanatics would like to restore the mediæval system under which those who rejected the religion of the majority were exposed to severe penalties affecting life and property. Religious divisions are so much accepted as the normal social relation in civil society, that probably no one religious body, no matter how exclusive its claims, would consent to take over as a free gift the organization of another communion founded on different principles.

In Islam the State and the religious system are virtually identical; no one can separate those whom Mohammed has joined together. Islam without the State is in a far worse condition than papalism without the Pope. In India and Oriental countries the State

organization was crudely developed; it was an organism of arrested growth. Contact with the Christian States of Western Europe has produced deep and vital changes.

There is a missionary work going on in the East carried on in far larger proportions than the religious work of the many religious communions represented there. It is the Christian State, the creation of the Christian society of the West, that is to-day working changes on a mighty and unprecedented scale in India, China and Japan. The new vitality that is coming to these old civilizations is from the outside, it is not self-created. Governments are being altered, social conditions are being transformed, new governmental machinery and standards are being introduced; all these changes are immediately due to a civilization which has the stamp of Christian practice and idealism. No church or churches can do this work alone; they can co-operate, but they cannot complete it.

The Christian State has become the cultural formula of man's demand for self-expression and self-realization. Living as one does in the complicated details of modern life, bent as one has to be on the effort to provide for one's economic existence, it is no

easy matter to stand outside the machinery and mark its activities as a whole. The organism that has been built up is nicely adjusted, yet, so far as its construction is concerned, it seems when we survey its origin to have followed from as purely instinctive processes as a beehive. Intelligence is behind the several parts, but the symmetrical accommodation of the parts appears almost fortuitous.

The foundation of the modern State has been traced in its several mediæval component elements; it is now time to note the adjustment of the parts, the elimination of waste products, the strengthening of certain tissues, the growth of new reflexes that resulted from the Reformation movement. The first point to keep deeply impressed on one's mind is that the theological or doctrinal changes of the Reformation are concerns of subordinate interest when measured in the scale of social change. The revolting religious bodies and the organization dominated by the papacy all were subject to the forces of transition. The mediæval Church ceased to exist in Western Europe under any name; Christians, no matter what they were called, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, were

in a new environment which could not tolerate the old, no matter what period of antiquity was appealed to in support of their claims. The reformers supposed they were reviving primitive Christianity; the Roman Catholics supposed they were maintaining the mediæval system. Both were mistaken.

Many religious communities to-day look back with affection to their founders, but however deep their sentiment may be they cannot identify themselves with those they reverence. There is no possibility of treating these two stages of life as interchangeable terms. The mediævalists cannot restore the Middle Ages. The New Zionists cannot revive the kingdom of Judah; if they succeed in doing so it will be under the protection of the great Christian Powers. The modern Calvinists can find no new Geneva to administer as a theocracy. No one in the same way could escape the Reformation. Ignatius was as much its product as Luther. In both cases the career of each submitted to the direction of new forces and the task of each was conditioned by social and political factors of a new type. Luther's work could, as far as one can judge, never have been effective had he not been supported by the territorial princes

and imperial cities of Germany. The counter reformation, led by Loyola, could not have stayed the tide of Protestant expansion had he not recognized that the chief aim of the Jesuits was to exert control in the counsels of secular rulers.

Neither Luther nor Loyola believed in a theocracy; they did believe in using the power of the State to mould the religious views of the citizens of the State. Calvin, it is true, established a theocratic municipal system at Geneva when his partisans came into control of the town. But apparently this was done to secure for him a *"pied de terre,"* safe from interference, from whence he could exercise a real if indeterminate dictatorship through his disciples and sympathizers in Western Europe. He, too, accepted the State as a social organism which could and should be placed in the service of religion, though in regard to the privileges of the ecclesiastical order as such he stood closer to Loyola than to Luther.

CHAPTER X

The Reformation and Its General Results.

Protestantism is a much more extensive term than is indicated in its historical ecclesiastical connections and connotations. Countries where to-day the government is in the hands of a decided Roman Catholic majority, or where an official Protestantism practically has no existence, are essentially Protestant. No country, no matter how loyal its allegiance may be to the tenets and practice of modern Roman Catholic religion and worship, accepts the principles so long contended for by the mediæval papacy. Neither Spain nor Austria would tolerate the exercise within their boundaries of the autocratic imperial religious system championed by Innocent III.

Only by devious tentative methods pathetically weak in their results does the Roman See attempt to interfere even as a co-operat-

ing factor in international affairs. There is no predominance; it is often content to be allowed to appear to be not so insignificant as to be passed over in Hague Conferences. Its greatest achievement is to make good newspaper "copy." Indeed, it is one of the curious paradoxes of American civilization that while in strong Roman Catholic countries the clerical press has almost no influence, in the United States there is very considerable evidence that ecclesiastical wire-pulling is producing in the American secular press a very decided inclination towards clericalism. Industrial ethics in press production is responsible for some strange phenomena, but this latest association of sensational news-mongering with a fatuous exaltation of papalism is a combination that proves how much remains to be done in the campaign for popular education.

It is a mistake to assume that finality was reached in any field during the age of religious revolution which, rightly speaking, lasted from the spread of Humanistic teaching in the universities of Northern Europe to the close of the Thirty Years' War. One of the illusions created by the exaggerated self-consciousness of sectarian organizations

is the attempt to fix on some past standard as capable of guiding their future with absolute authority in an undeviating line. One knows how, by the convenient and necessary fictions of judicial decisions, one can find legal instances cited from Coke or Bracton to justify the handling of cases involving the complicated details of railway business or trust administration.

It is only by such a convenient fiction that fidelity can be kept toward the dicta of reforming leaders or that the various confessional documents produced during the age of the Reformation can be regarded as authoritative. Protestantism has changed as society has changed. In its original shape it was in many respects the heir of the Middle Ages; it accepted the mediæval postulate of uniformity in religious belief, as we have already seen, as necessary to the existence of the State. A great, if unnoticed, revolution took place at the end of the seventeenth century, when the principle of religious equality was established, and when it was acknowledged that experience proves that religious societies can exist alongside one another without endangering public tranquillity. Voluntary effort, not regulative con-

trol, is made the constructive element in most religious communions. All that the State is asked to do is remain indifferent, or at least to recognize religious equality.

People concede generally that all types of religion have a right to exist; it is even contended that Christianity is better off itself under a régime of competitive organizations. While the Church is free there is an equal freedom attained by the State. It has come to be recognized that citizens for one purpose work together to carry out the aims of the State, while the same individuals might conceivably work together to carry out the religious programme of the Church. The State, therefore, must be as absolutely untrammeled as the Church; the ancient mediæval doctrine that the State, as the sphere of the law of nature, can only be saved by subjecting itself to the law of God, incorporated in the Church, has been frankly abandoned.

Few imagine, however, that the State isolates itself from religion because it is separated from contact with religious organizations. What has happened is a division of spheres, but there is no class division or separation of laborers for one definite type of work. Because a man is a Christian man

is not regarded as a reason why he should not share in the political life of the community to the full. In fact, it is recognized that the State is most secure in the hands of leaders who are intensely loyal to their religious convictions, men of the type of Lincoln and Gladstone, although this loyalty is not shown in making the religious organization predominant over the secular.

In working out this separation of powers, the secular and religious, the changed attitude towards the Bible has been responsible for the development of new points of view. Undoubtedly when allegiance to papal autocracy was abandoned an authority of an equally tangible kind was set in its place, the Bible. The Old Testament gave a picture of a theocracy which might be used as an infallible guide in offering this Judaistic model for the State. In many cases it seemed to be considered, as in Puritan England, that as the individual attained salvation through the authority and saving power of the Bible, so the State must aim at producing something resembling a revised kingdom of Israel. This literal reproduction of Bible truth has not been able to withstand the influence of the historical spirit by which one is taught that

the Bible itself is a product of well-recognized social conditions, enduring at a particular time and a definitely fixed place. Its teaching comes to succeeding generations as the resultant of spiritual experiences which must be assimilated, not repeated parrot-like, before they can become translated into terms adapted for use to-day.

Biblical ethics are one thing; the political institutions contained in the Biblical narrative are related to a past which has disappeared and cannot be revived. Even in the case of Biblical ethics the attempt to give literal vital values has led to the founding of strange, uncouth sects, which have only preserved a continued existence by a process of isolation.

Modern civilization is the product of Protestantism, but it is in no way a replica of the principles of the Protestant Church organization that came into being at the period of religious revolution. England and the United States are Protestant countries, but they are not in their governmental and social life moulded on the lines which approved themselves as final by the reformers of the sixteenth century. Calvinism especially has had a decisive influence on both English and

American religion, but no one can say that the State organization in England and America to-day is the outgrowth of Calvinism and nothing else. Constitutional government in the modern sense is an essential part of Christian civilization, yet neither Luther nor Calvin, so far as we can see, would have appreciated either the meaning or the significance of constitutional government as a means of realizing the essential social teaching in Christianity. The process which took place admits of no simple generalization; there are so many factors mutually combined in successive stages and of different values in the equation which finally emerges, that they cannot be treated as if they constituted a single term and nothing more.

When one starts to analyze the problem involved in the evolution of Protestantism in its various derivative forms, as they appear either in Protestant or Roman Catholic countries, one must remember that the sixteenth century reform was simply a modification of mediæval religious life and theory. Neither the governments which gave their support to the Protestant revolt, nor the society which accepted Protestant doctrine, was the product of Protestantism itself. There

was no start *"ab initio"*; there was no vacuum for purely experimental purposes. The situation on a large scale resembled the condition of passive antagonism which always confronts communistic enthusiasts when they set out to found a community based on the principles of communism. The material to be dealt with is the product of different influences and such communities rarely pass beyond the first stage of experiment.

In a similar way the reformers, no matter how aggressive they were, no matter how consistent was their logic, could not make a clean sweep of the pre-existing order, either religious or social. In the early days of Christianity small groups were selected from a pagan society; they were trained apart, they were submitted to strict discipline. They had to bear the brunt of government oppression and social disfavor. Yet, with all these factors favoring segregation, nothing is clearer than the infiltration into the early Christian communities of an important number of tendencies and traditions derived from the Greco-Roman world.

The Reformation was conducted on far different lines; the changes were by territo-

ries and nations, not by small groups; there was no time for education, no opportunity for discipline; the transformation took place *"en masse."*

There is much, therefore, in the modern State which is nothing more than a residuum of mediæval society, and when one says mediæval society one means, roughly speaking, a combination of Teutonic tribalism, Christian ecclesiasticism and Greco-Roman culture. All these factors are visible in modern society, yet they have nothing directly to do with the religious system promulgated by the reformers. This system was concerned with the assurance of individual salvation; the question was, of course, not a new one, but at least the reformers answered it in a new way. The elements of the doctrinal system were in no sense newly created, however; predestination, original sin, the Atonement are not inventions of the Reformation period. A different emphasis is given, but the difference between the old and the new consists in combination, in elimination, rather than in a fresh creation of a doctrinal standpoint.

The institution of the Church was maintained, but Church institutionalism was rejected. The value of preaching, the infalli-

bility of the Bible were not new discoveries made by the reformers; what was new was the elimination of the hierarchical authority in the Church with its appeal to tradition and the substitution for it of the individual assurance of salvation, supported by an appeal to the Bible as a final arbiter. The Church remained, but its functions must be interpreted by the Bible and by nothing else. It seemed to be the hope of the reformers at first that their views would be accepted universally; as such they had no sectarian policy; they aimed to affect the whole Church organization and not a mere fraction of it. As both Church and State were to be subject to the supreme authority of the Bible the old conflict between the secular and the spiritual world had no longer any meaning. The State had the duty of protecting the Church as the instrument in which the work of individual salvation was being fulfilled, while the Church was expected, without conflict or self-seeking, to explain to the civil authorities the line of conduct laid down for governments in the Scriptures.

It will be seen from this how formally logical the reformers were in substituting for the papacy an infallible tribunal in the

shape of the Bible. Separation of the powers was not contemplated; spiritual authority included within its sphere the whole range of life. Wherever the Bible was explicit in its teaching there could be no barrier set up. Uniformity must prevail where Divine Revelation speaks in a definite way. Some concession was made by allowing that the Bible did not speak on every subject; in this neutral sphere were so-called things indifferent or *"adiaphora,"* but there was by no means any agreement as to their extent and character. Among the Lutherans there was great rigidity as to the Sacrament of the Eucharist and the dogmatic terminology regarding Grace and Faith, while the Calvinists were strongly insistent on maintaining a fixed form of Church discipline and leadership.

Calvin himself gave a curious example of what he considered *"adiaphora"* when he characterized the Anglican Prayer Boook as containing "tolerable fooleries," though many of his followers, John Knox, for example, were by no means so liberal in their interpretation. Knox, we know, was much shocked, on first visiting Geneva, to find Calvin treating the Sabbath law as an *"adiapho-*

ron" by playing at bowls on Sunday. To quote a further instance as to this debated point, Bishop Hooper preferred imprisonment rather than to wear the episcopal vestments prescribed by the Prayer Book. In Nuremberg the Lutheran interpretation as to things indifferent may be still visibly noted by the mediæval accessories of worship; even the shrine of St. Sebald has been kept inviolate and the wonderful bit of Gothic tracery executed by Vischer is carefully preserved. It is possible, too, to find in country churches in Wurttemberg copies of the mediæval missal still placed on the altar. Calvinism was a ruthless destroyer of art treasures simply because in its system the *"adiaphora"* did not include them.

In its conception of the State Protestantism adopted the idea of a "Bibliocracy," *i.e.*, society as a whole was to take the Bible as its guide literally and implicitly. There was no self-conscious clericalism, though in the rules of a man like Knox the thing itself existed owing to his personal strenuousness of temper. In his "Old Mortality" Scott has drawn with the realism of a great artist the theocratic ideals which prevailed in Scotland

among the adherents of the Sacred League and Covenant.

Luther's strong vein of mysticism, his deep-rooted belief in the perfectibility of human nature, caused him to anticipate no difficulties from any future contact of State and Church. If the Gospel is preached in the form that brings assurance of salvation to the believer, if the Sacraments are administered, no regulations are needed to secure the creation of a religiously ordered State. The authorities can use force to produce uniformity, but when this is accomplished the spiritual power of the Gospel will do the rest. An attitude of passive resistance was suggested by Lutheranism when the secular authorities proved hostile or indifferent; in the end things were bound to come out right under a better-minded ruler.

Far different from this is the attitude of Calvinism towards matters involving secular interests. Calvin was a realist; he was not a monk like Luther, but the pupil of Humanists and jurists. System and discipline were the watchwords of the ecclesiastical system he founded; he believed in the power of deductive reasoning; he left nothing to chance and gave no place to sentiment. As a matter

of theory the spiritual authority was made subordinate to the civil authority; as a matter of fact this subordination was only realized when the State accepted to the full Calvinistic principles. It is easy to see how this point of view was applied practically in England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth by the Puritans; they did not hesitate to disregard the laws of the realm, because the Queen's government refused to sanction the system of Church government approved by Calvinism.

Discipline, not love, was the foundation of society; where Luther depended on the spontaneous activities of the human heart, Calvin founded his faith on a social progress in which the minutest details of ethical conduct were imposed by the State on its subjects. If the State showed itself untrustworthy, it was possible to organize an *"imperium in imperio"* as the Puritans did in England and the Huguenots in France. As the State so frequently was not complaisant, Calvinism prepared for a hard conflict and drew up a plan of campaign based largely on the precepts of the Old Testament. In this way it was able to preserve a larger measure of independence when the State itself proved

unfavorable to its claims. Many of the principles of modern civil liberty are derived from this inherent conviction in Calvinism that the State must be opposed because it is not sincerely to be trusted. Where the civil government is more than lukewarm Calvinism is as ready as Lutheranism to accept its sovereign claims. The difficulty, of course, is to find such a complaisant government; experience in opposition contributed largely to impress upon Calvinism its virile character. Only on rare occasions in Geneva and in New England could the Calvinistic commonwealth be actualized.

A vague impression of the influence of the Reformation in English national life is given by the common use of the phrase State establishment of the Church to mark the difference between the religious history of England before and after the sixteenth century. The words are misleading and inaccurate. There was a State establishment of religion in England from the time when the Saxons accepted Christianity under Ethelbert. In every country in Western Europe there was a legal status given to the Church by the secular power, and as the authority of the State advanced the legal details of estab-

lishment became more complicated and significant. There was never a time in England when the civil power did not deal in legislative enactment with Church matters. In fact the Church establishment of the Tudors was the legitimate offspring of the Church establishment of the Plantagenets. Parliament legislated for the Church in the fourteenth century, and it was because of this experience in mediæval Church legislation that it so completely understood how to carry out its purpose when the time came to throw off the jurisdiction of the Roman See.

Every step that was taken in the sixteenth century was strictly in line with the precedents of English Law and constitutional procedure. Just as there was no actual break in the legal life of the colony of Massachusetts after it became a commonwealth in the federal system and disowned the sovereignty of the British Crown, so there was no actual break in the life of the Church of England after it cut off its relations with the Roman See. There was no foundation of a new Church; it was the old Church upon which the will of the nation, legally expressed, imposed a number of statutory regulations affecting its property, its service, its canons,

and its relations with the See of Rome. The claim that Henry VIII created a new Church organization because of the various acts passed by Parliament during his reign can only be made legitimately if it is also added that William the Norman created a new Church at the Conquest by eliminating the Saxon Church system, and Edward III made another new one when his Parliament passed its anti-papal statutes—Provisors and Mortmain.

The political character of the Reformation in England can only be understood when it is remembered that no other European nation of first-rate importance emancipated itself wholly from papal jurisdiction. Doctrinal changes were given, in contrast to the amount of attention they received elsewhere, only a subordinate importance. Groups of Calvinists and small Lutheran principalities and cities were confronted with a problem far different from that by which England was faced. There was a firm, unalterable resolve in England not to be dominated by Spain and its ally, the papacy, subordinated to Spanish interests in establishing an imperial sway over Western Europe. There was the experience of a defeated France to act as

an object lesson, and few will question the shrewdness and success of Tudor policy when its work is measured in the light of the contemporary political history of France and Germany. The main thing accomplished was the preservation of national independence; there were no civil wars as in France and no disintegration into weak and opposing territorial units as in Germany.

To have accomplished so much was a national asset against which the failure in England to produce religious uniformity will count but little on the debit side of the account. It was in the end advantageous to the Church as well as to the State that the political experience of English statesmen who had worthier tasks to do was not diverted from them in the futile effort to make all Englishmen think alike in religious matters. Because of the demands made upon British nationalism in its struggle with Spain, a broader sphere than elsewhere was left open for religious differences, and what was more, Englishmen who differed religiously saw the need of uniting on the platform of a common patriotism.

When a civil war did come it was fought on constitutional rather than religious

grounds. This in itself was a tremendous gain. How great the gain was may be estimated from comparing Germany after the Thirty Years' War with England at the Restoration. The national Church profited by the broad political experience of the English. Its members were preserved by this training from those pitiable forms of religious partisanship which concentration on narrow issues invariably produces, and the Church came to learn the lesson through its association with the State that different parties can co-operate without disloyalty to their principles. As this freedom from sectarian squabbles began to be appreciated, it was possible for the Church to represent nationally, even after all idea of uniformity had been abandoned, the cultural aspects of historic Christianity. It became conscious of its strength but yet avoided clericalism and presented to the English nation a religious communion reflecting some of the soundest and most progressive elements of the national character.

Protestantism is often eulogized because it did away with a double standard of life. This is perfectly true; it did abolish monasticism and it did eliminate class asceticism.

But it did not do away with the view which had made monasticism possible. Original sin and the complete natural corruption of all man's powers are the foundation stones of all Protestant doctrine. The world is an evil world, but to try to separate one's self from it is not allowable, because the world is the arena of man's action and gives the ground of his salvation. He has to work out his salvation under hard conditions; these conditions must not be made easier by a self-created isolation. Monasticism encourages the idea of personal merit, while man's salvation is the product of divine grace. By itself the world and all it has and gives must be rejected, because since the Fall it is corrupt in all its parts. The situation, though necessary, is anything but alluring; we have to accept the world in a spirit of obedience; its trials must be received as the irresponsible changes of wind and weather. By itself it is nothing; it is our duty to be submissive; all the qualities of the world, its sin, its disease, its misfortunes, only point conclusively to the truth of the doctrine of original sin. Its joys are a deception, they are only transient and in any case the curse of sin is written over the face of the world. To live

under its order is a discipline appointed by God for us.

In a real sense, therefore, the Gospel of the Reformation is a Gospel of asceticism; under monasticism the man with a higher call was bound to separate himself from the world and live a segregated life. Now the Christian, without exception, was to renounce the world inwardly and live in it, but not of it. It behooves the Christian, as one sensitive to this opposition, to reshape the world in accordance with the divine plan. Hence comes the legitimacy of the Christian commonwealth, its disciplinary enactments and its other-worldly ethical standards. Recreations are anathematized; æsthetic values must be reduced to zero; emotions and sentiments are to be treated as the idle by-products of a depraved human nature. Every form of love of the world for its own sake is "creature worship." Man's duty is to master the world, not to be patient under its corrupting system. Nature is opposed to the sphere of grace. There is a thorough other-worldliness in Protestant thought which carries humanity back to the precepts of monasticism, widening them indeed, but maintaining their integrity. In

the religious field, therefore, Protestantism is a continuance of the mediæval spirit, with its emphasis on a society dominated by the Church. This characteristic is plainly marked in the Puritan commonwealths in New England and in the ideals of the groups and sects that emerged into publicity with the supremacy of the Long Parliament in England.

CHAPTER XI

The Growth of the Modern State—Its Economics and Education.

England itself, though a typical Protestant political power, was by no means typically ordered in its social fabric or its ecclesiastical arrangements by Protestant ideals. The Tudors had no intention of allowing the establishment of a theocracy, and sharp measures of repression were employed against the Puritans when they attempted to capture and control the English Church. In no country, not even Scotland or Scandinavia, were governments established completely reflecting the Protestant spirit in its entirety. The influence of previous political experience could not be negatived, no matter how strong the impelling force of the new religious movement might be. In the way of the full sweep of Protestant theory stood the absolute State under a strong monarchy, a progressing eco-

nomic life and nascent Humanistic culture. None of these factors could be absorbed and taken into the current of "other-worldliness."

It had not been found possible to create a new religion, *i.e.*, new in a complete sense, in the first and second centuries; equally impossible was it for the reformers of the most radical type to form a new religion on the assumption that their theories as a kind of deluge had swept away all that had gone before. More might certainly have been accomplished if they had succeeded in establishing anything resembling religious uniformity. As a matter of fact some of the most potent as well as the most beneficent influences of Protestantism in modern life are side influences. They are the resultant of the failures rather than the successes of the age of religious revolution. Toleration, for example, is a by-product of Protestantism, not the conscious production of the Protestant religious system.

In many spheres of social life, where the activity of government is most direct, the contribution made by Protestantism is difficult to establish. The administration of criminal law was not likely to be made milder by the exaltation of the idea of original sin,

nor was the authoritative appeal to the Old Testament at all likely to promote a humanitarian conception of justice. Trials for sorcery and witchcraft continued with the unreasoning and blind obduracy illustrated by the crude methods of repression practised in the Middle Ages. Law reform in general cannot be traced to the teaching of either Luther or Calvin.

Luther was in doubt whether any kind of law could be brought into relation with his theory of Grace; at best law was a concession to man's present sinful state. But he was not a slave to logic, and insisted that rulers should concede to their subjects laws that were popular and equitable. Calvin by training was a lawyer and was thoroughly in earnest in insisting on the importance of law as a primary element in realizing the Christian life in a disciplined Christian commonwealth.

In England and in its colonial possessions the Common Law was so firmly established that only superficially can the Reformation point of view be detected; as notably in the Sabbatarian legislation, where the Mosaic Code was accepted as the norm for ordinary citizens who, whether they liked it or not,

were obliged to regulate their conduct according to the standards fixed by the elect. Under the common law the liberty of the individual, where assent was not given, was so well assured that nothing like a theocratic tyranny could be established. In New England the rigidity of Puritanism did not survive its decline in popularity; fortunately the Common Law could not be turned into an engine of despotism.

In the international relations of States, Protestantism, simply because in most cases it had to depend on the secular power to protect it from papal absolutism, tended to encourage the autonomy and independence of the State. As one sees in the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles, the civil magistracy, in accordance with the teaching of St. Paul, is allowed the character of a God-ordained calling. The State has ethical rights and obligations. Under Lutheranism many of the functions of the Church—philanthropic, educational, economic—were directly assigned to the State. So the modern Prussian bureaucracy virtually exercises a kind of pastoral care over the citizen.

In Calvinism the spheres of Church and State came to be sharply differentiated as

the State itself ceased to lend itself as the willing instrument of a theocracy. *Laissez-faire* was accepted as the best solution of the situation; the State being given the rôle of the guardian responsible for public order, while the citizen knows best how to shape his conduct, untrammeled by State interference in a positive direction. The deep strain of individualism in American political life is to be traced directly to the Calvinistic jealousy of enlarging the ethical functions of the State, after the State itself has ceased to be an organism in such close harmony with the State that it can be trusted to carry out a social policy dictated by the Church.

Very positive ideas of governmental forms are contained also in Calvinism. Where the tenets of Luther accepted without debate any constituted State authority, without imposing upon the Christian citizen anything but passive obedience, Calvin's system had a clear vision of a God-ordained government. In Geneva, under Calvinism, an aristocracy was accepted as the governmental norm; the rule of the elect in the State naturally corresponded with a Church made up of the elect. After the long experience of struggle in the broad field of international politics in France,

the Netherlands, Scotland and England, the right of resistance was strenuously maintained.

If the authorities are ungodly they must be opposed and their power reduced to *nil* by those in subordinate official relation to them and, if needs arises, the individual can treat himself as the holder of a divine commission to remove a tyrant by assassination, as in the case of Jael and other Old Testament champions. To secure the best results the State must be reorganized under ideals supplied from the Calvinistic Church system, with its presbyteries and synods.

Much, therefore, is owed to Calvinism in the extension of the representative principle and also in the acknowledgment that the relation between the governors and the governed is to be judged as a purely contractual one. The transition from this to the idea of a written constitution is immediate, although only in a few cases was a Calvinistic community organized on democratic lines, as notably in the New England commonwealths. But in these Puritan colonies there was no acknowledgment of the rights of the people as such. Eligibility to office depended on Church membership and the officials exercised an unde-

fined type of patriarchal control. Where Calvinism was uppermost the contract theory of government would naturally be stressed. In New England the colonists belonged without exception to one social segment of the population of the mother country; there were consequently no class distinctions perpetuated on its soil. The New England democratic theocracy is, therefore, due more to accident than design. It must be allowed, though, that this accident contributed to a considerable degree in encouraging the spread of democratic theory among the colonies which developed into the United States.

The familiar phrase, the rights of man, is an unquestioned axiom of modern governmental life. It means shortly the guarantee to the individual of his life, freedom and property. Such a guarantee is closely associated with the non-interference of the State in affairs concerning man's religious belief. The idea of these individual rights is to be traced back to the constitution of the original commonwealths in the American Union. From these documents the enumeration of individual rights passed into the French constitution, which itself acted as the distributing agent to all modern constitutional docu-

ments. In no way can the Puritan State be credited with originating the principle of liberty of conscience; only in Rhode Island did it prevail, and there it was due to the Baptist affiliations of the founder of the colony, Roger Williams. Another focus of liberty of conscience in America was the colony of Pennsylvania, where Quakerism was dominant. As the principle became extended its acceptance in the Calvinistic commonwealths was due to commercial reasons rather than to any change of conviction among those of Puritan stock.

Voluntarism has to-day taken the place of uniformity; the idea of the separation of the Church from the State is now accepted on all sides, but the progress towards this end was slow, not to say precarious. The Anglican Church had a curious development when it is looked at in contrast with evangelical communions, either Lutheran or Calvinistic. It preserved a stronger corporate consciousness than Lutheranism, for it represented England in a way that Lutheranism could not represent Germany, with its small States, none of which was co-extensive with German nationality. Again, even when Calvinism had most influence on the theological

doctrine in England of the National Church, the political ideals of Calvinism were practically put aside. As the historical appeal to Christian antiquity gained in strength, so it increased with a more reasoned reliance on the royal prerogative. There was an element of Byzantinism in the emphasis given by Caroline bishops and theologians to the "divine right" of kings, but this is not strange, as it was found in the literature of the Christian Greco-Roman Empire, to which they appealed for their dogmatic system.

If the term Protestantism is taken in its wider sense to mean organizations apart from and opposed to the mediæval Church system of Western Europe, the impulse towards religious freedom can be with adequate justice ascribed to the revolt of the sixteenth century, although the official movement connected with the revolt had no sympathy with the principle of toleration. Internationally the age of reform led to a more emphatic recognition of the finality of national rights; the great States, whatever might be their religious confession, came to count as equals. The period of the balance of power was ushered in, during which combinations were made that disregarded without scruple the

particular type of religion professed by the States which accepted alliances on grounds other than those of religious consideration. Roman Catholic States engaged in alliances with States that were Protestant against other States which were Roman Catholic. In the coalitions against Louis XIV, even the pope did not hesitate to encourage in every way an alliance intended to humble France, a leading Roman Catholic power, by using the leadership of the Prince of Orange, the natural head of a league of Protestant powers. By the eighteenth century all thought of directing the policy of the State by ideas connected with questions of religious supremacy were abandoned. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants were in practical agreement that confessional divergences had become articles for home consumption. Even with the revival of an aggressive ultramontanism to-day little opposition is felt when a Roman Catholic power such as Austria connects itself with a definitely Protestant power, the German Empire.

The situation is not only the creation of statesmen and diplomats; in the rank and file of armies there is no reluctance at all in bearing arms against those who belong to

the same religious confession. Of course, the classical instance of the subordination of the religious motive to the needs of State policy is the siege of Rome in the sixteenth century, when Lutherans and Roman Catholics gladly served under a Roman Catholic emperor in an effort to take a pope prisoner.

In the causes contributing to economic advance one must be careful in contrasting the backwardness of Roman Catholic countries with the progressive impulses that manifest themselves in Protestant countries. France is certainly, if not a Roman Catholic country, at least not a Protestant one; no one can question its strong economic position. Even in the Tyrol, where backward traditions are maintained in connection with a semi-patriarchal organization of society under Roman Catholic auspices, there can be no question that the existing stage of economic life is far in advance of that reached by the mountaineers in the southern commonwealths of the American Union, where the Roman Church has no hold whatsoever. Lutheranism seemed to contribute little to the economic advancement of the German States; the reformer himself took really a monastic point of view of social phenomena

and contemplated only the existence of agriculture and the mechanical trades in a conservative form of society. Finance and credit he suspected and wholesale trade he regarded as an abomination. His teaching did encourage a strong government, which in turn, in a paternal way, helped forward the development of industry. In other ways the preparation of a docile labor population devoting themselves to agricultural pursuits encouraged the growth later on of capitalism by giving it ready at hand a labor supply trained to be obedient and submissive.

Indirectly popular education encouraged a working-class self-consciousness, and the teaching of an individual ethical system brought with it a hatred of exploitation that was certain to become intense under the kind of life promoted by modern capitalism where man loses his individuality and becomes a mere instrument in production.

Much of the alienation of the working classes from Church organizations without distinction comes from the inability of modern Christianity to emancipate itself from the economic standards of the sixteenth century, where work was generally made synonymous with tillage of the ground.

Calvin in all industrial questions was far ahead of all other reformers; his enlightenment can be traced directly to his legal training. He understood the advantages of the credit system, rejected the old teaching as to the unlawfulness of interest and induced his followers to start a bank in Geneva and organize industries. Wherever Calvinism went it can be traced in the expansion of capitalism and industrialism.

The cause lies deeper than Calvin's own upbringing as a lawyer. Capitalism and Calvinism have no mere accidental associations. The spread of capitalism is not the resultant of discoveries, industrial inventions or large commercial advantages. Banking began long before the period of the Reformation; there were large capitalists such as Függer and the Medici in the age of the Renaissance. In the first epoch of discovery the Spaniards showed more enterprise than either the Dutch or the English. Capitalism is not peculiar to Calvinistic communities; it is not even limited to those holding to the tenets of Judaism, from which source certain theorists have attempted to explain its influence over Calvinism, but there can be little doubt that the spirit in which modern

capitalism has thriven is the direct product of Calvin's teaching. Discipline within the sphere of man's ordinary calling, in plain words, the Gospel of work, is a main tenet of the Calvinist theory. Here one has a new type of asceticism in the obligation of every man to live a life of hard, unremitting devotion to toil, not for the sake of the pleasures secured by the gains of industry, but because of the disciplinary nature of work. The world itself is not the object worked for, nor the products of work as a source of enjoyment; the goods produced by industry are not to be dissipated by consumption, but are to be added to the capital already created. Laboriousness as an end in itself is recommended as a mortification of the flesh, as a working out in a spirit of resignation of the conditions produced by the fall of man and the consequent curse on human nature.

While work is urged as a constant discipline, the readiness to undergo it willingly, without any hope of emancipating one's self from it, no matter what material goods might be its resultant, is a proof that man in an elect status is developing his God-given powers of self-control. As the whole community gives itself up to the same tireless

pursuit, unconnected with the actual needs of supporting life, a high standard of moral excellence on a collective scale is reached. There is no horizon to this incessant industry because of its association with spiritual, not material, aims. A man does not work to attain a certain degree of comfort in which he can retire and lead a life of ease; rather, though in the world, he must treat himself as the subject of monastic discipline and make out of this discipline, so ready at hand, not artificially devised, the test of self-sacrifice.

Wherever Calvinism was strong, in English towns, in Holland, in America, among the Huguenot communities of France, there existed these traits of character and industry which have combined to produce intensive capitalism. No attention was paid to developing the area of æsthetic enjoyment and in its essence the so-called materialism of modern wealth has an other-worldly character. To find the real materialism of wealth one must go back to the days of pagan antiquity, when the millionaire was graded according to his ingenuity as a consumer. Even where there is a recrudescence of this spirit to-day it is usually found not in the actual

creators of great fortunes, but in those who have come into possession of wealth by inheritance and have ceased to cultivate habits of industry.

Intense activity devoted to the production of wealth on the part of sects such as the Quakers and other Pietists, can be easily explained by the fact that as they were cut off from public life and official position their members turned to economic activities as the sole outlet of their energies. This use of the world as the sphere of self-discipline has given an heroic mould to many characters. Often the captains of industry develop a temperament not found in other ages except in those who have devoted themselves to a military career.

The essential weakness of the gospel of work is that it so often goes with a pitiless handling of one's fellow-men as the mere instruments of production, as the parts of a machine whose destiny is to produce economic goods and nothing else. Asceticism practised on the basis of religious ethics is one thing, while asceticism to secure power and control is altogether different. But even asceticism of the higher type aims at individual ends and obscures man's place as a

member of a social group for whose betterment he is bound to work. It is a right instinct to-day that is prompting all churches to concentrate their attention on organizing the kind of life in which fraternity is possible. This is better than to teach that the individual has the right in his career of self-discipline to sacrifice the powers and capacities of other human beings brought into relation with him only through the money nexus, as employees in industrial undertakings.

Some powerful corrective is needed for the soullessness of business life which assumes that, as it is a purely secular matter in any case, it really makes no difference how it is directed. In the search for an antidote no help can be gotten from a system which so clearly divides the temporal from the eternal. It is necessary to revive the older teaching of the Church, under which the trusteeship of wealth was emphasized, in its implication that only through the social group does the individual attain rights, which in turn must be justified by the services contributed by the individual to society. Social reorganization was not the aim of the Reformation movement; in regard, therefore, to many of the details of the administra-

tive system of the modern State it is not possible to trace any immediate connection between it and the teaching of reforming leaders. In a general way also the main lines of democratic constitutionalism are inter-confessional, *i.e.*, assuming similar standards of education and ethics, any kind of Christian organization can accept or promote the type of democracy implicitly contained in the constitutional documents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Protestants, Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox are not divided as a practical matter when they once accept the principle of constitutional government and are advanced enough educationally to understand it.

In Mexico the failure to secure any vital allegiance to a republican constitution has a racial rather than a religious origin. The descendants of African negroes, no matter what their confessional allegiance, have shown an equal inability to organize and conduct governments that demand training, character and industry. In Albania, where tribalism has persisted to a degree unknown in other parts of the European continent, modern governmental forms are equally objectionable to Roman Catholics, Orthodox

and Mohammedans, though experience shows in the long run that the Moslem remains the most intractable element where progressive administration is introduced. Both in India and in Egypt probably no amount of religious tutelage would be sufficient to train its present population to support and administer a modern democratic State. It seems likely, therefore, that the chief work in disintegrating Islam will come, not from direct Christian missionary efforts, but rather from the example of the governments founded among Moslem races in accordance with the ideals of the Christian State. Turkey has had only a short experience with constitutionalism, and the results are rightly criticised as most discouraging, but in any case no one thinks of the possibility of reviving a Moslem State strong enough to stand alone on the political ideals of a Moslem population. If constitutionalism succeeds in maintaining itself it will only mean that Islam must so change its character that its identity will be lost.

In the formation of modern society on which, as its basis, the success of the democratic State rests, the influence of the religious changes of the Reformation period can be directly traced. Class distinctions were

the specific mark of the Middle Ages, while their abolition is the specific mark of the modern world. Everything is being done to-day by a common school education, by the opening up of university privileges to all sections of society, by the common use throughout each nation of a single type of educated speech to do away with the long continued division between the educated and uneducated. The abolition of this kind of social sectionalism can be closely connected with the intellectual appeal to Protestant doctrine as the test of Church membership. It was no longer a share in a common worship, but an ability to understand a series of intricate theological propositions and to correlate them with scriptural texts, that constituted the cachet of ecclesiastical regularity. Hence came the value placed on systematic education as the method best adapted to give the mind due equipment.

It was some time, however, before a liberally rounded education was regarded as an obligation of social value apart from its connection with the various learned professions. The rise of an educated class coincides with the disintegration of Protestant orthodoxy in the beginning of the eighteenth century,

when a literature arose which paid little heed to the disputes of a contentious sectarianism. In all branches of literary production the technical religious interest remains in abeyance. Johnson was undoubtedly a far more religious man than Dryden, yet he never wrote poetry of the type of the "Hind and the Panther." At the same time, both in history and philosophy, the subject matter comes to be treated independently of the terminology and questions of formal theology.

How far Protestanism produced the scientific attitude in the study of nature and in Biblical criticism has been a frequent subject of debate; freedom of thought, of science and the press are achievements not directly related to any type of organized Christianity. The mediæval control of science was destroyed, but there was no positive programme pointing to advancement. What was accomplished was the secularization of scientific work. This was an assured benefit, for it proved the emancipation of science. If a body of Protestant theologians had taken the place of the officials of the Inquisition who condemned Galileo there is no reason to suppose they would have reached a conclusion different from the same number of Roman

Catholics. The changes made at the Reformation made it impossible for the Church to assume such jurisdiction, and in this respect freedom of investigation became an acknowledged principle.

Much useful training in historical and critical method was secured and achieved through the detailed examination of the history of the Church, a process conducted in order to overthrow Roman Catholic claims. Valuable results, too, came from the intensive study of the Bible, which necessarily could not be done without the help of Humanistic learning. Scholars, after much experiment, learned to use philological criticism, and so exact thinking was furthered in a field where investigation had to be constantly contrasted with the dicta of tradition. Progress in this sphere was, however, strictly limited by the exaltation of the Bible as the final, irrevocable authority in all spiritual matters. Its points of affinity with other literature were disregarded; the actual words of the text were taken as inspired, as declarative of an infallible dictum which could only, according to the theory, be understood in one way. Humanism was not rejected, but was circumscribed. It often happened that the stricter school of

Protestant orthodoxy found Humanistic representatives a burden, not a help, for they had a way of overstepping the limits prescribed for them. Hugo Grotius, by reviving the method of Erasmus, with its untrammeled inquiry into the religious interests of mankind, met with bitter opposition from the orthodox circles of Dutch Calvinists who had no sympathy with his refusal to tie himself up with confessional shackles.

Actual work in physical science was carried on under the influence of the Renaissance, irrespective of the lines of religious change. Perhaps a larger proportion of the greatest names in the earliest rôles of discovery, both mathematical and scientific, are found among those who were trained in a Roman Catholic environment. Kepler was suspected by the Church authorities of Protestant Germany, and in philosophy Leibnitz had so little satisfaction with the results of German Protestantism that he spent much time elaborating a plan for bringing together severed Christian Churches. With the eighteenth century a new era begins, in which religious organizations frankly adopt the sectarian point of view; they draw in their cords in other ways. They see that national

life cannot be contained in the formulas of a unique dogmatic scheme and that citizens as a whole cannot be forced to accept any single ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

Even in this narrower form, the religious life of to-day, where liberty of conscience prevails, with its freedom to adopt any system of thought or conduct, is no replica of Reformation principles. It has not been possible to exclude the results of the new scientific outlook, nor to reject the experience of a new economic industrial order. A new combination has been made, preserving, it is true, elements of the older Protestantism, but all modified by new, often alien, currents, when judged by the strict standards of the original teaching of the reformers. Unconsciously, from the first there was embodied in the Protestant revolt a readiness to assimilate the new and allow the old to become atrophied. No matter how strictly the original orthodoxy was guarded by theological experts the adherents of evangelical communions have constructed for themselves a deposit of faith uncontrolled by authority. The impulse to free inquiry, which was the creation of Humanism and was taken over by the Protestant Reformers as a convenient

weapon in the attack on papal autocracy, could not be arrested or canalized. It was bound sooner or later, after its function had been completed in one direction, to stimulate a movement subversive of many of the convictions of the Reformers themselves, just as it had proved to be in the case of scholastic thought and autocratic ecclesiastical government.

The long-continued lessons of confessional conflicts, sometimes destructive of civil order and invariably contrary to the best interests of social progress, sank deeply into the national consciousness. It became perfectly clear that the purposes of government could not be fulfilled unless government itself was rendered immune from the inducement to champion ecclesiastical interests. How strong this instinct of self-preservation on the part of government has become may be seen in the persistent refusal to-day of Roman Catholic powers to undertake the cause of restoring the temporal dominion of the papacy. Campaigns in behalf of philanthropic purposes, or movements to prevent disease, or to bring about arbitration, can enlist the co-operation of the Christian States of Europe and America, but the proposal

to further measures even indirectly promoting denominational propaganda would be dropped as soon as this aim was detected.

This suspicious attitude does not mean that Christendom has become a fictitious term, nor does it mean that Church organizations within the State are viewed with hostility. It does, however, imply that a rough distinction has been made between society organized as a State and social groups organized as churches. The distinction is a rough one because the lines of demarcation are irregular and not direct. There is no attempt made to attain logical consistency. When the State is under democratic control, with the Church as a voluntary body in a segregated relation with it, there is no reason to postulate a decline of the State from ethical standards. They are probably more deeply fixed to-day in the popular consciousness than at any other period of history. As these ethical standards influence legislation, as they are appealed to in the direction and criticism of government, as they are inseparably a postulate of judicial opinions, they have in national life an essential place in the social fabric. Their origin is Christian and

they harmonize with the aspirations of large numbers of persons who are members of Christian churches.

There is no fancifulness in speaking of a Christian State, even after the old order of church organization as a function of government has disappeared. This is a conception which took years to be assimilated; there are evidences, even to-day, of how imperfect the process of assimilation has been, in spite of the acknowledgment that the existence of toleration under the modern State is a great aid to the progress of religion. Frequently one still hears, when measures of disestablishment are being urged, that the abolition of the connection between State and Church is an official denial of the Christian faith.

Even if all citizens accepted an identical religious allegiance there would be no reason for confusing the spheres of Church and State by a State establishment of religion. The same men who were called together to act as representatives of State as legislators might well act as members of Church synods, yet the two kinds of representative functions might be kept entirely distinct. Laws need not be confused with canons, and in such a

case one would not hesitate to call the State itself Christian, though the statute book did not mention Christianity, and the budget of the government failed to contain items for the maintenance of ecclesiastical buildings or allocations of money for salaries of the clergy.

CHAPTER XII

The Beginning of Toleration. Cromwell's Policy. Religious Liberty in Maryland: The Federal Constitution.

There is often a misunderstanding of the actual aims of the Reformers when they were working for religious separation. Finality in their arrangements was by no means assumed, and it appears as if the great factor that produced a permanent cleavage was the fear of imperial absolutism in German States rather than the desire to work out a new series of theological formulas. The foundation stone of reforming doctrine is the Augsburg Confession, yet the spirit in which this document was composed can be determined by the words of its author. Melanchthon, in reference to the whole controversy with Roman Catholics, explained his position by saying, "The question is concerning certain abuses." Luther finally became

wearied of the stress of theological discussion and felt inclined to allow it only a subordinate place. "Abraham," he said, "had faith; therefore Abraham was a good Christian."

German Roman Catholics could not understand why the religious views of Lutherans should be regarded as barriers to the making of an agreement by which the division of the Church might have been avoided. The Bishop of Augsburg was in favor of making concessions. "We are agreed," another Roman Catholic prelate declared, after seeing the Augsburg Confession, "on all the articles of the faith." All attempts to discover a field of concession were frustrated by the difficulty arising over the property which had been confiscated in the states and cities where Lutheranism had spread. Nothing could be done to lessen the bitterness of the Roman Catholic partisans who asked for all or nothing. Charles V, Spanish as he was, and irreconcilable where he saw the rights of the imperial power attacked, changed his mind in regard to Luther's supporters; at first he was in favor of the most drastic methods of repression; then, when he discovered that they denied no article of the faith and

accepted whole-heartedly the Apostles' Creed, he inclined to milder measures. Cardinal Loaysa, the Archbishop of Seville, was instrumental in inducing the Emperor to adopt a more amenable temper. He begged the Emperor to come to terms with the Protestants and leave them to their religion, provided they were faithful to him. Clement VII himself had no love for violence as a method of settling this religious dispute; being an Italian, diplomacy appealed to him as the better way, and he suggested that the Emperor would do well to appear in Germany without an army.

The consciousness of a final religious difference, incapable of obliteration, which marks the subsequent religious history of Western Europe, had certainly not yet predominated in the mind of Luther himself when he wrote the following words describing his attitude towards Latin Christianity: "We admit," he said, in criticising the Anabaptists, "that under the papacy there is very much of the good that is in Christianity. Nay, more, that all the good of Christianity is there, and also that the papacy was the source whence we derived it. In fact, we admit that the papal system has the true

Scriptures, true baptism, the true sacrament of the altar, the true keys of the forgiveness of sins, the true office of preaching, the true method of oral instruction, consisting of the Lord's Prayer, the ten commandments, and the articles of the Creed. I go further, and say that under the papal system there is a true Christianity; nay, more, the true kernel of Christianity."

Passages equally eirenic in tone could be quoted from other reforming leaders, including Calvin. But as time went on, though in no generation were there wanting men appalled at the idea of a permanently divided Christianity, the separated church organizations, strong in their confidence in their policy and principles, built up a system of vested self-interest. Even the best they produced was infected with the self-interest purpose which aims to drive all competitors from the field. Conformity at any cost became the watchword of success, the test of loyalty.

A new stage in the era of religion on the Continent began with the celebrated Edict of Nantes, by which Henry IV, after overthrowing the influence of Spain in France, granted liberty to his Protestant subjects. All offices were opened to them; mixed tribunals were

established to protect their interests. Far clearer than any contemporary ruler, Henry understood how to hold the balance evenly, for, in return for the concessions made to them, the Huguenots were obliged to allow Roman Catholic services in two hundred and fifty towns where the Protestants were in a majority. The basis of this treaty was purely opportunistic; no special right of freedom of conscience was acknowledged. Only two parties, Roman Catholics and Calvinistic Protestants, were permitted to share in these privileges. Persecution was restricted, but not abrogated. The State was supreme; what it could give it could also take away without formally violating any principle or right. Uniformity of religion remained the national ideal; but for the time being it had to be subordinated, because the experience of eight civil wars had taught Frenchmen that religious differences could not be settled by bloodshed. It was not a case of killing by kindness, yet the opportunity was given to the monarchy to gain in absolute power, and so it became possible by administrative means under Louis XIV to achieve results previously denied to cruder methods of repression.

On neither side, in France, was there anything resembling the Independent point of view, by which freedom from State control was championed as alone in harmony with the Gospel. The author of the tract, "What the Independents Would Have," writes that he thinks it a sin either to follow an erring conscience or to go against it; but to oppose it the greater sin, for he that will do the least sin against conscience is prepared in disposition to do the greatest. In regard to an established Church the Independents were equally emphatic at a time when England allowed only one norm of organized religion and when France permitted the existence of only two types. In a petition of 1616 the Independents declare: "We deny also a national, a provincial and diocesan Church under the Gospel to be a true, visible, political Church"; and more plainly Robinson writes: "It is the Church of England, or State Ecclesiastical, which we account Babylon, and from which we withdraw in spiritual communion." This attitude, with its encouragement of a divisive sectarianism, is a menace to Christian efficiency, but it did positive good in helping men to think out the problems which tended

to procure the definite adoption of religious liberty.

The tenets of liberalism, as long as they were associated with a sectarian bias, could show no expansive power. Anglicans and Presbyterians were naturally forced to oppose them, as they were the products of a religious organization antagonistic to both of them. They could not become the common property of mankind until they lost their theological associations. This is exactly what happened in England during the period of Stuart Restoration. Political parties, no longer churches, were the centres of agitation, in which, however, religious questions had a considerable if not a preponderant share.

The gift of religious liberty comes from an inconspicuous origin through the Independents, who, on the Continent, came into contact with the residuum of the Anabaptist movement, so cordially detested by Roman Catholics and Reformers alike. The English-speaking Independents had no doctrinal originality; their special contribution was in respect of Church government. They were organized as democracies; each church was autonomous, like the Greek city State. The

special object of detestation was a State establishment of religion, with its hard and fast relation—episcopate or presbytery. As Milton declared, Presbyter was but Prelate writ large.

Popular control was the basis of church government. Robinson, one of the founders of Independency, declared: "We are not over one another, but one with another." Liberty and equality were applied as well as professed. No weight was attached to past precedents; the dead could not control the living. The Scriptures must not be interpreted according to the letter, and religion should not be made a matter of coercion. Persecution was regarded as a monstrous crime, nothing less than spiritual murder. No reverence was felt for the Reformers, and the age of the Reformation was regarded as an age of darkness. Liberty of conscience was claimed as the birthright of man; therefore, the Independents refused to be called champions of one particular cause. All sects alike were to be free, religious liberty was to be extended as well to Jews, Turks, and Roman Catholics.

As advocates of tolerance the Independents did not stand alone; they were supported by

the Baptists and by the Quakers, under the leadership of Penn. They kept up an aggressive propaganda of the principles of liberalism in spite of the small number of their adherents. In London, in 1641, it is said the Independent congregation numbered no more than sixty or seventy members. But they grew rapidly during the time of the Civil War; as Presbyterians failed to secure the allegiance of England after the downfall of Anglicanism, the Independents and their influence increased notably.

Strange it is that it was left to these remnants of the Anabaptist enthusiasts, who had threatened to turn the existing social order into chaos, to develop a régime of liberty in which a man's religious belief should not affect his rights of citizenship. The debt that is owed to the Anabaptists is well described in the following passage written by the Roman Catholic scholar, Lord Acton: "The idea that religious liberty is the generating principle of civil and that civil liberty is the necessary condition of religious, was a discovery reserved for the seventeenth century. Many years before the names of Milton and Taylor, of Baxter and Locke were made illustrious by their partial condemnation of

intolerance there were men among the Independent congregations who grasped with vigor and sincerity the principle that it is only by abridging the authority of the State that the liberty of the Church can be assured. That great political idea of sanctifying freedom and consecrating it to God, teaching men to treasure the liberties of others as their own, and to defend them for the love of justice and charity, more than as a claim of right, has been the soul of what is great and good in the progress of the last two hundred years. The cause of religion, even under the unregenerate influence of worldly passion, had as much to do as any clear notions of policy in making this country the foremost of the free."

There is no opportunity to trace the individual writers, most of them obscure, who, on the continent of Europe, had a vision of the new State under which the inner personal life of the individual would be held to be inviolate. The critical moment was the downfall of the Stuart rule in Church and State, the result of the struggle between monarchy and parliamentary government in the middle of the seventeenth century. With this crisis there is brought to an end the mediæval idea

of civilization. A coercive Church and State civilization gives place, as time goes on, to an individualistic civilization, free from authoritative Church direction. Those who have been quaintly called the stepchildren of the Reformation enter into their inheritance. The religious life of England received a lasting impress from a combination of religious forces made up of Baptist Free Churchism, democratic and communistic, Spiritualistic non-Churchism and Pietistic Calvinism. This novel religious *entente cordiale* could have accomplished nothing had not its propaganda been supported by the weight of Oliver Cromwell's authority. Cromwell, it must be remembered, was an astute politician, as well as a skilled master of military strategy; he was not a Humanist and his language was not the speech of modern culture. As he used the phraseology of Puritanism he is often mistakenly ranked as a Puritan. Cromwell was, to begin with, a nationalist; he had no intention of establishing a theocracy in England of the type created in Scotland by Presbyterianism. He used religious convictions where they did not conflict with the interests of the State, but he was careful not to allow the government which he directed to be made

the slave of a religious theocracy, whose language he used to convey his meaning to the party which supported him.

With the pettiness of Puritanism he had little sympathy; he often, we know, interfered to protect men of royalist sympathies from the harsh treatment of his subordinates. In his scheme for a National Church, provision was made for including Presbyterians, Independents and Baptists. The constitution of the Protectorate promised liberty of worship to "all such as do profess faith in God by Jesus Christ." Unfortunately an exception was made of Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism.

Many of the ejected Anglican clergy, who gathered small congregations in private houses, were not molested, and even after the royalist insurrection of 1655, any man whose "godliness and good affection to the present government were capable of proof was ordered to be treated with tenderness." As a matter of fact, during the period of the Protectorate, a congregation of Anglican Royalists met in London, and the government did not apply the penal laws passed against Anglican services and ceremonies. Roman Catholics fared worse. In June, 1654, a

Roman priest was executed in London on no other grounds than that he was a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. It was said that Cromwell wished to pardon him, but was prevented by the opposition of his Council.

It must be said, too, that Cromwell, even in his devotion to political opportunism, contemplated moving further in the direction of religious liberty. Writing in 1656 to Cardinal Mazarin, who urged him to grant toleration to Roman Catholics, the Protector declares: "I cannot, as to a public declaration of my sense on that point; although I believe that under my government your Eminence on behalf of the Catholics has less cause for complaint than under the Parliament. For I have of some, and those very many, had compassion, making a difference. I have plucked many out of the fire, the raging fire of persecution, which did tyrannize over their consciences and encroach by arbitrariness of power over their estates. And herein it is my purpose, as soon as I can remove impediments and some weights that press me down, to make a further progress and discharge my promise to your Eminence."

Cromwell conceded unofficial toleration to Jews, and did much to secure lenient treat-

ment for the Quakers. It was no easy task to achieve the measure of toleration already attained. Cromwell's own advisers disagreed with his liberalism. He had great difficulty on one occasion in preserving a Unitarian from capital punishment. His own ideal of a National Church appears to have been a confederation of Christian bodies co-operating with the State to secure a national Christian polity. He preferred diversity to uniformity. "All that believe," he once said, "have the real unity, which is more glorious because inward and spiritual." But he realized that only a few could sympathize with him. "Is there not," he said in 1655, "a strange itch upon the spirits of men? Nothing will satisfy them until they can press their finger upon their brethren's conscience to pinch them there." He regarded himself as the bulwark against the persecuting spirit. "If the whole power was in the Presbyterians they would force all men their way, and the Fifth Monarchy men would do the same, and so the Rebaptized persons; and his work was to keep several judgments in peace because, like men falling out in the streets, they would run their heads one against another;

he was a constable to part them and keep them in peace."

Cromwell's chaplain, John Owen, acted as his Minister of Public Worship. As an Independent, Owen showed a wise toleration. To him was handed over the work of supervising the administration of the University of Oxford, where Royalist feeling was strong. Even Clarendon, who had no love for Puritanism, allowed that under his rule the university reaped a "harvest of extraordinarily good, sound knowledge in all parts of learning." He was tender to ancient ceremonies and institutions, as Evelyn shows when he speaks of Oxford chapels being permitted to retain "their ancient garb, notwithstanding the scrupulositie of the times." Non-interference on the part of the government was a principle that appealed only to the few, but among this small group were men such as John Milton and Henry Vane.

Writing to Cromwell, Milton argued: "If you leave the Church to the Church and discreetly rid yourself and the magistracy of that burden, actually half of the whole, and at the same time incompatible with the rest, not allowing two powers of utterly diverse nature, the civil and ecclesiastical, to commit

fornication together, and by their promiscuous and delusive helps apparently to strengthen, but in reality to weaken, and finally subvert each other; if also you take away all persecuting power from the Church, for persecuting power will never be absent so long as money, the poison of the Church, the strangler of the truth, shall be extorted by force from the unwilling as a pay for preaching the Gospel, then you will have cast out of the Church those money changers that truckle not with doves but with the Dove itself, the Holy Ghost." More tersely, with epigrammatic vigor, Vane propounded the same principle, "the province of the magistrate is this world and man's body; not his conscience or the concerns of eternity."

In summing up the case for the religious policy of the Commonwealth, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, no special pleader, and perhaps the best exponent in modern English historical literature of the conscientious expert in research, says: "With the exception of the condemnation of the use of the Common Prayer Book, the scheme was in the highest sense good and generous.

Holland, after winning its independence from Spain, became, through force of circum-

stances, the home of religious refugees, not from any direct allegiance to the cause of toleration, but simply by reason of dissensions among the Protestant bodies themselves, and not the least because its trade supremacy brought to its cities representatives of different faiths. A strong party arose questioning the tenets of Calvinism. Among them were men who, like Grotius, carried on the traditions of the earlier Humanism, of which Erasmus had been the leader. Indignant voices of protest were raised against the infliction of capital punishment for heresy, and Calvin's burning of the Socinian Servetus is specifically condemned as a horrible precedent.

It was under a régime of equity, not of law, that religious toleration came to be practised in Holland. Spinoza lauded Amsterdam for her generous treatment of religious refugees; somewhat later Noodt, a famous jurisconsult attached to the University of Leyden, made a definite plan for full liberty of conscience, basing it on the law of nature. "What prevented," he asked, "the omnipotent God from including the whole of the human race in an identical religious formula, inspiring all with an exactly equal idea of

religion? Just as the idea of arithmetic and numeration is one and the same among all peoples, so that Belgians, Britons, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, French, Africans, Indians, Scythians, Americans, counting on their fingers, will say two and three make five, and neither more nor less." As to the relation of the State towards religion, he urged it must limit itself to prevent the formation under religious motives of associations hostile to the State and contrary to public order and good conduct.

In Holland, Roman Catholics were not by law exempted from the penal legislation which had been passed during the period when adherence to the Roman Communion was synonymous with loyalty to Spain. But these measures were relaxed as the spirit of toleration became more generally appreciated. From time to time there was a return to severity, especially because of the sympathy felt in Holland due to the bad treatment to which Protestants were subjected in Roman Catholic jurisdictions. When Louis XIV abrogated the Edict of Nantes there was a recrudescence of this anti-Roman Catholic sentiment. Sometimes Dutch Roman Catholics interceded with their co-religionists in

Belgium to induce them to stop the persecutions against the Protestant minority in that country.

A definite and comprehensive legal toleration of all Christians is found first of all in the famous Act of the Colony of Maryland, passed on April 21, 1649. This act states: "And since the coercion of conscience in the matter of religions has often produced harmful consequences in those communities in which it was exercised, for the more tranquil and pacific government in this province and for the better preservation of mutual love and unity among its inhabitants . . . nobody in this province, who professes faith in Jesus Christ, shall be disturbed, molested or persecuted in any way for reasons respecting their religion or the free exercise thereof." By the same act those who blasphemed the name of God or attacked the Holy Trinity or one of the Three Persons comprising it, were to be punished capitally. There is no evidence to show that this penalty was ever applied.

There were personal, not official, reasons for this exceptional type of ecclesiastical modernism. Sir George Calvert, himself a convert to the Roman Catholic faith from

Anglicanism, desiring to create in America a refuge for his co-religionists, applied for a charter for the territory bordering on Virginia that had been conceded to him. It was stated in this charter that the rights conferred upon the proprietors should never be exercised in such a way as to prejudice the holy true religion of God, the Christian religion. The Calvert brothers, the sons of Sir George Calvert, interpreted the clause in the most liberal sense by inviting as colonists to Maryland the Puritans, who were oppressed by the Episcopalians of Virginia, and the Episcopalians who were suffering persecution by the Puritans of New England. Liberal legislation was passed by which matrimonial and testamentary cases, still according to English law in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities, were turned over to the civil authority. Measures in restraint of mortmain, to prevent the possession of large landed estates by the Jesuits, were also enacted.

Taken with the act already mentioned, Maryland legislation presents a unique case of toleration. The policy adopted by the Calverts was consistently followed and no arguments can deprive them of the credit

of being pioneers in the field of religious liberty. They met with opposition both from the Puritans and the Anglicans, and finally the era of toleration came to an end with the establishment of the Anglican Church in Maryland as the privileged religious organization.

It was a long time before, on Roman Catholic territory, the precedent established in Maryland found imitators. The Emperor Joseph II, himself a representative of enlightenment and a general opponent of clerical dominance, issued an edict under which, in his Austrian dominions, although the Roman Church was to be still the dominant cult, the Lutheran, Reformed, and Uniat Greek communions were allowed the power of the private exercise of their religion. They were permitted to have schools, to administer their own religious affairs, and to educate their children in their own religion. They were also insured the full enjoyment of all civil rights and full equality with Roman Catholics in regard to academic degrees and public offices.

In harmony with this enlightened legislation a number of works appeared from Roman Catholic writers in Austria urging the

principles of toleration. Among them, perhaps the most notable is that of Watternoth, who declares: "The Protestant Reformation has been of wonderful assistance in purifying customs and doctrines. Luther was right in many points, and if this had been recognized a schism would have been avoided. We owe it to the Protestants that we are able to understand the genuine truths of the Gospel in our own language, so that they become accessible to all. Their learned men have despoiled the history of the Church and religion of all the monkish fancies and excrescences which had been added to it; they laid the foundation of a sane philosophy based upon experience and religion; they are far in advance of us in all the branches of literature; their schools have supplied our universities with the best teachers and our institutions with worthy officials. We, it is true, have had many extremely able men; but they have been prevented from fully exercising their faculties by Catholic oppression, for which reason we are now far from being able to offer a counterpoise to Protestantism in Germany. Accordingly, it is not only our duty, but the supreme interest of the country to admit them as citizens."

These are words expressing the feelings of a liberal-minded Roman Catholic layman, but various Austrian ecclesiastics were equally eulogistic in praising the policy of their sovereign. The Bishop of Königgratz, often spoken of as the Austrian Fenélon, in a pastoral letter to the clergy of his diocese, praised the Emperor's edict as a document aiming to unite in Christian love all those whom differences of religion and the compulsion of the laws had kept apart and to gain for the country innumerable useful citizens, so assuring the progress of the State. It is the duty of everybody, he said, to obey this edict. "There may be some, however, who feel they are doing a good work in preaching bitterness against the disbelievers or acting in a similar manner. That is not the spirit of the Gospel. We should tolerate all those whom the Master tolerates; and we should go out to meet the members of any other religion and greet them with words of love."

His recommendations to his clergy are first to abstain from polemics and to attend only to the explanation of the highest truths of the Gospel, and those Christian principles which are as free as possible from superflu-

ous and superstitious additions; secondly, not to deprive anybody of any particular book or reprove him from possessing it, because liberty of conscience and worship implies also liberty to procure whatever we deem to be of comfort to the soul or necessary to the divine services; thirdly, not to disturb Protestants in their religious practices; fourthly, not to visit sick Protestants unless invited, since whoever possesses religious liberty in general must also be free to die tranquilly in his own religion; fifthly, in baptizing Protestant children, until the Protestants have ministers of their own for that purpose, to abstain from all the formulas contrary to their belief, and in the burial of the dead to avoid all purely Catholic usages; sixthly, to grant to the Protestants burial amongst other believers.

A new stage in religious liberty begins when the delegates to the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia inserted the article in the Federal Constitution which reads: "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." There was a good deal of opposition to its adoption, for many feared that under this article power might

pass into the hands of the Roman Catholics, Jews or the infidels. A short time passed and one finds, as the first Amendment to the Constitution, the declaration, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Separation with the guarantee of religious liberty is the corner-stone of American theory and practice in dealing with religious organizations.

In the commonwealths where the union between Church and State prevailed, no change was made by the Constitution, but such changes were effected by the various local bodies in course of time. This system prevailed in Massachusetts long after the acceptance of the Constitution, though Virginia, as early as 1785, had passed legislation by which the Episcopal Church had been disestablished. It is significant of the strong feeling caused by this step, that Washington was in favor of maintaining the privileged position of the Anglican Church in his own state.

The victory of the voluntary movement in America was evidently due to the divergent practice of the different commonwealths which accepted the Federal Constitution. It

was impossible to find any other common ground, except in separatism; in other words, no religious body was so strong that it could command the allegiance of the citizens who made up the population of the newly founded federal republic. The principle followed has been not only to free the State from all ecclesiastical concerns, but also to allow each religious communion to organize itself according to its own tenets. No model of religious incorporation is enforced by the Federal Government.

So strongly applied is the axiom of non-interference that under American law the Roman Catholic Church has, as continental observers have pointed out, far more effective power in the United States, where it is in a minority, than in Italy, where it has, nominally at least, under its allegiance almost the entire population of the country. The law of the State of New York of 1895, which has been used as a model elsewhere, gives no recognition to Roman Catholics as an incorporated religious society unless the consent of the bishop is obtained. When the incorporated religious society has been constituted it cannot elect its trustees, because the law recognizes as trustees the hierarchy of the Church

and the corporation in its activities is made legally dependent on the will of the ecclesiastical officers of the Church.

The result, as described by Prof. Ruffini, who holds the chair of Canon Law at the University of Turin, is that the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Roman Church in the United States "is recognized and protected in such a manner as rigidly to exclude any democratic or representative aspirations of the lay element, and hence in a manner which has no parallel in the European States, unless one goes back to the Middle Ages. The consequence is that in the alleged régime of full religious liberty and of common law, the laity, in the administration of its societies, has a power infinitely inferior to that which, for example, the Prussian laws of 1875 assign to it in parochial administration, and even to that which is attributed to laymen in Italy in the so-called parochial vestries." It is, in other words, easy enough to imagine, under the American system of non-interference, in the case of a revival of ancient Egyptian religion, that the property belonging to such an organization might be vested in a sacred cat or crocodile, provided the members of the organization so constituted

agreed that the animal so designated was the accredited object of their worship. How far this liberty extends may be seen in the attitude of the American government towards Mormonism; the Mormons are left to decide for themselves the degree of absolutism they wish to accept; all the property they own can, without fear of State interference, be vested in the President of the Mormon Church; the State will protect his claims as the holder of it and nothing would be done to interfere with his control as head of the organization.

CHAPTER XIII

Moralizing the State.

The winning of religious liberty meant the elevation of the Church to a voluntary organization. It meant also the emancipation of the State from the necessity of intruding upon the sphere of the individual conscience, but these conventional phrases hardly do justice to the significance of the victory achieved after so long and wearing a struggle. Forces have been liberated which have tended to a more intense moralizing of social life. Church activities have become enlarged to a degree unknown under the régime of State establishment. While reactionaries were insisting that the State, after adopting an attitude of legal indifference to Church organization, would lose the sense of moral obligation such prophecies have been negatived constantly with such emphasis that no one can mistake the lesson enforced by the demo-

cratic principle of a free Church within a free State.

Those communities where the Church is freed from rigid methods of State control, where the State treats all religious organizations with an even-handed justice, are the centres of the progressive efforts to promote national well-being on the most extensive scale. Social legislation, benevolent associations, co-operative movements, societies with altruistic aims, campaigns for wide ethical reforms, all flourish on the ground where it was said, not long ago, the religious consciousness would be sterilized because it lacked the support of official State favor. The argument is reinforced when one looks at the negative side. Wherever the antiquated policy of State control prevails to-day, or where its cessation of control has just ceased after animated controversy—to be more specific, let us take France and Portugal—it can hardly be denied that there is a less intense moral virility and purpose both in governmental ideals and in the religious organization which devotes itself to partisan political squabbles, in the aim to recover long cherished privileges. One must be optimistic enough to believe that this atmos-

phere of bitterness and animosity is only a temporary phenomenon.

The State is no longer in a condition of tutelage. Its Christian character is not guaranteed by phraseology, but by deeds. It was once the cause of satisfaction to the national kingdoms of Western Europe that their reigning monarchs could add to their titles such designations as most Christian or Catholic Majesties, or the phrase Defender of the Faith. Modern democracies need no such trade-marks; they are content to stand by their record in philanthropy, by their untiring effort to prepare their citizens to become a community guided by the axioms of Christian brotherhood. Is it possible to believe that in this conscious movement towards a higher goal, inspired by ever clearer ethical motives, Christian organization has no part simply because to-day the legal relations of Church and State are no longer what they were two hundred years ago? These legal relations, be it remembered, are only remotely connected with the historic phases of the existence of the Church—they were imposed upon it from without by perfectly ascertainable causes, political and economic. They had really little to do with the primary

and immediate significance of the message of Christ interpreted by the accredited teachers of the Catholic Church. The best that can be said about them is that they were experimental and therefore excusable, but not only is there no obligation to continue these past experiments, but rather a duty imposed upon Christians to-day to see that they are abandoned as either noxious or needless.

Such convictions are not the growth of a visionary radicalism; the test is realistic and no one need fear to apply it. It is fair and reasonable to determine the respective values of the two systems by an appeal to the ethical test. Uniformity in religion was the aim of all governments after the successful nationalistic revolts of the sixteenth century. An enormous attention was given to the construction of correct formulas of faith. The Thirty-nine Articles, the Westminster Confession, not to speak of less known confessional charters, all bear witness to the importance attached by the State to the idea that its members should profess an identical religious belief of acknowledged and authenticated soundness. This general desire to impose clear-cut, accurately defined doctrinal

statements, by force if necessary, was not thought to be incompatible with the standards of morality. Such a policy can only be extenuated on the ground that society had not yet put off childish things and was, therefore, still barbarous and crude. It is almost impossible to avoid asking why governments which tolerated crudeness, which were forgetful of plain ethical distinctions, should be at the same time so keenly appreciative of spiritual values that they could be trusted to draw up statements of the Christian faith that are to be treated as permanently valid for all succeeding generations.

The great age of reforms dealing with slavery, prison administration, poor relief, bettering the condition of the workers, producing measures leading to more hygienic surroundings, inventing methods of combating disease or protecting the victims of disease from its most trying consequences—all of these typical movements of modern times coincide with a period when the State no longer takes upon itself the task of drawing up doctrinal definitions and imposing such definitions on its citizens. An English writer has recently well characterized the transformation that has taken

place under democratic government, "The Light of Christ, the Social Christ," is seen illumining political and economic development. All things are being referred consciously or unconsciously to Him. He animates and penetrates social aspirations and international relations; we seem to hear Him declaring that the kingdoms of commerce and industry are His and must yield Him allegiance and homage. No doubt the days when the officers of the Church more or less directly controlled government, education, art and philanthropy are gone, never to return. But so far from regarding this as a weakening of the Church's influence, we may see in it a splendid testimony to the efficient work of the Church in the past, and an encouragement to her to lead mankind to still higher issues in the future. . . . She is correcting that excessive other-worldliness with which secularists have with only too much justice charged her. She has learned to regard every institution of human society as part of the Divine Order, which is being revealed, and sees that the progress of true civilization is part of the growth of the kingdom of Christ. In a word, she is seeking to justify her claim to be the moral and spiritual

teacher of the race by proclaiming unhesitatingly that "the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof."

This clearer and more generous interpretation of the place of religion in the modern State has been accompanied by an equally radical conversion of the State itself to a recognition of its functions towards citizenship in general. It is no longer held that the State is a necessary evil, the result of man's sinful condition, or that a government can be operated for the benefit of certain privileged classes, whose services to the community are to be rewarded at an exorbitant rate of compensation. The State has ceased to be considered as an indifferent onlooker who maintains fair play while the individuals in the ring, under the blessed privileges of free competition, fight out their squabbles. It is no longer held that a prearranged harmony of interests makes it certain that might shall always be right.

There is an evident consensus of opinion to-day that the State has a practically indeterminate authority over its citizens because its essential purpose is the promotion of well-being, both corporate and individual. In this conception of well-being moral advancement

is one of the paramount elements. The State has to treat its citizens on the assumption that they are capable of progress towards a better conditioned life, that they can apply to themselves the guidance of a higher and more consistent standard of ethics. It must not be supposed that modern legislators are aware of the implications of the laws that are passed. This study must be left to the theorist, and if logical consistency were the aim some of the spontaneous charm and unexpectedness that accompanies all reforming movements would inevitably be lost. People who give their time ungrudgingly to one cause as the sole purpose of their life would take little interest in it if they were told that the cause they had at heart was virtually identical with another one to which they had never devoted any attention. This intensity can only be maintained if some exclusive field is selected. Party divisions in politics, societies with philanthropic programmes can only be productive of good on a large scale on condition that they restrict themselves to well-defined ends.

No generalizations can be laid down as to the limits of the State's own activity; it all depends on what may be called the morali-

zation of the State itself. It is impossible to decide off-hand how large a sphere should be allowed to the State in matters of morality, education and economic organization. Actual experience is the one guide, but even this is not decisive, because the State itself advances in knowledge and in moral sensitiveness. In any case the day of pure self-help has passed; we have been almost brought to the point where, when a question of State interference is under review, the onus of proof is thought to rest upon those who still plead for the rights and benefits of individualism. Though there is still a large debatable territory on some questions, even the most radical individualists are not willing to maintain their principles.

Herbert Spencer asked that the post-office should be handed over to private management, because, as a general rule, government departments are worse organized than private firms. Such objections as these are commonly treated as a type of criticism which is of value only so far as it stimulates the State to produce a more efficient kind of administration. Practically no one thinks that the post-office should be placed in private hands; the demand is to-day that the

State shall undertake improvements and reforms by which its own activities shall be directed by accredited business methods. It is always assumed that the pressure of public opinion will be strong enough to produce a better kind of government—no one contemplates the possibility that the sphere of governmental action is to be reduced.

Where the public good is in question, it is taken for granted that the State may interfere with the individual to any extent. This optimistic outlook is based on the expectation that the State can exhibit collectively the ethical standards that obtain among its most enlightened citizens. The belief that government can fulfil, with a certain measure of success, all the manifold obligations imposed upon it, depends ultimately on the assurance of the perfectibility of human nature. There is a widespread conviction that collective effort must move by its very nature towards a higher goal. What, after all, is this deep-rooted instinct but another form of religious faith? Each individual is thought of as having undeveloped capacities. Under changed conditions freer play will be given to them and, therefore, we look to the State, which represents the will of the collective whole, so

to modify existing conditions that a more wholesome, a more generous sphere of opportunity is offered for self-development.

If personality in itself were a poor, fragile and naturally depraved element, there is no reason why so much effort should be concentrated on the effort to allow it freer play, unhampered by harsh and burdensome economic trammels. Alleviation of the kind of existence that has to be endured in the slum districts of great cities would be purposeless unless one first conceded the primary value of the citizen as an individual. And again, no one would appeal for governmental action to improve these conditions unless the ethical demands of the individual can be satisfactorily met by the organic power of the State. As a distinguished contemporary authority has said, "The State exists to promote the good life of her citizens; nothing that affects human life can she afford to treat as altogether alien to her." If any one takes the trouble to examine the presuppositions that lie behind this widespread conviction, no other ground can be found for it but the Christian principle that man is the expression under the limits of time and space of the divine. No other form of religion but the

Christian can supply the postulates which anticipate the rising curve of human progress. Only in fragments, it may be said, is the vision of the future upward trend of humanity as yet revealed; but on the other hand, some of these fragments have already become so far the common possession of the civilized world that they are being put to use and are the foundation stones of modern life.

Nowhere is this assurance of common possession more definitely seen than in the programme which to-day makes all the world kin, to give every citizen the advantages of an education. Desultory and accidental methods of acquiring knowledge are superseded, the individual cannot know what things he ought to learn; the course of his studies therefore is imposed by the collective will of the State. In other ages the prize of knowledge was left to the few; it could only be acquired by certain classes enjoying economic freedom. Outside these it could be obtained only at the cost of self-sacrifice and hardship.

To-day the State has done more than make education accessible; at great financial cost it has taken measures to ensure that all shall receive, whether they like it or not, a degree

of training that in other centuries was reserved for the higher classes alone. It makes no difference whether the form of government be monarchical or republican, every civilized State in Christendom is upholding, with a firm belief in the social utility of education, a democratic public school system. The response to this movement is constantly widening and deepening in proportion to the increasing sense of the value of citizenship and the obligations growing out of it. The masses of the people are not intent alone on advancing their material condition; they wish to raise themselves intellectually, to reach a higher level of knowledge, to have their share also in the wonderful achievements of scientific investigations. On all sides, among the uneducated as well as among the educated, it is assumed that knowledge can be acquired and that its acquisition means progress and betterment all round.

Education has become the religion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and in this respect the modern world has revived in another field the intensity of the "ages of faith." On the point of unanimous acceptation of educational doctrines and axioms, a

degree of uniformity is attained to-day which was never before reached in the sphere of religious doctrines. There is an unquestioning sublime confidence in a future secular life, in which every member of society will be saved by knowledge. The value of personality, as such, is the foundation dogma on which the modern educational creed is built up and harmonized. The State accepts the principle of the infinite perfectibility of human nature, and because of this belief it demands from all its members, by taxation, a large share of the social national income to be spent for the coming generations. There is a high ethical idealism in this firm purpose to make life better and nobler for all. Education means for the masses independence, economic and general; it means just as much an enrichment and development of life through factors that have no immediate connection with either politics or economics. Who can estimate the change that will come over society through the cultivation of artistic taste, the capacity to appreciate great paintings, music and architecture? Small communities in the ancient world by natural endowment, by an intensive type of training, reached a degree of culture which is still the

envy of mankind. This high level only belonged to certain groups, or to small classes within these groups. To-day educational advance, it is hoped, can be attained on a larger scale. Its progress must be carefully guarded to prevent the repetition of past failures and losses.

There must be no repetition of the decay of civilization which marked the break-up of ancient society. The danger is not external; there is small likelihood of the frontiers of modern countries being overrun by armies composed of an inferior race. The peril is rather within, due to the vast increase of population, the result of industrialism, which may, if not duly watched, bring into existence a type of citizenship only nominally civilized. The masses of the workers may be among us, but in a real sense not of us, unless they are actually as well as nominally the heirs of all that man has fought for and won in many centuries of conflict.

The intensity of the educational movement is thoroughly justified. Its ideals do represent a measure of social salvation and the universal faith so heartily given to the promised regeneration betokens an optimism that makes light of obstacles and criticism. Even

where all kinds of educational experiments are being made, as in America with its free field for trying them out, no one would contend that there is any excuse for abandoning experimentation and accepting the alternative of class education and the common man's illiteracy. Economic independence with an opportunity for every adult to develop personality is the aim. There is no short cut to this goal. No artificial nostrums will expedite progress.

While there is the general desire to escape the mechanism of the factory and the office, it is a poor substitute to accept the mechanism of ready made educational programmes where all the items are standardized. Education without moral discipline can only be destructive of social order. Goethe's profound saying should not be forgotten: "Everything that sets free our intelligence without giving us self-control is fatal." Institutions for spreading learning and knowledge cannot by themselves fulfil the task assigned to them. The pursuit of knowledge is a moral act in itself, it may be said. This is true, but it is a fact which has to be taught the learned just as any other fact. Education to accomplish its true work on

character and life must be self-conscious of its worth. Just as a national army represents patriotism, devotion to one's country, as the actual medium in which the individual can make life worth living and secure a value for his existence as an individual unit of society, so the educational forces and organizations of a country must recognize that their efforts represent the social impulse of an exalted theory of man's nature.

One axiomatic truth invigorates and explains the whole driving power of education, accounts for its social sacrifices, its mass achievements. The ideal inspiring it is the universal brotherhood of mankind, itself the basis and the product of Christian teaching. Devotion to this conviction explains and justifies all educational activities. There should be no hesitation in claiming an essentially religious character for the mission assumed by the State in making knowledge accessible to all. It would never have been doubted had not sectarianism disguised the sound foundation of religion by urging with irritating insistence that partisan differences should be incorporated in the educational structure.

Education by and in itself represents civic

idealism; it attests the existence of a social conscience keenly alive to the most vital ethical interests. As such it gives a direction to individual growth on lines parallel with the primary religious sanctions. The constancy with which this work is being carried out by the collective powers of the civilized State would be by itself sufficient to identify without further analysis the differentia of Christian society and Christian government. The practice of government as seen in the history of the modern State has never accorded with the theory of individualism. All who have written from the individualistic point of view, from Rousseau to Spencer and Nietzsche, are inspired with the desire of reforming existing society or radically transforming the State by substituting for it a social organism altogether unlike any existing during the past or the present of civilized government.

Long before the present trend towards a socialized government (as distinguished from a government directed by dogmatic socialism) individualism was never logically carried out as a political principle. According to individualistic theory the government function is only to interfere to pro-

tect the property and person of the citizen. Such a limitation was never actually accepted, though in countries of Saxon speech political parties have professed to decide questions of State interference by these individualistic tenets. Only in a society of advanced capacity in morals, education and discipline could it ever be imagined that "each individual, in the long run, knows his interests best, and in the absence of arbitrary restrictions is sure to follow them." The exposition of these principles of non-interference curiously coincided with a period of intense industrialism. The growth of the laboring population, devoted to the processes of production, brought *ipso facto* into existence conditions that proved the inefficacy of individualism in the very countries where it was being urged by individualistic champions that the public welfare could only be established by a policy of non-interference on the part of the State. The State itself was convinced that it must introduce factory legislation and must pass laws to regulate the employment of women and children. Herbert Spencer, not so many years ago, was opposed to the assumption by the State of the right to enforce sanitary regulations. It

should do nothing, he said, to improve drainage or prevent the spread of contagious diseases; he even went so far as to reprobate the exercise by the State of the sole right of coining money. These questions are not now regarded as debatable. It is held generally that the State is not to confine itself to the limits prescribed by a doctrinaire individualism. Upon it are imposed various obligations termed common welfare functions. These include all social and cultural legislation.

There is no exact consensus in practice as to the point where State control should begin to interfere. Some modern governments administer the railways and telegraph, while others would altogether decline to be put in the class of unprogressive States because in matters of transportation they still adhered to private initiative. Purely utilitarian grounds are urged for both positions, and the use of the phrase "social welfare" indicates how broad is the scope of interpretation. Neither Australia nor New Zealand would be willing to be termed socialistic commonwealths, yet proposals for legislation far less radical than measures actually on the statute books of these English colonies would be

branded as Socialism pure and simple in the United States and in England.

But whether governments adopt a critical or expectant attitude in interpreting the meaning of common welfare there can be no question that they are one and all moving in the same direction. There are different rates of progress but the evidence is irresistible that the modern State is moving towards socialization and away from individualism.

It must be confessed that the obligations of the National State to its own citizens are more clearly realized than its relationship towards other similar political organisms. Here, despite much righteously inspired effort, there is a notorious failure to provide protection against an internationally organized system in which disregard of ethical distinctions is made synonymous with patriotism. Militarism is applauded as civilization's best formula for attaining peace. Diplomacy has been taught to respect the paradox that armaments promote international welfare, and millions of people have accepted the specious claims of the militarist nostrum as the one specific on which national prosperity must be maintained. The dictum of force has been offered as the gospel of peace. Bad

logic and bad ethics have been combined and have shown that on no such shoddy texture can civilization retain its integrity. The State in its Christian form cannot tolerate such an inversion of its aims. This ugly paradox of peace by force must disappear—the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde scheme of national right combined with international wrong. A State cannot in this way keep its ethical physique intact. Clear thinking by itself might have eliminated this malevolent social influence. High ethical purpose might have cast it out. Rougher and harder ways seem necessary, but the outcome is assured, for the trend of history is unmistakably towards the better way and higher level. There is nothing to warrant the belief that the Christian world will ever consent to make itself the realm of Ormuzd and Ahriman. It is not a question of even chances; the balance is too heavily weighted on the side that accepts man as the vehicle of God's purpose to bring the world into harmony with the divine nature. Nothing less than this is consistent with the religion which sums up the meaning of human personality in its doctrine of the Incarnation.

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